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FOREIGN-POLICY BELIEF SYSTEMS OF POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN ELITES

by

Oleg Kovalev

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Summer 1996

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
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
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ABSTRACT

The dissertation approaches the task of analyzing the processes of formation of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy from the cognitive perspective. It examines the spectrum of post-Soviet Russian elite foreign policy belief systems. Each belief system is considered as including two types of beliefs: images and policy preferences. The images include first, the view of the nature of the contemporary international system, its major trends and driving forces; second, the view of Russia's place in the international system, of the nature of Russia's strengths and weaknesses as an international actor. The typology of the belief systems is based on an indicator which permeates both of these sets of images--the attitude to the "West," i.e. the leading industrialized nations. The dissertation's classification includes three major belief systems: pro-Western, centrist (or realist), and anti-Western. The dissertation demonstrates that within each of these belief systems a strong correlation exists between the images of Russia and the world and policy preferences. The policy preferences are examined in two areas: first, Russia's policy toward the newly independent states (the former Soviet republics), specifically, Russia's role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the attitude to the re-integration of the post-Soviet area, and the ethnic minorities problem; second, Russia's policy

toward the West, specifically, the relations with the United States and the approach to European security.

The primary sources analyzed in the dissertation include a broad range of books, articles, and speeches by Russian politicians, scholars, and journalists.

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War put many new problems on the agenda for students of international relations and foreign policy. These problems are especially challenging for scholars whose major interest has been the foreign policy of the two Cold War era superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union. The research of at least two generations of scholars was structured and determined by the main feature of the Cold War "objective reality": political and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War situation created a new hierarchy of issues, both globally and in relations between the United States and the successor states to the USSR.

The international significance of the Soviet Union and of its heir, Russia, decreased dramatically after the Cold War. Yet given its size, population, remaining military (including nuclear) might, and its role in the United Nations, Russia certainly remains an important country. Post-Cold War Russian foreign policy is being formed, and the results of this process are far from determined. These results will ultimately depend on the outcome of the current transitional period in Russian economy and politics.

With little hope for reemergence in a near future of a 'structural stability' which

existed during the Cold War, an analyst of Russian foreign policy has to explore ever-unfolding processes on the basis of limited and sometimes contradictory information. One of the ways to approach the study of Russian foreign policy in this situation is to analyze the relevant concepts and ideas circulating among Russia's political and intellectual elites. For an analyst of Russian foreign policy, it is obvious that during the four years of existence of post-Soviet Russia its foreign policy rhetoric and behavior have been changing, as well as the composition of the circle of foreign policy decision makers. However, an observer of Russian foreign policy discussions of 1996 cannot help but notice that most of the very different, often opposite, judgements about the post-Cold War world and Russia's place in it have been heard before, as early as 1992. In different periods after the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberal pro-western, nationalist, or communist views have been visible. Their popularity and influence differed, but they have been always present in the spectrum of foreign policy views. Ideas voiced by politicians who rose to the top of Russian political arena or by newly appointed foreign policy officials are rarely completely new. In a fluid political situation like Russia's, knowledge of the spectrum of elite foreign policy beliefs can help avoid surprises and evaluate particular ideas in a context of coherent belief systems.

The goal of this dissertation is to examine the spectrum of Russian elite foreign policy belief systems and to demonstrate that each of them contains a distinctive set of images of the international system and of Russia as an international actor and a

corresponding set of basic policy preferences. The variety of elite images of Russian foreign policy is extensive. Therefore, they will be classified by distinguishing several "ideal types" based on a limited set of characteristics. The dissertation's classification includes three major belief systems: pro-Western, centrist (or realist), and anti-Western.

The dissertation includes four chapters. Chapter 1, "Belief Systems in the Study of Russian Foreign Policy," includes two parts. Part 1.1, "Belief Systems and International Relations" gives an overview of approaches to belief-system analysis and outlines the methods used in the dissertation. Part 1.2, "Foreign-Policy Belief Systems of Russian elites: the Spectrum" states the principles on which the dissertation's classification of belief systems is based and outlines the major belief systems. Chapter 2--"The Pro-Western Belief System," chapter 3--"The Centrist Belief System," and chapter 4--"The Anti-Western Belief System" have similar structures. Each contains two parts: one analyzing the images of the world and Russia and the other analyzing corresponding policy preferences. Each "images" part includes sections devoted to (1) the assessment of Soviet foreign policy; (2) the view of the nature of the contemporary international system; (3) the view of Russia's place in the international system. Each "policy preferences" part includes sections devoted to (1) Russia's policy toward the former Soviet republics, specifically, Russia's role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); (2) Russia's policy toward the West, with an emphasis on relations with the United States and on European security.

Chapter 1

BELIEF SYSTEMS IN THE STUDY OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

1.1 **Belief Systems and International Relations**

A distinctive trait of study of belief systems in international relations and foreign policy is its focus not on observable events and behavior but on phenomena and states of human mind. This trait is shared by other branches of a broader approach to the study of international relations known as the cognitive (or also as psychological) approach. The main assumption of this approach is that the way decision-makers perceive the world and other actors, influences decisions and outcomes; behavior depends on what decision-makers "think" about reality rather than on what really "is." More exactly, beliefs, perceptions, and images constitute specific "reality" within which decisions are made.

The cognitive approach has produced a very diversified body of literature whose authors share the basic assumption mentioned above but otherwise have little agreement about the most appropriate units and methods of analysis, and terminology. Terms such

as "belief," "perception," "image," "operational code," "role concept," and others often overlap or even coincide in writings of different authors. One of the first problems for a scholar of cognitive factors in foreign policy and international relations is how dependent one's research should be on theoretical achievements of psychology. On the one hand, psychology gave the initial impetus to the development of the cognitive approach and provided its basic concepts, and continues to feed the study of foreign policy and international relations with new theoretical insights. On the other hand, due to profound differences in the foci of the two disciplines, applicability of psychological literature to the study of foreign policy and of politics in general is limited. Robert Jervis listed several major faults of the psychologists' work. Among those faults, first, greater attention to emotional factors and pathological aberrations of individuals than to general cognitive factors explaining how intelligent and careful actors may draw diverging inferences from ambiguous evidence. Second, most data supporting theories are derived from laboratory experiments with settings of unclear relevance to the real world. Third, the structure of the international system is ignored: there is little comprehension of the consequences of the lack of government in the international system and little analysis of the reasons of why even rational decision-makers often think that they must be suspicious and distrustful. The result is that the literature on perceptions written by psychologists contains a great deal of "over-psychologizing," i.e. excessive

substitution of the analysis of personal disposition for political analysis.¹ Holsti has made an important comment on these issues:

Although these criticisms may overstate the difficulties, they are quite correct in suggesting that indiscriminate borrowing is no panacea. The starting point and the criterion of relevance should be the substantive concerns of the foreign policy analysts rather than those of an experimental psychologist.²

Generally, authors using the cognitive approach follow Holsti's advise because most of them are not psychologists but students of international relations and foreign policy. An international relations scholar's interest in cognitive variables emerges as soon as he or she turns to individual decision making as the primary object of investigation or, in other words, selects the level of analysis which some authors call "individual" and others "decision making."³ At this level of analysis it is impossible to ignore the way decision-makers perceive the world. However, the relevance and value of the study of cognitive factors are subject to debate among international relations

¹Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations*, Princeton, 1976, pp. 3-5; see also: Christer Johnsson, "Cognitive Approaches to International Politics," in: Christer Johnsson, ed., *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics*, London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1982, pp. 6-7; Erik Beukel, *American Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Nuclear Adversary: From Kennedy to Bush*, London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1989, p. 21-22.

²Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively," in: Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision*, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 26.

³See Jervis, op. cit, p. 15; Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 18.

scholars. First of all, many international relations theorists assign only marginal importance to the individual, or decision-making level of analysis as such. For the structural realists, for example, it is the structure of the international system that dictates major foreign policy choices. Secondly, the possibility of obtaining true knowledge about beliefs, perceptions, and images, as well as their influence on decision making is often questioned. The most commonly cited problems are the following:

- The sheer amount of information required to construct an image or a belief system from decision-makers' statements.⁴

- The "quality" of data. As Christer Johnsson notes, "no 'hard' data on the cognitive beliefs or processes of decision making exists. Nor is there agreement as to what constitutes the best available 'soft' data, or the appropriate categories into which whatever data are available can be coded."⁵ There is no easy solution to the problem of validity and "sincerity," i.e. whether or not the actors' statements really present their beliefs and perceptions, or they are intended for justification of behavior and for influence on others.

- The unit of analysis problem. Perceptions and beliefs are most precisely described at the individual level, while policy outcomes are almost always a product of group efforts. To what extent can we talk about collective perceptions and beliefs--these of a group or

⁴See Steve Smith, "Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations," in: Richard Little, Steve Smith, eds, *Belief Systems and International Relations*, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 28.

⁵Christer Johnsson, op. cit., p. 9; see also Holsti, op. cit., p. 35.

even a "state"?⁶

- Somewhat related to the above and to the level of analysis problem, is the problem of the type of influence of beliefs on foreign policy behavior. According to Holsti, it is not fruitful "to assume direct linkages between beliefs and actions in foreign policy, because the role that beliefs may play in policy making is much more subtle and less direct. Rather than acting as direct guides to action, they form one of several clusters of intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision making behavior."⁷

- The question of whether the work on belief systems, perceptions, and images is essentially descriptive of explanatory. As Smith puts it: "The question is simply one of whether in outlining an individual's belief system we are describing his or her worldview or whether we are involved in explaining his or her choices."⁸

The problems discussed above highlight some important limitations of the cognitive approach but do not invalidate its strengths. First of all, one needs to be aware of the limits of explanatory power of any single level of analysis. As Jervis noted, "it is unlikely that there is a single answer to the question of which level is most important. Rather than one level containing the variables that are most significant for all problems, the importance of each level may vary from one issue to another."⁹ Moreover,

⁶See Johnsson, op. cit., p. 7; Smith, op. cit., p. 31.

⁷Holsti, op. cit., p. 32.

⁸Smith, op. cit., p. 33.

⁹Jervis, op. cit., p. 16.

explanatory importance of certain levels of analysis or classes of variables may vary for different types of circumstances. Holsti listed the following circumstances as the ones under which detailed investigation of decision makers' belief systems proved rewarding: non-routine situations that require more than merely the application of standard operating procedures and decision rules; decisions made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from organizational and other constraints; long-range planning; ambiguous situations (thus open to varieties of interpretations) resulting from scarce, unreliable, or contradictory information; situations of information overload in which decision makers are forced to use a variety of strategies; unanticipated events in which initial reactions are likely to reflect cognitive "sets"; circumstances of various types of stresses.¹⁰

Characteristics of many of Holsti's "circumstances" are clearly applicable to the formation of contemporary Russian foreign policy. The post-Cold War situation is apparently a "non-routine" one which lowers the utility of standard operating procedures; it is a situation of "long-range planning" when future strategies' foundations are being sought which may define foreign policy courses for decades. Studying the somewhat similar situation of the formation of American Cold War policy towards the Soviet Union, Deborah Welch Larson who used a "multilevel explanation"--which took into account the international system, the American political context, and cognitive processes of individual decision makers--concluded that the "origins of containment" could not be

¹⁰Holsti, op. cit., p. 29-30.

explained without accounting for the ways key American decision makers processed information about Soviet foreign policy behavior.¹¹ There is a good reason to suggest that foreign policies of the two countries in the first post-Cold War years will be also strongly influenced by beliefs of key decision makers.

Given the current state of the cognitive approach literature, the analyst is confronted with a rich diversity of meanings of major concepts. As has been already mentioned, many authors do not precisely define terms such as "belief," "perception," or "image." I will briefly discuss these concepts, not to suggest elaborate definitions of them, but simply to impose--perhaps arbitrarily (which is justified by the state of the literature)--some terminological framework for this study. I will take into account only the foreign policy-related literature on beliefs, images, and perceptions.

Beliefs are usually thought of as judgements of more or less general character that serve as filtering devices for the incoming information.¹² Holsti describes a belief system as "a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received....[It also] has the function of the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences."¹³ It is not easy to make a clear distinction between beliefs and other cognitive factors, or, as Smith notes, between a "belief system" and the general

¹¹Larson, op. cit., pp. 331-332.

¹²See, for example, Smith, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

¹³Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," in: James Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: Free Press, 1969, p. 544.

set of beliefs and images of an individual. Any more or less stable judgement about reality can play a role of a "lens" for the new information and influence the establishment of goals.

"Image" is usually described as "representation," "view," or, to add a term preferred by the Marxists, "reflection" of reality. Burgess in his study of Norway's elite images uses the concept of "strategic image" and defines it as "organized representation of the important features of the foreign policy environment as articulated by the authoritative decision makers on foreign policy issues."¹⁴ Jervis defines a decision maker's image of another actor as "those of his beliefs about the other that affect his predictions of how the other will behave under various circumstances."¹⁵ Boulding's definition of image is very broad: "The total cognitive, affective and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself or the universe."¹⁶

The difference between "images" and "perceptions" is not obvious. The term "perception" is used in the literature in dual sense: first, as a process of acquiring information, second, as a result of that process. The second usage is more common for the international relations literature. One can often come across such concepts as "Soviet

¹⁴Philip M. Burgess, *Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway*, The Ohio University Press, 1967, p. 4.

¹⁵Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 5.

¹⁶Kenneth N. Boulding, "National Image and International System," in: James Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: Free Press, 1969, p. 423.

perceptions of the United States" or "the U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union" that essentially fit the above cited definitions of an "image."¹⁷

One of the attempts to draw a line between perceptions and images was made by R. Herrmann. He treats images as indirect indications of perceptions: images are conscious pictures presented through language, while perceptions are not observable and have to be inferred from images; behavior is the ultimate test of what the real perceptions are.¹⁸ The distinction between "images" and "perceptions" may be useful for cognitive psychology, but its utility for foreign policy studies is questionable. Foreign policy behavior which is influenced by so many variables other than the cognitive ones can hardly serve as an adequate measure of "true" perceptions--especially when we deal with foreign policies of democratic states and with policies in particular issue areas. I will assume that verbal imagery, unless specifically used for disinformation, is a more or less correct reflection of one's perceptions. Moreover, perceptions of different aspects of behavior of other actors or of the world in general may be linked together only via articulation in verbal imagery ("linguistic reality," using Herrmann's term). Sophisticated "complex perceptions" may be logically "inferred" from images, but do not exist apart from them.

¹⁷See, for example, John Lenczowski, *Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy. A Study of Ideology, Power, and Consensus*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982; Morton Schwartz, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

¹⁸Richard Herrmann, *Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985, pp. 30-35.

Therefore, in this study "images" and "perceptions" will be treated as similar concepts, differing not so much in precise definitions as in predominant usages. "Perception" is used often and "image" rarely for the description of an actor's vision of some particular action or particular aspect of foreign policy. For example, one is likely to hear about the Russian perception (not "image") of the NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs or the American perception of Russian actions in Tajikistan or Georgia. I will maintain a conditional distinction between the two concepts based on their generality: in my usage, "image" will refer to the view of a nation-state and its foreign policy, while "perception" will refer to the view of a particular aspect or particular action.

Scholars have studied beliefs, images, and perceptions of both individuals and groups of people. Group images are usually treated as ideal types embracing important common features of individuals' images. Groups sharing certain images may be of different size: from a narrow circle of key decision makers to large segments of population ("public opinion"). The group this study is focused on is the "elite," which includes: (a) individuals involved in policy making--politicians and bureaucrats; (b) intellectuals (in terminology of public opinion analysis--"opinion leaders") who publicize their views of foreign policy and of other nations and thereby influence and reflect both public opinion and the opinions of decision makers.

The importance of the elites' beliefs has been widely recognized. As Mingst notes in her study of mass images, "for political scientists, the elite-mass distinction is

of utmost importance....Since decision makers determine policy, the linkage between their images and politically salient behavior is direct."¹⁹ However, since elites are not homogeneous, there is a variety of elite belief systems in each country. Not all of them equally influence decision making. Herrmann introduced an important concept of 'prevailing view' and defined it as "generally accepted construction of reality in which foreign policy decisions are made." According to Herrmann, "this construction of reality may not be characteristic of any particular leader. Instead, it is thought of as a result of the overall decisional process that can be measured and observed in state behavior and specified verbal reports."²⁰ Foreign policy making in Russia has been characterized by instability and competition between multiple centers of power and agencies. It is too early to attempt establishing a Russian 'prevailing view' in Herrmann's sense. Instead, in this study I will analyze the spectrum of Russian elite foreign policy belief systems. This is a necessary precondition for future research on the 'prevailing view'.

The value of the study of belief systems conducted without linking them to the 'prevailing view' may be questioned for two reasons. First, such study invites a question related to the general cognitive approach problem (noted above) of relevance, in other words, is the study of belief systems useful for explaining foreign policy behavior?

¹⁹Karen A. Mingst, "National Images in International Relations: Structure, Content, and Source," *Coexistence* 21 (1984), p.176.

²⁰Herrmann, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Second, for an observer of Russian politics it is obvious that the relative influence of particular belief systems is often shifting due to the replacement of individuals from one political camp by individuals from the other and due to the evolution of views of the same individuals (e.g. Yeltsin and Kozyrev).

The first of these concerns can be dealt with by clearly defining the limits of belief systems' relevance to explaining behavior. A belief systems analyst should not derive foreign policy actions directly from beliefs, because too many other variables affect decision making (structure of the international system, domestic politics, 'bureaucratic politics', etc.). An approach that may most effectively serve the purposes of this study has been suggested by Alexander George. In his opinion, "the influence of an actor's beliefs is likely to be more weighty in determining his *policy preferences*--the options he prefers--than in determining the option he finally chooses."²¹ This approach has been used productively by Keith Shimko who studied the connection between the Reagan administration top foreign policy officials' images of the Soviet Union and their policy preferences, or 'behavioral predispositions'.²² The main advantage of this approach is its ability to take into account the complex and indirect character of the cognitive factor's effect on the state behavior. Another advantage is that it allows an

²¹Alexander L. George, "The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System," in Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., *Psychological Models in International Politics*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1979, p. 104.

²²K. Shimko, *Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1991.

analysis of the whole spectrum of elite belief systems, including those of persons who do not have access to actual decision-making at a particular moment.

To make the conceptual framework of the dissertation more clear, I suggest some terminological refinement to the approach based on policy preferences. Policy preferences, or behavioral predispositions, are not a special class of phenomena between the cognitive realm and the realm of actual behavior. Policy preferences are states of mind (cognitive phenomena), and I will consider them as a class of beliefs. Operational code literature which deals with the most abstract beliefs about politics, suggests that the core of an actor's belief system is divided into two subsets--"philosophical" and "instrumental" ones.²³ The latter subset includes behavioral predispositions, such as an approach to taking risks and utility of different means for advancing one's interests.²⁴ When we descend to a more concrete level within a belief system, such as the beliefs about foreign policy of a particular country, the "instrumental" beliefs become "policy preferences." For example, if one believes that another state is inherently hostile, the policy preference will be to prevent the increase of that state's influence in international affairs.

A foreign policy belief system includes beliefs about "what is" going on in the

²³See Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making," in: G. John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, Glenview, Ill., Boston, London: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989, pp. 487.

²⁴See, for example, George, "Cognitive Beliefs...", p. 100.

world and about "what to do." I will call the former group of beliefs "images" and the second "policy preferences." Images are the beliefs of individuals and groups about the characteristics of the international system, of other states, and of their own state. Policy preferences are the beliefs about the desired course of action of one's state toward other international actors. Images and policy preferences correlate with each other, and this study will argue that a set of images of each elite belief system has a corresponding set of policy preferences.

The second concern about the value of belief systems analysis (instability of Russian decision-makers' positions in power and of their beliefs) is alleviated by this study's focus on elite rather than individual belief systems. As noted above, elite and other group belief systems are ideal types embracing the most essential common features of individual beliefs in an issue area. While influenced by the dynamics of individual beliefs, group belief systems have their own "life" and are relatively stable. Once a coherent belief system emerges and finds numerous adherents, it acquires considerable momentum. At each period of time, there is a limited number of belief systems in each issue area. For example, in their well-known study of U.S. elite views, Holsti and Rosenau discerned three relatively stable belief systems, or ways of thinking about foreign affairs: those of "Cold War internationalists," "post-Cold War internationalists," and "semi-isolationists."²⁵ When an individual's old images and policy preferences

²⁵Ole R. Holsti, James N. Rosenau, *American Leadership in World Affairs*, Boston and London: Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp. 108-139.

change, the new ones are rarely invented. More often, they are borrowed from another, existing belief system. In fact, the existing spectrum of belief systems provides a "bank of ideas." Thus, the value of a study of a spectrum of a nation's elite images and policy preferences consists in providing a range of ideas capable of influencing decision-makers.

The task of analyzing a whole spectrum of Russian elite foreign policy belief systems necessitates the use of a very broad range of sources. The data for this study come from books, published speeches, and journal and newspaper articles. The individuals whose beliefs will be analyzed on the basis of their published statements will include government officials, politicians, scholars, and journalists, i.e. all members of the "elite" who either can influence foreign policy decision-making or shape and reflect public opinion.

1.2 Foreign-Policy Belief Systems of Russian Elites: the Spectrum

Foreign policy views of Russian elites were not absolutely uniform even in times of the old, pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union. Many analysts of Soviet foreign policy demonstrated that the seemingly monolithic Soviet elite consisted of groups whose beliefs about international relations and other countries significantly differed from each other.²⁶

²⁶See, for example, William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations*, Princeton University Press, 1969; John Lenczowski, *Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy. A Study of Ideology, Power, and Consensus*, Ithaca and London:

Gorbachev's reforms of 1985-91, first of all *glasnost*, allowed for a real debate about foreign policy to gradually emerge. Much of the contemporary spectrum of Russian images of Russia as an international actor has its origins in the discussions of the *perestroika* period. Two factors stimulated the growth of differences of views: first, relative freedom of speech introduced step by step by the Gorbachev leadership in the hope of creating popular support for reforms against the resistance of the conservative part of the communist party and state apparatus; second, Gorbachev's "new political thinking" and changes introduced by him in the "classical" Soviet foreign policy.

Despite Gorbachev's rhetoric about a return to a true Leninism, the "new thinking" challenged some basic foundations of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook, which could not be readily abandoned by the adherents of the orthodox party ideology. First of all, the ideologues of "new political thinking" proclaimed priority of "common human values" over particular class and national interests, stressing interdependence of states regardless of the character of their political systems; they refused to strictly follow Marxist-Leninist class-based approach to international relations and to interpret the latter as just another arena of class struggle. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" that had been used by Soviet leaders since Lenin as a means of explaining why the state of war was not the only possible state of relations between socialist and capitalist countries (the latter being doomed to lose the historical struggle as a result of socialist revolutions)

Cornell University Press, 1982; Morton Schapiro, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

started to be interpreted in terms of the possibility of an indefinitely long cooperative coexistence between the two types of states, with an admission of the legitimacy of capitalism as a way of life for societies whose members have made their choice in its favor. Secondly, Gorbachev's view of foreign policy of the Western countries contradicted one of the most important postulates of Lenin's theory of imperialism by admitting the possibility of non-aggressive, non-militaristic behavior of the major capitalist powers.

Traditionalists such as Yegor Ligachev (one of the key Politburo members) insisted on the validity of the class-based approach²⁷ and criticized--more and more openly--foreign policy decisions made by the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze leadership in accordance with "new political thinking." The traditionalists called for a tougher stance in arms reduction negotiations with the United States, for continued support for the "national liberation movements" in the Third World, for stronger unity among the communist parties of the world, against weakening the Warsaw Treaty Organization and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. While for Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and other reformers the image of the Soviet Union as a great power was associated mostly with non-military means of influencing the world affairs, the conservatives saw "greatness" mostly in military might (especially the ability to counterbalance American military power), control over client states, and economic and

²⁷See for example Ligachev, E.K., *Izbrannye Rechi i Stat'i*, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, Moscow, 1989, pp. 290-291.

political independence from the West.

Foreign policy discussions, generally, reflected the divisions within the political and intellectual elite on domestic issues. For the conservatives, concessions to the West and weakening of the alliance between the Soviet Union and other socialist states were thought to come from the same source as the relaxation of the discipline in society and dangerous experiments with "non-socialist" economic practices: the retreat from traditional Marxist-Leninist "principles" that were effective only in their undiluted entirety. Adherence to those principles also meant the impermissibility of a historical critique of Soviet foreign policy in that such a critique would be offensive to the cause for which the older generation of Soviet men and women worked and fought.²⁸

On the other end of the spectrum was a group of intellectuals (many of whom entered politics as members of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR elected in spring of 1989) who demanded even more radical reforms in foreign policy. As well as the conservatives, the radical reformers approached foreign policy issues from an ideological point of view: in search of total rejection of communism, they denounced foreign policy doctrines and practices of the Soviet Union as direct reflections of the totalitarian and inhumane nature of Soviet communism. In contrast were the virtues of foreign policies of Western industrialized countries that served as model societies for the reformers. The foreign policies of these countries were seen as direct consequences of

²⁸A notorious example of such reasoning was the article "I cannot give up my principles" by Nina Andreeva, published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on 13 March 1988.

democratic character of their political systems. Therefore, the right foreign policy course had to consist in rapid dismantling of the Soviet communist legacy: disbanding alliances, halting aid to former clients, reorientation toward the West, and a faster tempo of disarmament. The radicals' view of the Soviet Union as a "great power" was well reflected in Andrei Sakharov's characterization of the USSR as a "Burkina Faso with nuclear missiles"; they not only emphasized non-military dimensions of power or "greatness," as did Gorbachev, but went further, proclaiming the inevitability of the USSR's turning into a second-rank underdeveloped state unless it adopted Western economic and political models of development.

Perestroika witnessed the rise of Russian nationalism as an independent political force. It is well known that, starting with Stalin, communist leaders of the USSR often employed slightly disguised great-Russian rhetoric and symbols. Conservatives in the Communist Party often criticized the "new political thinking" for neglecting Russian national interests and the historic achievements of the Russian state. However, despite cooperation with the communist conservatives, nationalists differed from them in idealizing pre-revolutionary Russia rather than the Stalinist Soviet Union and in embracing open anti-Semitism and xenophobia instead of preaching proletarian internationalism. In the Gorbachev period, Russian nationalism established itself as an important intellectual current enlisting many writers, artists, film-makers, and even scientists. Politically, however, it did not become an influential force. Organizations like *Pamyat'*, known for its anti-Semitism, remained marginalized because of their perceived

extremism. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party, officially registered in 1990, was only testing its appeal to the electorate by combining populist promises of cheap vodka with calls for restoration of Russian empire within the limits of the USSR.²⁹ The most visible was probably the *Soyuz* (Union) bloc in the USSR Congress of People's deputies led by Victor Alksnis and Yevgenii Kogan that was committed to the preservation of the unity of the USSR and appealed to the Russian-speaking population of non-Russian republics. But the *Soyuz* was too closely linked to the CPSU conservatives to claim its own political identity, and united, on the common ground of preservation of the USSR, very different groups--from great-Russian chauvinists to orthodox communists-internationalists.

Post-Soviet Russia inherited the range of foreign policy views of the late Gorbachev era, but the old debate was significantly modified by the consequences of the breakup of the USSR. The situation became new in many respects. First, despite the fact that Russia gained international recognition as a legitimate heir to the Soviet Union and inherited USSR's permanent member seat in the UN Security Council (which was considered by many as a great power attribute), the sheer size of the country in terms of population and territory became significantly smaller than that of the USSR. Second, 25 million ethnic Russians who lived in non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union found themselves abroad, often facing hostility and discrimination. Third, the Russian

²⁹In the presidential elections of June 1991 Zhirinovskiy came in third place having collected about 6 million votes (8 per cent of the ballot).

economy, as well as economies of other former Soviet republics, was severely damaged by liquidation of the single Soviet economic space. Fourth, having eventually assumed responsibility for what used to be the Soviet Army, Russia had to deal with the necessity of pulling out its troops from several newly independent states that demanded it: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. Fifth, Russia had to settle disputes concerning ownership of Soviet nuclear weapons with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on the territory of which part of those weapons was located. Sixth, disputes also arose with regards to dividing some conventional weapons, hardware, and, in some cases, whole military units such as the Black Sea Fleet. Seventh, many in Russia questioned the legitimacy of transformation of borders between Soviet republics into borders between sovereign states, on the pretext of arbitrariness of internal border drawing and redrawing in the USSR. One of the most painful of these issues was the issue of Crimean peninsula that was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR from the Russian Federation in 1954. Eighth, ethnic conflicts and civil wars started in several former Soviet republics (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Moldova); Armenia and Azerbaijan found themselves in a de-facto war over Nagorno-Karabakh. In condition of virtual transparency of borders between the former Soviet republics and their continuing economic and political interdependence, Russia was likely to be involved in those conflicts in some manner. Finally, the Commonwealth of Independent States that united most of the former Soviet republics proved to be a weak organization without means to adopt and implement truly collective decisions: most important problems between the newly independent states

were resolvable only on a bilateral basis.

The overall sense of instability and insecurity after the breakup of the Soviet Union was one factor that led to further polarization of foreign policy views. Another factor was the development of deep political cleavages in Russian society in reaction to the radical economic reforms started by the Yeltsin-Gaidar government in late 1991-early 1992. During the Gorbachev era the major conflict had been between so-called "partocrats" and "democrats," the former being conservative party and government bureaucrats and the latter--reformers willing to undermine the Communist Party's control over all levels of the Soviet government. As a result of the suspension of activities the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the territory of the Russian Federation and confiscation of its property after the August 1991 coup attempt, and of the influx of the "democrats" to the Russian government (especially its executive branch), the old political cleavage lost its significance and the new one started to emerge. The central issue on the political agenda became the cost and consequences of the economic reform. The most important factions of the Russian political spectrum since 1992 have been radical pro-Western reformers, moderate reformers (differing from the former in assigning greater economic role to the state), communists, and right-wing nationalists. As the popular discontent with the hardships resulting from the reform grew, the influence of the radical pro-Western reformers in both the executive and the legislative branches of power diminished. The executive branch is dominated by the moderate reformers now, while after the December 1995 elections the communists have become the most powerful

faction in the lower house of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma.

As in any other country, the domestic political spectrum of Russia does not entirely coincide with the range of foreign policy views, but nevertheless correlates with it. The reason for such correlation in the case of Russia lies in the very essence of the painful process of transformation of the former communist society that is accompanied by a search for a new national identity. This search proceeds through the struggle of competing belief systems each of which suggests an ideal image of Russia as it "ought to be." Such images do not appear from nothing: each belief system offers a reference model to which Russia should aspire. For the reformers such a model is found in the West with its industrial might, wealth, effective democratic political systems, and protected rights of individuals. The Western model has little or no appeal to the communists who continue to look for the image of an ideal society in the Soviet past with its relative income equality, official denunciation of consumerism, social protection of the population by the state, and absence of visible ethnic conflicts. For many nationalists, the model is found in pre-revolutionary Russia with its explicit dominant position of the ethnic Russians and its "original" social, political, and spiritual institutions that provided strong national cohesion.

The view of the Western model of economic and political development tends to influence the perception of the Western countries' foreign policies. It is not difficult to note that "reformers" and "anti-reformers" have different images of the United States and other industrialized democratic countries. Given the dominant position of these countries

in the contemporary international system, this difference in views has crucial influence on entire foreign policy belief systems of Russian elites. The debate on whether or not to follow the "West" (or "Europe") along the path of modernization is not new for Russia: it is well known that this debate, in different forms, emerged several times in Russian history--it would be enough to mention discussions between "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" of the nineteenth century or Peter the Great's struggle against traditionalist opposition in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. However, never before was the problem of choice of a model for Russia's development so directly linked to the question of foreign policy orientation. Both in the nineteenth century and in Peter the Great's time a "Western" orientation did not entail friendship of alliance with a particular state or group of states: the West itself was an arena of wars between the most advanced countries of the time, and to have a Western-type foreign policy meant to play the great power game. In the late twentieth century the West is a group of liberal democracies that, due to interdependence and the presence of a clear military hegemon--the United States, excluded war from the arsenal of mutual relations. Moreover, these countries have developed a framework of institutions that allows for the resolution of conflicts through peaceful means and securing the functioning of the global economy so as to assure the material well-being of the Western countries. Finally, for the first time in Russian history, the success of reforms aimed at modernization depends to a large extent on the political will of the dominant Western countries to render massive economic assistance to Russian modernization.

The significance of the question of Russia's relation to the liberal and capitalist West is strengthened by decades of ideological conflict between the latter and the communist Soviet Union. Most observers of Russian elite views on international relations and foreign policy note the centrality of the division between pro-Western and anti-Western orientations. A focus group interview study of views of Moscow (still Soviet at that time) elites conducted in June 1991 by a team of researchers from the Ohio State University and their Russian collaborators found strong correlation between ideology and attitudes toward international relations (the researchers tried to identify the relationships between three issue dimensions: marketization, democratization, and Russia's--then the Soviet Union's--general relationship to the world community).³⁰ The study indicated five major ideological groups: Westernizers, moderate reformers, democratic socialists, communists, and nationalists, and concluded that a "position on the degree to which Russia should or can be integrated into the world community in terms of sharing the basic characteristics of the advanced members of that community seems to be a primary component of ideological orientation."³¹ Attitudes toward Western countries and particularly to the Western assistance to Russian reforms were found to correlate with ideological orientations. Another important finding was the variation in

³⁰See Judith Kullberg, *The End of New Thinking? Elite Ideologies and the Future of Russian Foreign Policy*, An Occasional Paper from the Mershon Center project "Assessing Alternative Futures for the United States and Post-Soviet Relations," Ohio State University, 1993.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 18.

approaches toward the status of the Soviet Union as a nuclear superpower. While the westernizers were, on the whole, content with the loss of superpower status, nationalists, communists, democratic socialists, and the conservative part of moderate reformers were deeply worried by a prospective loss of that status as a result of reductions in nuclear weapons.³² In conclusion Kullberg noted that a transfer of power to the groups opposing President Yeltsin would undoubtedly have an effect on Russian foreign policy.³³

Many Russian analysts also recognize the centrality of Russia's relation to the West. For example, Alexandr Panarin who uses a "civilizational" approach to Russia's dilemmas summarizes the contemporary situation as "polarization of politically active population in a form of preference to one of the two civilizational strategies," one of which is "acceptance of the Western (Atlantic) model--irreversible Westernization of the country," and another is "creation of a specific civilizational model absorbing achievements of the West into its own cultural and historical traditions."³⁴

Variation of views within these major--pro-Western and anti-Western--orientations is significant. It can hardly be measured by a single factor, such as the degree of "pro-" or "anti-Westerness" or by a left-right political spectrum. Nevertheless, analysts of

³²Ibid., p. 21.

³³Ibid., pp. 22-23.

³⁴Alexandr Panarin, "Mezhdu atlantizmom i evraziistvom: Tsivilizatsionnyi protsess i vyzov Zapada" ("Between Atlanticism and Eurasianism: Civilizational Process and the Challenge of the West"), *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, No. 10, 1993.

Russian elite foreign policy views present very similar classifications of existing "schools of thought." Dawisha and Parrott describe five of them.³⁵ First, there is the school of thought led by former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev that sees friendship and cooperation with the West as a vital condition of success of democracy in Russia; gives priority to relations with democratic countries; is very cautious about the use of military force; and wants to interact with other former Soviet republics on the basis of equality to avoid accusations in expansionism and imperialist behavior. A second school of thought also wants Russia to modernize along the Western ways but with a more active and assertive foreign policy, especially in the former Soviet Union that is considered a sphere of Russia's special interests and responsibilities. A third school of thought also sees Russia as a great power, but one resting on an ethnically defined domestic base and whose primary responsibility is to protect ethnic Russians residing in the neighboring states by all means, including questioning of the existing borders. A fourth school of thought is isolationist, Slavophile, and focused on domestic reconstruction and revival. A fifth school of thought, the one of the extreme right, is openly xenophobic and expansionist.

Alexei Arbatov distinguished four major political groups in Russia affecting or trying to affect foreign policy.³⁶ His first two groups--the "pro-Western" and "moderate

³⁵Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 199-202.

³⁶Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No.2 (Fall 1993), p. 8-14.

liberal"--essentially coincide with the first two of Dawisha and Parrott's "schools of thought." The third one, "centrist and moderate conservatives," is different from others in two respects: first, it is supported by a predominant part of the military high command, industrial managers, and the main segments of the federal bureaucracy; second, it cannot reconcile itself to the demise of the Soviet Union (though it does not advocate reunification by military force). The fourth, right-wing group, unites neo-communists and nationalists and is devoted to the goal of revival of the Russian empire and Russia's superpower role. Essentially the same classification is used by Alexei Pushkov who labels the third group "the statist bureaucrats."³⁷

In this study of Russian foreign policy belief systems, the approach will be somewhat closer to Dawisha and Parrott's "schools of thought" than to Arbatov's "groups." Arbatov's classification is strong in its clear description of foreign policy views and programs of major political groups that are present--or, more exactly, were present in 1993--on the Russian political arena. Arbatov's (and Pushkov's) analyses are focused on the degree of support or disapproval by different groups of the current foreign policy of Russian government. This allows a forecast of possible foreign policy actions and attitudes of these groups if they obtain access to Russia's foreign policy making. But political ideologies, belief systems, and images of Russia as an international actor are likely to be longer-lived than current political alliances or even informal groups and

³⁷Alexei K. Pushkov, "Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over," *Foreign Policy*, No. 93, Winter 1993-94, pp. 77-85.

movements because of the turbulent character of today's Russian politics, with its constantly shifting balances of power between social and political forces. Moreover, as noted earlier, roots of some belief systems can be traced to a distant past. This suggests that the classification of belief systems may not exactly coincide with classification of foreign policy views of political groups visible today and it may have its own value for the analysis of long-term trends in Russian foreign policy.

To avoid linking of elite belief systems to current political 'camps' and organizations, a spectrum must be built on a set of core questions which are the most important for the issue area under consideration. Foreign policy belief systems are based on the images of the world, of one's own state, and of other actors. Therefore, to establish the spectrum of Russian elite belief systems, this study groups individual views according to the following questions: What is the individual's image of the international system, its major trends and driving forces? What are the images of other states, most importantly of the West? What is the image of Russia as an international actor, i.e. what is the view of its place in the international system and of its strengths and weaknesses? The latter question, in fact, includes two parts: the image of contemporary, post-Soviet Russia, and a historical perspective of Russia's foreign policy.

For each type of answers to the above question, corresponding policy preferences are analyzed. To limit the scope of this study, I considered policy preferences in two areas: Russian foreign policy toward the West and toward the former Soviet republics.

The resulting typology includes three belief systems, distinctively different in both

their images and policy preferences: pro-Western, centrist (or realist), and anti-Western. To give them names, an indicator was used which permeates both of these sets of beliefs: the attitude to the "West," i.e. the leading industrialized nations. As discussed above, the attitude toward the West--especially the United States--occupies the central place in Russian foreign policy debates. First, the view of the international system depends on the assessment of the West's role in it; second, the view of Russia's place in world politics is typically stated in terms of Russia's position vis-a-vis the West and whether the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy should emulate foreign policies of the Western nations.

The roots of the *pro-Western* belief system may be found in the views of the radical democratic opposition of the Gorbachev period. It is based on a view of the international system that combines some features of two schools of thought known in the West as idealism and complex interdependence: its proponents believe that modern liberal democracies, by their nature, tend to pursue foreign policies aimed at the common good and conflict-free environment; the removal of the Soviet Union as the leader of the global non-democratic forces opens great opportunities for creation of a new harmonious world order; the well-being of Russia depends entirely on its acceptance in the "community of civilized nations" both in the sense of internal transformation and in the sense of aligning its foreign policy with the West.

The *centrist* belief system is closer to the realist school of thought in international

relations: its underlying belief is that the international system is an arena of competition between states pursuing their particular interests (the most important being maximization of power); Russia should westernize, i.e. become a capitalist democracy, but it should guard its own interests without any illusions about the benevolent character of the others' policies.

The *anti-Western* belief system includes three major subdivisions: communist, imperialist (Eurasianist), and nationalist (more precisely, ethnic nationalist). The *communist* view, which is very close to the views of the conservative opposition to Gorbachev during *perestroika* period, is based on a well-known class-based approach to international relations that links the character of foreign policy of states to the type of their ruling classes and sees the modern international system as organized so as to serve the interests of a narrow circle of capitalists of the Western countries. Russia's fate in the event of its capitalist transformation and joining the world capitalist economy will be that of a dependent, semi-colonial country. Thus, the only way to preserve Russia's independence and power is to step back on the path of socialist development and to recreate the Soviet Union. The *imperialist* view is built upon the geopolitical approach to international relations and a specific vision of Russia's mission as a unique society between the Western and the Eastern civilizations; Russia's destiny and power depend on its ability to recreate a unified state in the core of the Eurasian continent, i.e. the territory of the former USSR. The *nationalist* image sees the source of Russia's power in consolidation of ethnic Russians (living both in Russia and in other former Soviet

republics) on the basis of ideas on national unity, ethnic purity, and struggle for the living space; international relations are seen through a prism of struggle of ethnic groups whose rise and fall depends on the strength of their national spirits.

All subdivisions of the anti-Western belief system share important common ideas. They see international relations as an arena of struggle, but, unlike in the 'realist' belief system, not between particular nation-states but rather between supranational and transnational entities: civilizations, transnational elites and classes. The West is inherently hostile to Russia--either due to civilizational differences, as in the 'Eurasianist' view, or because it is controlled by transnational capitalist elites aspiring to world domination, as in the communist view. All brands of the anti-Western belief system converge in their conviction that the West's major goal is to enslave Russia. They see Russia's great power role in its ability to be an equal military rival to the West and to resist attempts of Western domination.

The following chapters will analyze and compare the three belief systems sketched above. Each of them will be discussed in two chapters, one dealing with images, and the other with policy preferences. The chapters on images have sections discussing a historical image of Russian and Soviet foreign policy, an image of the contemporary international system and of the West, and an image of post-Soviet Russia as an international actor. The chapters on policy preferences are divided into sections on Russian policy toward the former Soviet republics and Russian policy toward the West.

Chapter 2

THE PRO-WESTERN BELIEF SYSTEM

Among the three Russian foreign policy belief systems, the pro-Western one has experienced the biggest shifts in popularity and influence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed totally dominant among the public and the policymaking elites alike. The other two belief systems were developing, in large measure, in response to the pro-Western views. This is why it is logical to consider pro-Westernism first. As the disappointment with both pro-Western foreign policy and domestic reforms grew in Russia, the pro-Western belief system was losing its adherents. However, its low standing today has not removed it from the spectrum of "living" belief systems.

The analysis of the pro-Western belief system is complicated by the fact that some prominent individuals, such as President Yeltsin, enthusiastically supported pro-Western ideas in 1992-93 but changed their views later. Since any phenomenon is studied best in its developed form, the elements of the pro-Western belief system should be analyzed as they were at the height of its popularity. Therefore, it is not feasible to exclude

Yeltsin and people like him from consideration. To avoid confusion, it is necessary to include an important notice at the beginning of this chapter: the views of President Yeltsin described here are the views of "early Yeltsin" of 1991-93.

This chapter is mostly built on the analysis of views of the most prominent pro-Western Russian policymaker--former foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. It also includes the writings of other politicians and analysts: F. Shelov-Kovedyaev, O. Latsis, Yu. Shishkov, A. Zagorsky, A. Zlobin, S. Solodovnik, M. Khrustalev, S. Blagovolin, E. Grebenschchikov, V. Moskvina, and others.

2.1 Images

2.1.1 History of Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy

Beliefs about the character of Soviet foreign policy and the consequences of decades of the Soviet Union's activity in the international system have been shaped by overall denunciation of communism and the Soviet political regime by adherents of the pro-Western image. For them, the totalitarian nature of Soviet communism serves as a

major explanation for negative aspects of Soviet foreign policy.

In most of the 1992 speeches by Yeltsin and Kozyrev eloquent criticisms of communism and of the Soviet foreign policy were blended together. In his speech before the U.S. Congress on 17 June 1992 Yeltsin said:

The world may breathe freely--the communist idol which has been sowing social strife, animosity, and unprecedented cruelty everywhere, that has been a fear of the human community--collapsed! Collapsed forever!...The experience of the past decades has taught us: communism does not have a human face. Freedom and communism are incompatible!¹

Communism is thought of as an international phenomenon that was based on Russian soil. It is common for the westernizers to depict Russia as a victim of communism, as a country whose bad luck was in finding itself a subject of a historical experiment. The first source of damage to Russia has been the ineffective economic system and cruel political regime. Two days after the speech in Washington cited above, Yeltsin, speaking in the Canadian Parliament, addressed the drastic differences of quality of life in the two countries having similar geographic and climatic conditions:

In our country the damage inflicted on Russia by the seventy-years long rule of communist totalitarian system is especially visible. Here, in Canada, the arguments by which the party ideologues explained the super-low quality of life of the Russians, fall apart.

Neither the northern nature, nor severe climate, nor some national narrow-mindedness of the Russian people, nor hostile enemies are guilty in Russia's poor condition. The principal causes are rooted in the anti-people regime, in the ideology that have been imposed on the country and methodically destroying the foundations of its life.²

¹*Diplomaticeskii vestnik*, 1992, No.13-14, p. 5.

²*Ibid.*, p. 19.

The second source of damage has been the foreign policy whose inseparability from the evil character of the regime was stressed by Kozyrev in his speech at the session of the CSCE Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in December 1992:

The "realism" of simplified power-based decisions in politics and of administrative-command methods in economics, the confrontationist, suspicious, and aggressive "patriotism" vis-a-vis surrounding world turned my potentially rich and spiritually generous motherland into an impoverished and overarmed one.³

An important feature common for both domestic and foreign politics of the USSR was the absence of an access for the people to decision-making, and the closed and secretive manner of policy-making: "Under its totalitarian regime, Soviet foreign policy was made in deep secrecy by the Communist Party elite. No one in the Soviet Union had the right to discuss it openly, much less criticize it."⁴

First among the features of Soviet foreign policy that brought nothing but harm to the Russian people was its ideological and messianic character that had two sources. The first of these sources was the legacy of the Russian Empire. As Kozyrev wrote, "after all, the USSR did not materialize out of thin air; it came in the wake of the former Russian Empire and bore many of its birthmarks."⁵ Imperial legacy itself was controversial: on the one hand, in Kozyrev's opinion, the Russian Empire differed from

³*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No.1-2, p. 33.

⁴Andrei Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), p. 60.

⁵Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: a Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, p. 2.

other colonial empires in its lack of clear division between the metropolis and colonies, of severe ethnic repression, and of advantages of the colonial policy for the population of the metropolis; on the other hand, the closeness of the imperial heartland and conquered territories was breeding an overwhelming concern with protection of boundaries that was enforcing the sense of "otherness" and "an eminently messianic belief in the special mission of tsarist Russia as heir to the global vision of a Third Rome."⁶ The second source was the Marxist ideology that, having been adopted by Russian revolutionaries, "acquired wild and most extravagant features." The result of the implementation of that combination of imperial and Marxist ideologies was that "not only was the erstwhile empire reinstated under new ideological colors, it became more despotic and repressive, trampling upon the freedom and very existence of human beings."⁷

The terms "empire" and "imperialist" have strongly negative meanings in the pro-Western belief system. Manifestations of imperial behavior that are criticized include both the oppression of independence movements of non-Russian nations within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and the creation and maintenance of an "extended empire" of satellite communist states in Eastern Europe. Addressing the latter issue in his speech in the Hungarian State Assembly in November 1992, Yeltsin said: "totalitarianism or any tyranny never contain themselves within the limits of one country.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 3.

They try to spread their poisonous tentacles as far as possible. They recognize neither borders nor moral prohibitions."⁸ Yeltsin and Kozyrev, as well as most of Russians politicians from the democratic camp, denounced Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). Prominent journalist Otto Latsis in his article about the return of Russian troops from Germany and the Baltics described the decades of Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and Mongolia as the time when enormous resources were wasted due to the paranoid fear of foreign invasion and of a loss of faithful allies.⁹

The issue of relations between the imperial center and national territories (republics) formally does not belong to the discussion of beliefs about Soviet foreign policy, but it is directly relevant to the perceptions of post-Soviet Russia's policy toward the newly independent states. As mentioned with regards to the above-cited article by Kozyrev, the westernizers carefully emphasize the fact that Russian masses gained little or nothing from the creation of the empire, but they denounce oppression of the movements for independence--both by the tsars and by the communists, the latter being often accused in pursuing worse nationalities policy than the former.¹⁰ The principal

⁸*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p. 28.

⁹See Otto Latsis. "Russkie idut. Idut domoi" ("The Russians Are Coming. Coming Home"), *Izvestiia*, 31 August 1994, p. 1.

¹⁰See for example Kozyrev, op.cit., p. 3; Yakov Etinger, "Mezhnatsional'nye konflikty v SNG i mezhdunarodnyi opyt" ("Ethnic conflicts in the CIS and International Experience"), *Svobodnaia mysl'*, 1993, No. 3, pp. 87-88.

belief is in the continuity of tsarist and communist policies. To cite another author,

In XVIII-XIX centuries the Russian Empire was already openly pursuing the policy of colonialism....The October 1917 coup d'etat has mostly changed the ideological cover of that policy, but not its essence. Having proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination, the Bolsheviks in 1918-1922 in fact forcefully suppressed the process of the breakdown of the Empire and preserved it within practically the same boundaries.¹¹

The Soviet Union's efforts to expand its influence in the Third World are also an object of criticism. D. Volskii in his article about Russian policy toward developing nations wrote that the attempts to stimulate a "revolutionary wave" in Asia and Africa and the support of the so-called "countries of socialist orientation" resulted in great material and moral losses to the Soviet people.¹² Nikolayenko also criticized the ideological approach to selection of allies in the Third World and a double standard used by the Soviet leadership with respect to human rights in the developing countries, i.e. the practice of Soviet condemnation of human rights violation in pro-American countries combined with turning a blind eye to those violations within the countries in the "Soviet orbit."¹³

Finally, one of the most important negative features of the Soviet Union was its

¹¹Yu. Shishkov, "Budushchee SNG" ("The Future of the CIS"), *Narodnyi deputat*, 1992, No. 10, p.79.

¹²See D. Volskii, "Kuda napravlen vektor peremen" ("In Which Direction is the Vector of Change Pointed"), *Aziia i Afrika segodnia*, 1992, No. 1, pp. 2-3.

¹³See Valeri Nikolayenko, "The Developing Countries in Our Policy," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, July 1992, p. 12-13.

militarism. Westernizers blast the Soviet approach to national security for its narrow focus on the military means. The USSR, as was mentioned above in one of the citations from Kozyrev, has been overarmed. That narrow-minded power-based approach, said Kozyrev on another occasion, "has lead the Soviet Union to the economic and foreign-policy dead end."¹⁴

In the pro-Western image, the negative aspects of Soviet foreign policy are hardly balanced by any positive ones. The evaluation of the USSR is characterized by an intense sense of aversion to practically everything the Soviet Union was doing as an international actor. The totalitarian character of the Soviet regime is directly linked with the confrontationist approach to the "democratic" outside world and with imperialism (which continued the practice of the Russian Empire).

2.1.2 Post-Cold War International System: Character and Trends

The negative view of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy is closely linked to the westernizers' general optimism about the trends of international development after the removal of the USSR from the international scene. The collapse of Soviet

¹⁴"Vystuplenie A. V. Kozyreva pered uchenymi-mezhdunarodnikami i predstaviteliami delovykh i politicheskikh krugov Iaponii" ("A. V. Kozyrev's Speech to the International Relations Scholars and Representatives of Business and Political Circles of Japan"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 9-10.

communism is interpreted as an event of global significance that opens new exciting opportunities for the international community. Yeltsin said in his speech at the UN Security Council summit on 31 January 1992:

At the end of the XX century the world lives in a time of new hopes and concerns for people. The perpetual process of search for truth and comprehension of the perspectives awaiting mankind has entered a new stage.

Now--may be for the first time in history--the real opportunity has come to finish with despotism, to dismantle the totalitarian system, no matter which form it assumes.¹⁵

Speaking at the British Parliament in November 1992 Yeltsin said: "The icebergs of the Cold War are intensively melting, and soon they will disappear forever. Unseen earlier horizons of cooperation will be opened to the mankind, to the civilized world."¹⁶

The end of the Cold War means much more than simply the end of superpower hostilities; it means victory of democracy over totalitarianism, and that must have immediate consequences for international relations. "The collapse of communist totalitarianism expanded the limits of the world's democratic space" (Kozyrev).¹⁷ The strengthening international consensus about human rights and democracy has been one of the major forces that undermined communism. Addressing the importance of the CSCE human rights norms at a session of that organization's Council of Foreign

¹⁵*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 4-5, p. 48.

¹⁶*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No.23-24, p. 5.

¹⁷"Vystuplenie A.V. Kozyreva na vseмирnoi konferentsii po pravam cheloveka" ("A.V. Kozyrev's Speech at the Global Conference on Human Rights"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 13-14, p. 15.

Ministers, Kozyrev said:

In the 1970, at the dawn of the all-European process, the fight against totalitarianism also started from the assertion of certain moral principles. These were the principles of respect for human rights, of freedom of movement of persons and ideas, of openness and trust.

These principles and their tireless and loud reiteration by the democratic countries at the CSCE forums proved more dangerous for totalitarianism in the long run than the NATO bloc with its nuclear missiles.¹⁸

According to this view, the defeat of communism has been a result of long-term trends that are likely to persist and gain additional strength after the end of the Cold War. One of these trends is the global "offensive" of democracy. As Yeltsin said in his speech to the U.S. Congress in June 1992, "history gives us a chance to implement President Wilson's dream: to make the world safe for democracy."¹⁹

Several other trends have been described by the pro-Western analysts. Zagorsky, Zlobin, Solodovnik, and Khrustalev write that in the recent two decades conditions have been created for a qualitative transformation of the system of international relations. The most important of these conditions is the prevalence of non-confrontational relations among the leading countries that is different from the previous world of "poles." "Cooperation becomes a dominant means for settling disputes, since forcible action is equally self-destructive for all." The dynamics of emerging international relations are going to be determined "not by the competition of various centers of power but by the

¹⁸*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 23-24, p. 41-42.

¹⁹*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 13-14, p. 7.

logic of their common development."²⁰ This idea is shared by Blagovolin who theorizes that the general trend of the world development is the transition from a bipolar system not to unipolar or multipolar one, but to a "community of co-development" of leading countries based on complex interdependence.²¹

Zagorsky et al. see the world as developing in the form of "concentric circles," i.e. consisting of a core and a periphery, with the core (largely represented by the Group of Seven) consolidating and facing eventual challenges coming from the North-South dimension.²² Blagovolin also emphasizes the difference between the "community of co-development" and the rest of the world, the latter being potential source of instability in the future.²³

The new international system is characterized by the emergence of a "*common legal space*" as a commitment of all leading powers to adhere to the rules of international law,²⁴ which means recognition and adherence to the basic international standards of democratic political regimes, such as the rule of law, human rights, political pluralism, and free elections.

²⁰Andrei Zagorsky, Anatoli Zlobin, Sergei Solodovnik, and Mark Khrustalev, "Russia in a New World," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, 1992, No.7, p. 6.

²¹Sergei Blagovolin, "O vneshnei i voennoi politike Rossii" ("On Russia's Foreign and Military Policy"), *Svobodnaia mysl'*, 1992, No. 18, p. 5.

²²See Zagorsky et al., op. cit., p. 6.

²³See Blagovolin, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁴Zagorsky et al., op. cit., p. 6.

In sum, the removal of the Soviet Union from the international arena opened the way to an emergence of a new system of international relations called by many westernizers a "new world order," or a "new democratic world order."²⁵ This new order has three major characteristics: consensus about political (democratic) values, cooperative relations between leading countries of the world (the "core"), and the North-South division as the most profound international split.

The perception of the North-South gap is, however, totally different from the traditional Soviet view in which the capitalist North was pictured as both responsible for the South's problems and incapable (and unwilling) to help resolve them. The North (or, from another angle, the West), the "core," the "community of co-development" is seen by the westernizers as an example to follow and as the leading force of economic and social progress. Terms commonly used for the West include "democratic countries," "civilized community," "community of democratic nations," and the like. Most importantly, the West is seen as friendly to the post-communist Russia and interested in the success of its reforms. As Yeltsin said in his speech to the VI Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation in April 1992, "one can be sure that the majority of the world community is on our side, on the side of reforms and the renewal

²⁵See for example Blagovolin, op.cit., p. 3; Nikolayenko, op.cit., p. 13; Yeltsin's statement at the joint press-conference of Presidents of Russia and the U.S.A. on 3 January, 1993, *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 1-2, p. 25; "Rossiia--Amerika: partnery na mezhdunarodnoi arene" ("Russia--America: Partners in the International Arena"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 11, p. 17.

of Russia."²⁶

The West's friendly attitude toward the reforming Russia has its roots in the natural inclination of democratic countries to cooperate with each other. Kozyrev said at the meeting of Russia's Foreign Policy Council in July 1992: "As we know from the days of August [i.e. the coup d'etat of August 1991], the Western countries are natural friends of Russian democrats, and to the same extent they are natural enemies of Russian national-Bolsheviks."²⁷ This view echoes Marxist class-based approach to international relations, with global "struggle between socialism and capitalism" replaced by struggle "between democracy and totalitarianism" and with "proletarian internationalism" replaced by "friendship between democratic countries." In fact, Kozyrev himself has recognized that similarity: "...we are sure that democratic states...are our natural allies, as well as natural, if you wish, 'class enemies' of the reactionaries."²⁸

Since Russia is surrounded by the democratic "class friends" rather than "class enemies," it can hardly find potential enemies in the world dominated by the "civilized" democratic countries. According to Yeltsin's address to the conference "Transformed Russia in the New World" (February 1992), "our foreign policy for the first time

²⁶*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No.9-10, p. 3.

²⁷*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No.15-16, p. 62; see also Andrei Kozyrev, "The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance," *NATO Review*, May 1993, article 9301-1, p. 5.

²⁸"Press-konferentsiia ministra inostrannykh del A. V. Kozyreva 17 marta 1993 goda" ("Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. V. Kozyrev on 17 March 1993"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 7-8, p. 39.

assumes the absence of enemies for Russia, even potential ones."²⁹ The same says Kozyrev: "For the first time in many centuries of Russia's history it becomes possible to see formation of a belt of good-neighborliness in the so-called traditional abroad [i.e. outside of the former USSR], and the absence of even potential opponents among the great powers."³⁰

The general conclusion that follows from the pro-Western image of the world, and of its industrialized democratic "core" in particular, is that the new Russia lives in an environment offering exciting opportunities for progress and reforms. In his article "Russia: A Chance for Survival" Kozyrev gave a broad historical perspective on Russia's previous failures to westernize and concluded:

In contrast to the previous sharp reversals in Russian history, the second Russian Revolution unfolded in a favorable foreign policy setting and enjoyed tactful and discreet support from civilized and democratic nations, free from any instigative notes, much less any attempts at direct interference.³¹

2.1.3 Post-Soviet Russia's Place in International Relations

The pro-Western image of post-Soviet Russia closely links beliefs about Russia's

²⁹*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 6, p. 29.

³⁰*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 15-16, p. 63.

³¹*Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, p. 4.

place in international relations and its national interests with the negative assessment of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and with the optimistic view of the perspectives of international development after the collapse of the USSR.

First of all, the pro-Western image includes a belief that a major virtue of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy consists in not behaving "like the Soviet Union." Yeltsin emphasized in his speech to the U.S. Congress in June 1992 that Russia had abandoned imperialism (having recognized the independence of former Soviet republics) and "double standards" in foreign policy (having stopped lying to its partners in negotiations).³² Two months earlier, Yeltsin stated to the VI Congress of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation: "I will say it most definitely: the spirit of the 'Cold War' has no future in Russia! The Russian people will not let themselves be surrounded by an 'iron curtain' again and be involved in imperial adventures."³³ The same theme appeared in his speech to the British Parliament (November 1992): "Russia rejects everything that constituted the essence of the previous regime: lie and violence, hypocritical and aggressive policies toward other countries, spiritual and physical terror toward its own people that killed millions."³⁴

The dominant theme of speeches and writings of the westernizers is the necessity to end the worst legacy of the Soviet Union's foreign policy--the isolation of the country

³²See *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 13-14, p. 6.

³³*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 9-10, p. 3.

³⁴*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p. 5.

from the rest of the world. Assessing reforms in Russian domestic and foreign policy from a global perspective, Grebenshchikov writes: "Russia is returning to the mainstream of the global civilizational process."³⁵ Author(s) of an editorial in *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, the official publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in June 1992:

Having abandoned the ideology that was poisoning minds and souls of our and other peoples, having dismantled the structures of the totalitarian state and its foundation--the communist party, we not only cleared our way to a democratic humane society, law-based state, and economics of free civilized market, but also removed the main obstacle that had been separating us from the community of democratic states....The world experience shows that a policy of isolationism, even if driven by good intention to save resources, has negative impact--including the economic one--on any state, and leads to that state's lagging behind others.³⁶

The new Russia has not only created conditions for a change in international relations by destroying communism. It also has a profound interest in the processes of global interdependence. As former Deputy Foreign Minister Shelov-Kovedyaev put it, "the change resulting from the end of the Cold War, from the integration of the whole world into one civilized community, from the end of bipolarity and our opposition to the whole world--and, respectively, of the whole world's opposition to us--is one of the basic

³⁵Eduard Grebenshchikov, "Missiia Rossii: popravki k R. Kiplingu" ("Russia's Mission: Corrections to R. Kipling"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1993, No. 3, p. 96.

³⁶"Rossiia--Amerika: partnery na mezhdunarodnoi arene" ("Russia--America: Partners at the International Arena"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 11, p. 17.

foundations of Russia's security."³⁷

The concept of "civilized community" in the pro-Western image means, in fact, "the West," the group of industrialized democratic nations; "civilized" serves as a synonym to "Western" and "democratic." The reality of the division of the world into a poor South and a rich North, as mentioned in the previous section, is recognized, and the place where Russia should be is definitely the "North" ("West"). Zagorsky et al. formulate their thesis quite clearly: "As we see it, the basic foreign policy interest of Russia lies in creating favorable conditions for her gradual rise from the periphery to the center of world development. This implies a priority development of the interaction and cooperation with the leading states of the world and, first of all, with the United States, the EC, and Japan, and in a longer term--her joining of the Group of Seven most developed countries."³⁸ Blagovolin specifies major political objectives of Russia as preservation of integrity of the Russian state and the country's "organic inclusion into the structures of the "Northern hemisphere."³⁹ Moskvina argues that joining the West would restore continuity in Russia's historical development, and that the transition to a market economy would return the country to the group of countries from which it was artificially

³⁷Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev, "Trudno obognat' svoio vremia" ("It's Hard to Get Ahead of Your Time..."), *Narodnyi Deputat*, 1992, No. 17, p. 104.

³⁸Zagorsky et al., op. cit., p. 10.

³⁹Blagovolin, op. cit., p. 5.

removed in 1917.⁴⁰ Kozyrev in his speech at the conference "Transformed Russia in the New World" (May 1992) also addressed the theme of "return," in combination with geographic considerations: "[We have] the only solution--to return to that natural environment where Russia rightfully belongs. Look at the map of the world--even geographically Russia is that link that is still missing from the democratic belt of the Northern hemisphere."⁴¹

The pro-Western image has been inevitably influenced by Russian intellectuals' debates about Russia's "historical destiny" and about uniqueness of Russian culture and society. The westernizers are often accused, especially by the nationalists, of a lack of attention to unique features of Russian life, and of an intention to drag the country into the cosmopolitan Western civilization where those features would be completely lost. Therefore, they often emphasize that westernization would not mean a loss of Russia's national "face." As Kozyrev says,

Universality of democratic values does not mean universal unification and loss of national specificity. It is not democracy but totalitarianism that leads to the loss of a national ground. Experience of many countries, including Germany and Japan, convincingly demonstrates that only on the path of civilized and democratic development one can fully unfold one's national originality....We are not going to wander on impassable roads of a "third way" any more, but we do not want to be dissolved among our

⁴⁰See V. Moskvina, "Bezopasnost' Sodruchestva v kontse XX veka" ("Security of the Commonwealth in the end of the XX Century"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1992, No. 2, p. 24.

⁴¹*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 6, p. 33; see also Andrei Kozyrev, "Rossiia: god minuvshii i god nastupivshii" ("Russia: The Year That's Passed and The Year That's Coming"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 1-2, p. 3.

new friends. Partnership and friendship do not require us to forget our own geopolitical, economic, and other interests, and we will defend them.⁴²

This concept of uniqueness and originality is clearly based on the recognition of natural differences between "civilized" countries within the limits of the "civilized community." These differences allow the members of the community to have their individual faces and sometimes divergent interests, but not beyond the limits dictated by the basic values shared by everyone. These--democratic--values are associated with the Western civilization, and determine Russia's orientation toward the West. In his speech at the Royal Institute of International Relations--Chatam House (London) Kozyrev addressed last century's Russian debates on Russia's relations with the West: "150 years ago Alexander Herzen...warned that 'open hatred to the West is an open hatred to the whole process of development of mankind....Together with hatred and disdain to the West goes hatred and disdain to reason, to law, to all guaranties, to all civilization.' Ignoring this warning under the slogans of 'Soviet originality' cost too much to the Russians to let themselves be driven to the impassable roads of the 'third way' again."⁴³

When Kozyrev mentions the "third way" he means the views of those Russian intellectuals and politicians who argue that, despite Russia's failure with communism, it should not embrace Western capitalism and should look for its own, third, way. That argument is based on the ideas of "Eurasianism" (to be discussed in ch. 4), i.e. the thesis

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 21-22, p. 23.

that Russia serves as a link between the Western and the Oriental civilizations but belongs to neither of them. The westernizers reject "Eurasianism" in favor of an open Western, European orientation. Moreover, the Western civilization is seen as the one that has already integrated the world without leaving any viable alternative. Zagorsky et al. write:

We consider it a great illusion to reincarnate the myth of Russian "special destiny" as a cultural and economic *"bridge" between Europe and Asia*. In the second half of the 20th century a genuine synthesis of European and Asian cultures is going on apart from Russia as manifested by a growing number of Asian states joining or approaching the core of the world economy. In contrast to the past, Russia is called upon not to connect Europe with Asia but to join in the process of their synthesis which is already going on.⁴⁴

Some westernizers use the image of Russia as a bridge between the East and the West, but this image, first, serves as a geographical, not cultural metaphor, and, second, the "East" that they mean includes primarily the "Westernized" states--Japan and the newly industrialized countries. Russia in this image simply fills the gap in the democratic and capitalist "North."⁴⁵ Karavayev in his article on Russia's foreign economic relations uses the "bridge" metaphor in its geographic sense and stresses: "Historically, Russia has many of her roots in Europe which was a source of her civilization, religion, and culture. So her return to Europe whence it was pulled out by Communist totalitarianism

⁴⁴Zagorsky et al., op. cit., p. 11.

⁴⁵See Valeri Karavayev, "Russia's Foreign Economic Strategy in the 1990s," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1992, No. 8, p. 17.

is seen for Russia as a natural way of development."⁴⁶ Blagovolin argues that relations with the West should have priority not only compared to relations with the "East," but even compared to relations with the former Soviet republics; the latter entirely depend on Russia's success or failure to merge with the West in the "community of co-development."⁴⁷

If Russia is going to join the "civilized community," what should be its role and status within it? Answering this question, the westernizers take into account Russia's geopolitical position, size, and military might that secure continuity in the important role played by Russia in the international system. The *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* editorial cited above says:

The communist totalitarian empire collapsed. But Russia that had existed for centuries did not disappear. Its enormous spiritual, cultural, and intellectual potential, its territory and population, its natural richness, its science, and, finally, its military might, objectively predetermine the visible role that it invariably plays at the international arena.⁴⁸

Addressing the character of that "visible role" for the post-communist Russia, the article goes on: "Russia does not pretend to play a superpower role, but it should and will occupy an appropriate place in the family of civilized nations."⁴⁹

The "appropriate" role of Russia in the post-Cold War international relations is

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷See Blagovolin, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴⁸*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 11, p. 17.

⁴⁹Ibid.

usually characterized as the one of a great power, but with some important qualifications.

Kozyrev wrote in *Foreign Affairs*:

No doubt Russia will not cease to be a great power. But it will be a normal great power. Its national interests will be a priority. But these will be interests understandable to democratic countries, and Russia will be defending them through interaction with partners, not through confrontation. In economic matters, too, once on its own feet and later, after acquiring a weight commensurate with its potential in world trade, Russia will be a serious economic competitor to many but, at the same time, an honest partner complying with the established rules of the game in world markets.⁵⁰

The concept of "normal great power" is very important for Kozyrev's image of the new Russia. To be "normal" means, first, to base one's foreign policy not on messianic ideas but on one's national interest; and "apparently, for any state, as for any person, the interest is in being "healthy and wealthy."⁵¹ The concept of national interest, in addition to a natural for any state goal of national security, includes a transformation of the country into a democratic and capitalist one, with integration into the "civilized community" as a means and precondition of such transformation. The list of "fundamental national interests," according to Kozyrev, includes "preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the state, strengthening its security in all dimensions, revival of our country as democratic and free, providing favorable

⁵⁰Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," p. 10.

⁵¹A. Kozyrev, "Vystuplenie na konferentsii "Preobrazhennaia Rossiia v novom mire" ("Speech at the conference "Transformed Russia in the New World"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 6, p. 33.

conditions for the formation of market economy and Russia's entry to the group of the world's first-rank states."⁵²

Secondly, "normality" means a cooperative attitude to other members of the "civilized community": "What I mean by "normal" is that democratic Russia wishes to establish her status through cooperation and constructive interaction with the whole international democratic community, not through political and military confrontation (a traditional practice of the Soviet Union)."⁵³

Thirdly, a "normal great power" does not rely on military might as primary means of securing its status. In an interview to *Rossiiskaia Gazeta* in December 1993 Kozyrev said that the Russians should not "live under the influence of perverted concepts suggesting that a great power must keep everyone in fear."⁵⁴ Speaking to the VI Congress of People's Deputies he stated: "Russia's place in the world is determined today not so much by its nuclear potential as by the fact that it pursues a policy of trust and cooperation."⁵⁵ Latsis explains the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany and the Baltics by the Russians' realization that "not everything can be done by

⁵²Kozyrev, "Rossiia: god minuvshii...", p. 3.

⁵³Andrei Kozyrev, "Washington Summit: An End to Nuclear Confrontation," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1992, No. 8, p. 3.

⁵⁴*Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 8 December 1993, p. 6.

⁵⁵*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 9-10, p. 5.

force."⁵⁶

Fourthly, a "normal great power" plays by the rules accepted in the "civilized community." This includes not only observing the "rules of the game in world markets" mentioned by Kozyrev in his article cited above, but also acceptance of international norms regarding domestic politics and human rights. The latter includes respect to international law and to the authority of international organizations. As Kozyrev said at the Global Conference on Human Rights in June 1993, Russia had problems concerning guarantees of human rights, but was "open to cooperation in their solution with national and international organizations." He continued: "We consider it not as an interference into our internal affairs, but as one of the means of support for our reforms."⁵⁷ Earlier, speaking at the session of the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers in January 1992, Kozyrev cited the importance of international support for Russian democrats during the August 1991 coup d'etat and stated: "In general, humanitarian issues should not be constrained by considerations of state sovereignty and non-interference into internal affairs."⁵⁸ At the same time Yeltsin spoke similarly at the UN Security Council Summit:

Our unconditional priority is guaranteeing the totality of human rights and freedoms, including political and civil rights, decent socio-economic and ecological conditions of people's life.

⁵⁶Latsis, op. cit., p. 2.

⁵⁷*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 13-14, p. 15.

⁵⁸*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 4-5, p. 40.

I think that these issues are not internal affairs of states, but their obligations under the UN Charter, international pacts and conventions. We want such approach to become a universal norm. The Security Council should emphasize collective responsibility of the civilized world for protection of personal rights and freedoms.⁵⁹

Galina Starovoitova, prominent Russian democrat and westernizer, has emphasized the importance of international involvement in human right issues from the point of view of protection of democracy in Russia from the threat of authoritarian takeover. Speaking at a conference organized by the Ebert Fund (Germany) and the Institute of Politics (Moscow) as a co-chairperson of the Democratic Russia movement, she said: "We would not consider violation of human rights in our country as an internal affair of Russia. We recognize priority of international law in such issues--the priority that was demonstrated for the first time in history at the Nuremberg Process in 1945."⁶⁰

The concept of "normality," whether used explicitly or implicitly by the Westernizers, implies "behaving like a Western country." But it is important to note that the characteristics of the West used as an example to follow are those produced by the pro-Western belief system itself: the West is seen as honest, benevolent, peaceful, cooperation-oriented, and human-rights caring.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 51; see also Yeltsin's speech in British Parliament, *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p. 8.

⁶⁰*Polis*, 1993, No. 4, p. 208.

2.2 Policy Preferences

2.2.1 Policy Toward the Newly Independent States

The impact of the pro-Western images on policy preferences of the westernizers can be seen in their assessment of different aspects of Russia's relations with other former Soviet republics.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes 12 of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union, and relations with the CIS members constitute the most important part of Russia's foreign policy in the "near abroad," as the territory of the former USSR outside Russian borders is often called. Russian views of the CIS to a significant degree depend on the assessment of the breakup of the USSR: the answer to the question about the CIS legitimacy and viability depends on whether the decision of the republican leaders to disband the USSR and to form the CIS in December 1991 is seen as a mistake (or even a crime) or as the only possible reaction to the historical necessity to destroy the "totalitarian empire." The latter assessment logically follows from the pro-Western belief system. The formation of the CIS is seen as the only alternative to a violent and uncontrolled explosion that would have otherwise destroyed the "totalitarian empire" of the Soviet Union. As Yeltsin said to the VI Congress of the People's Deputies (April 1992), "We had to undertake urgent measures to prevent an uncontrolled breakup of the state, to form a new basis for further coexistence of republics

that were linked together by thousands of threads. That was the main reason that made the twelve states join the Commonwealth."⁶¹ Kozyrev repeated the same idea at the Congress:

There is no choice today between the USSR and the CIS....The real choice that we can and should make is the choice between difficult and multi-stage process of formation of the CIS and further uncontrolled breakdown, aggravation of relations with neighbors, the choice between step-by-step construction of a belt of good-neighborliness around Russia and a "Yugoslav variant" of hopeless and destructive use of force.⁶²

The westernizers are aware of Russia's significant interests in the CIS zone, which is explained by the closeness of the states that used to be parts of a single country. However, the question of Russia's role in the CIS and of means of protecting Russia's interests is different. In the pro-Western view, Russia should be aware of the imperialist past of Soviet totalitarian empire and, as Kozyrev said at his press conference on 17 March 1993, "not to claim a role of the former imperial center and to have any imperial ambitions."⁶³ Shishkov wrote: "The specter of the former imperial center is invisibly standing between Russia and other countries of the CIS."⁶⁴ According to Zagorsky et al., "Russian policy should unequivocally renounce any hegemonistic claims

⁶¹*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 9-10, p. 3.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 3-4; see also Kozyrev's speech at the conference "Transformed Russia in the New World," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 6, p. 35.

⁶³*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 7-8, p. 39.

⁶⁴Yu. Shishkov, "Budushcheie SNG" ("The Future of the CIS"), *Narodnyi deputat*, 1992, No. 10, p. 85.

for the role of a new center of the Commonwealth. Russia should aim at minimizing costs of the further disintegration and at avoiding hostilities while stimulating *equal* cooperation in pursuing economic and political reforms and in promoting human rights. "⁶⁵

Since the role of a "big brother" for Russia is rejected by the westernizers, they argue that Russia should be very careful in its approach to further CIS integration, in order not to scare others by excessive activism. Yuri Oleshuk wrote in *Izvestiia*:

"Russo-centrism" is natural. Russia is the largest in the former USSR economic, financial, political, and military power and a source of assistance for the near abroad living through hard times. But it's here where the difficulties of the integration process start. Russia used to embody an imperial country for a long time....Obviously, if Russia is active in the matters of integration...this may cause suspicion in the near abroad....Wouldn't it be better to pursue a policy of, so to speak, constructive passivity? Its essence would be in being minimally zealous in the integration construction, yielding it to the other, smaller states. "⁶⁶

Lack of Russia's initiative in the matters of integration is justified, for the Westernizers, by the necessity to concentrate on domestic economic and political reforms. As Zagorsky writes, "The costly policy of reintegration leaves no chance for successful reforms....Russia's economic interests call, at least in the short term, for a

⁶⁵Zagorsky et al., op. cit., p. 5.

⁶⁶Yurii Oleshuk, "Rossiiskie voiska ne poluchat golubykh kasok dlia mirotvorcheskikh operatsii v blizhnem zarubezhie" ("Russian Troops Will Not Get Blue Helmets for Peace-keeping Operations in the Near Abroad"), *Izvestiia*, 28 October 1993, p. 3.

certain, if only temporary, dissociation from the CIS to avoid defeating economic reforms and shaking the financial system."⁶⁷

Part of the cautious integration strategy should be a variable-speed approach rather than an insistence on uniform requirements to all participating states. As Kozyrev wrote, "peculiarities of the republics of the former USSR, of our links with them, and specifics of Russian interests in relations with each republic demand variable-speed and multi-variant movement."⁶⁸ A variable-speed approach is important not only from the point of view of demonstrating to others Russia's restraint, but also because Russia's interests may require differentiated policy toward different CIS states. Kozyrev said in January 1993:

I see nothing terrible in the fact that Ukraine and, say, Turkmenistan give increasingly outspoken preference to bilateral relations. I believe we ought to try more than one alternative of approaching the formation of relations inside the CIS. Let the CIS as an international regional organization include components moving at dissimilar speeds. The Commonwealth should exert collective efforts to solve as many problems as possible. This would be the right approach. In some cases, however, it would be far more preferable for us, too, to deal with Commonwealth members on a bilateral basis, especially in economic matters....I believe we should approach this sphere patiently, allowing for many alternatives and varying speeds. It is a highly effective approach.⁶⁹

⁶⁷Andrei Zagorsky, "Russia, the CIS, and the West," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1994, No. 12, pp. 66-67.

⁶⁸Kozyrev, "God minuvshii...", p. 4; see also Shishkov, op. cit., p. 86.

⁶⁹"What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue: A Forum," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 2, p. 4.

The majority of pro-Western authors do not approve complete Russian disengagement from other former Soviet republics. One of the reasons for that is the belief that Russia can play a positive role in bringing the newly independent states into the "community of civilized nations." As Kozyrev wrote, "those states that are most advanced in their democratic and market-oriented reforms will act as stimulants to those Commonwealth countries where such reforms are still in the initial phase."⁷⁰ Speaking at a Russian Foreign Policy Council's forum on Russia's foreign policy concept in January 1993, Kozyrev applied these ideas to Russia's relations with Central Asian republics:

I reject the idea of a "postimperial area." Nor can I accept attempts to limit cooperation among CIS countries. To be sure, not all our partners are prepared for it. We show from time to time that we are not prepared either, but, after all, it is a goal we must strive to attain. We must prevent a drift to "Asiaticism" or we may risk, say, allowing Islamic fundamentalists of other extremists in the region to bring Central Asia under their sway. We must draw the region into the CSCE process with all its lofty principles.

We saw to it that in early 1992 those states were admitted to the CSCE. It was not because we had forgotten geography, the fact that they lie in Asia. On the contrary, we did that precisely because we know full well that they lie in Asia. Russia's goal and interests demand ensuring that our international environment is not "Asiaticism" but the CSCE area with its democratic standards and market rules, or all that is inherent in European political culture.⁷¹

The speech at the forum repeated arguments that were put forward by Kozyrev two months earlier when, speaking to the officers of the 201st Division of Russian army and

⁷⁰Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," p. 11.

⁷¹"What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue....," p. 4.

of the border troops in Tajikistan, he stated that Russia's interests consist in that the states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan would not find themselves overwhelmed by the forces of extremism, including the ones of Islamic fundamentalism. He said: "It is very important for us that the former union republics, now the CIS countries, gradually overcoming the difficulties, were pulling into the civilized community, were becoming its part."⁷²

A similar approach is shared by many analysts. Grebenshchikov, for example, argues that, although Moscow, knowing the burden of "imperial overstretch," is not eager to dominate its former provinces again, it cannot and should not isolate itself from the stormy processes under way in the former USSR: "Voluntary self-isolation is incompatible with the position of a responsible member of the international community."⁷³

The pro-Western belief system sees Russia's role in the CIS as the one of a facilitator of westernization. One reason for this view, as the excerpts cited above indicate, is the belief in a direct link between domestic politics and foreign policies, i.e. that capitalist democratic countries are inherently peaceful and friendly toward each other; therefore, the more "civilized" Russia's neighbors are, the more stability there is on the Russian borders. Another reason has to do with the problem of ethnic minorities, first of all Russian minorities.

⁷²*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p. 53.

⁷³Grebenshchikov, op. cit., p. 95.

The problem of ethnic minorities has been one of the most important issues on the agenda of Russian policy toward the newly independent states. The problem has two major components: threats to security of members of ethnic minorities in countries ridden by violent ethnic and civil conflicts, and threats to their legal and social equality with the members of a "titular" nationality (the latter issue has been raised mostly with respect to the condition of Russian-speaking population of the Baltic states). Kozyrev has argued on numerous occasions that after the collapse of communism the main danger to peace and democracy comes from "aggressive nationalism": "If earlier people had to be protected mostly from encroachments of totalitarian regimes, now those are first of all the victims of aggressive nationalism who need protection."⁷⁴

In its assessment of "aggressive nationalism" as a grave problem the pro-Western belief system does not differ from others. The difference lies in the vision of means of confronting this problem. The issue of protection of ethnic Russians in the "near abroad" has been one of the most controversial in Russian politics, and the westernizers, first of all Kozyrev, have been often accused in betrayal of the fellow Russians who have found themselves abroad after the breakup of the USSR. Nationalists have demanded a tougher approach to countries allegedly violating rights of ethnic Russians. Kozyrev's position

⁷⁴"Vystuplenie A. V. Kozyreva na vsemirnoi konferentsii po pravam cheloveka 15 iiunia 1993 goda" ("A.V. Kozyrev's Speech at the Global Conference on Human Rights, 15 June 1993"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 13-14, p. 14; see also Kozyrev's speech at the session of CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1992, *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 1-2, p. 33; speech to the army and border troops officers in Tajikistan, *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p. 52.

in this debate included three major points.

First, the most important way of controlling "aggressive nationalism" is to "internationalize" the problem, i.e. to facilitate international organizations' involvement in human and minority rights issues on the territory of the former USSR and make the governments of the newly independent states feel a responsibility to the international community. The issue of Russians in the "near abroad" is put in the pro-Western image into a broader context of human rights protection, which is crucial for the "internationalization" of the problem.⁷⁵ As Kozyrev said to the VI Congress of People's Deputies, "the arsenal of Russian policy includes international mechanisms that the republics will have to take into account not only for political reasons, but also in a hope to receive economic aid that is traditionally linked by the West with the respect to human rights and to all CSCE norms."⁷⁶ This is why the entry of Central Asian states into the CSCE was considered important. Addressing the fact that participation in the CSCE puts serious requirements on member states, Kozyrev told the 201st Division and border troops officers in Tajikistan: "Among those requirements are observation of democratic norms, respect to human and national minority rights. This is also a direct

⁷⁵See for example Yeltsin's speech at the Council of Heads of States of the CIS on 16 April 1993, *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 9-10, p.41; Kozyrev's speech at the conference "Transformed Russia in the New World," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 6, p. 35; Shelov-Kovedyaev, op. cit., p.104; Etinger, op. cit., p. 90.

⁷⁶*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 9-10, p. 4.

answer to the concerns and needs of Russian and Russian-speaking population."⁷⁷ In his speeches at CSCE forums Kozyrev has strongly spoken for the use of CSCE (as well as the UN) mechanisms, including the office of High Commissioner for National Minorities, for protection of the rights of Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia.⁷⁸

Secondly, resorting to dictation and force may have negative consequences for the minorities themselves. Both Kozyrev and Yeltsin stressed at the VI Congress of People's Deputies in April 1992 that ultimatums and threats to use force would only provoke distrust and possibly violence against Russian minorities who would be considered as a "fifth column."⁷⁹

Thirdly, Kozyrev (and this goes beyond the scope of the minorities issue) has never entirely excluded forcible methods from the arsenal of Russian foreign policy. In the same speech at the VI Congress he said:

If we want to live in a democratic state that meets the highest standards ourselves, we should accordingly build our relations with the neighboring CIS states, without excuses and attempts to return to an idea that we have not grown up yet to observe democratic standards. This, however, does not mean that we shouldn't use sufficiently tough, including forcible, methods of protecting Russia's interests and human rights; on the contrary, we assume the necessity of mastering such levers, but in strict

⁷⁷*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p. 53.

⁷⁸See for example, *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 1-2, pp. 32-33; No. 23-24, pp. 41-42.

⁷⁹See *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 9-10, pp. 3-4.

adherence to modern ideas and norms of international law.⁸⁰

Resort to forcible methods is conditioned here by "ideals and norms of international law"; when this principle was applied to real conflicts on the territory of the former USSR, the westernizers argued for sanctioning of Russian actions by international organizations (such as the CIS, the CSCE, and the UN) as opposed to unilateral actions.

As Russian involvement in settling conflicts in the CIS states in a form of peace-keeping operations expanded (Tajikistan, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Moldova), Kozyrev was seeking an international mandate to Russian peacekeeping, presenting it as an essential part of the international community's peacekeeping efforts around the world. He repeatedly called for the CSCE support of Russian operations and for sharing their financial burden. He argued that what Russia was already doing was meeting the needs of the international community: "We need not invent speculative schemes or various artificial conditions for conducting peacekeeping operations, but practically implement and improve what life itself suggests. We call on the CSCE to support Russia's peacekeeping efforts."⁸¹ In his speech at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council session in June 1993 Kozyrev cited protection of Tajik-Afghan border by Russian soldiers as an example of an operation beneficial for the whole international community due to its contribution to prevention of drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe via

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 4.

⁸¹*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993; see also *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 1-2, p. 33; No. 21-22, p. 24; No. 23-24, p. 42.

Tajikistan.⁸²

Search for the international organizations' involvement in Russian relations with the former Soviet republics is a part of the general westernizers' desire to design and implement Russian foreign policy in cooperation with the West. According to Zagorsky, "A major prerequisite for finding an adequate response to old and new challenges of the post-Soviet area is a coordinated Russian-Western policy, the working out of a common cooperative strategy."⁸³

The pro-Western view of Russian policy priorities regarding the former Soviet republics includes a strong element of reversing the former, imperialist approach. Russia should by all means avoid creating an impression of a power pretending to play a hegemonic role in the post-Soviet area, and therefore should very cautiously approach CIS integration. In fact, the westernizers do not want Russia to lead in that process. However, they want Russia to be a leader in westernization, i.e. in the promotion of democratic and market reforms and in the integration of the former Soviet republics into international (Western) institutions, such as the OSCE.

⁸²See *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 13-14, p. 14.

⁸³Zagorsky, op. cit., p. 71.

2.2.2 Policy toward the West

The pro-Western belief system reserves a special place for the West. The West is a model to emulate, an ideological ally, a source of help, and a community to join. Since the overall goal of Russia is the return to the "family of civilized nations," its foreign policy should secure and facilitate partnership with the industrialized democratic nations. It should facilitate Russia's entry to the most important organizations which provide foundations of the contemporary world economic order. Addressing Russia's "opening" to the world, Kozyrev wrote in 1992:

We are undertaking concrete steps toward this aim by exploring an area that for decades has been a "diplomatic virgin land" for us. We are joining the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; becoming more active in the European Bank; establishing in deeds rather than words an interaction with the Group of Seven industrial nations, the European Community, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional banks and economic forums in Asia and the Pacific and other regions. We have a lot to learn. But rest assured, we are learning fast.⁸⁴

Relations with the West are friendly due to the sharing of common democratic values; the task is to develop appropriate political cooperation. The terms used by the westernizers for the description of a desired state of relations between Russia and the West are "partnership" and even "alliance."⁸⁵ Yeltsin said to the British Parliament in

⁸⁴Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," p. 9.

⁸⁵See for example Kozyrev's speech at the conference "Transformed Russia in the New World," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 6, p. 35.

November 1992: "I am sure that the achieved level of mutual understanding and trust is not the limit. I think that today time has come to raise the question of transition of Russia's relations with the West from partnership to alliance."⁸⁶ The content of the concept of "alliance" is not entirely clear. Yeltsin stressed in the same speech that he did not mean creation of any "closed alliance" or, moreover, of a "military bloc." He said: "I mean first of all trust and mutual understanding, the level of which may be raised." The only development of the concept included the following: "The relationship of alliance implies final elimination of military confrontation."⁸⁷ Kozyrev's interpretation is similar: "In our concept of alliance with the West, there is no room for political confrontation, because there is no longer an enemy."⁸⁸

The United States occupies a special place in Russian foreign policy envisaged by the westernizers, due to both the U.S. leading position in the world and Russia's role as an heir to the former second superpower, the Soviet Union. The general goal of Russian policy toward the United States is the same as toward the West in general: partnership and alliance. Kozyrev said in February 1993:

Our next door neighbors include the United States....I am quite sure that in this case our national interest lies in establishing the closest possible partnership and eventually allied relations with that leading Western

⁸⁶*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p. 7; see also Yeltsin's speech at the UN Security Council Summit (January 1992), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 4-5, p. 49.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Kozyrev, "The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance," p. 7.

country and our biggest Eastern neighbor. We need this from the point of view of our relations with the Seven, with international monetary institutions, as well as because we want to enter the Asia-Pacific region, to which we should belong. We have tried to achieve this through confrontation with the United States but have gotten nowhere.⁸⁹

The foundation of a Russian-U.S. partnership is the same as in the case of relations with the West in general: common values. Kozyrev wrote in January 1993:

"On the basis of existing agreements in military and financial-economic areas, Russia intends to achieve a steady development of relations with the U.S.A., with a goal of strategic partnership and, in the perspective, of alliance based on common values."⁹⁰

The *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* editorial emphasized that the new quality of relations between Russia and the United States is based on "congruent views on relations between a citizen and the state, principles of construction of the civil society and organization of effective economic life."⁹¹ If common values are the foundation of the alliance, the latter's goals include struggle for strengthening these values on the global scale, for the superiority of law and respect to human rights, for regional and global security, and stable and harmonious development of all countries and nations--"in other words, for a just new international order."⁹²

⁸⁹"What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue...", p. 5.

⁹⁰Kozyrev, "Rossiia:god minuvshii...", p. 5.

⁹¹"Rossiia-America...", p. 20.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 18.

Any success in the development of Russian-American relations tends to be interpreted by the westernizers as a step in the direction of forging closer partnership and building the new world order. One such success was the signing of the START II Treaty. Yeltsin said at a press conference on 3 January 1993 after the treaty had been signed:

This is a Treaty of a new epoch, a Treaty between two friendly powers, between partners who not only trust but also help each other. It indicates our mutual determined movement toward the new world order. From the first days of its existence the democratic Russian state embarked on building relations of equal partnership with the United States of America. Today we have full right to say that genuine revolution in relations between the two great powers has happened.⁹³

The westernizers see two reasons why the signing of START II became possible. First, Russia demonstrated a new approach having abandoned traditional Soviet determination to maintain numerical parity in nuclear warheads and drag on the negotiation process. "The past tactic of slow negotiations that were sometimes slower than the arms race, the tactic of propagandist declarations was changed by Russia's diplomacy into radical and accelerated decisions on reduction and liquidation of weapons, first of all of mass destruction, and on strengthening of global stability and security."⁹⁴ Second, the United States has also significantly modified its approach to arms reduction negotiations with the democratic Russia compared to its approach to negotiations with the totalitarian Soviet Union. Two officials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs--Oleg

⁹³*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 1-2, p. 25.

⁹⁴"Rossiia-America...", p. 18.

Sokolov and Yuri Klyukin--argued that the treaty became possible only due to the new level of political confidence between the two nations, and this could be proven by the fact (in their opinion) that the United States would execute comparatively more profound reductions in its nuclear forces than Russia.⁹⁵ Kozyrev wrote earlier commenting on the Joint Understanding on the Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms that had been signed in June 1992 and served as basis for the START II:

We must realize that the United States knows our actual economic and financial potentialities very well. The reason why it has put its signature to the Joint Understanding is not at all fear that Russia may achieve military superiority. What lies at the basis of the accord is the fact that the United States has really accepted our concept of Russian-American relations. It would never have agreed to cuts in the two most valuable components of its strategic triad had it not set out before that to promote relations with our country on the principles of partnership and eventual alliance.⁹⁶

One serious challenge to the pro-Western belief system with its clear orientation toward partnership and even alliance with the West came in late 1993-early 1994 when a much publicized "cooling down" of Russian-American relations occurred, mostly due to Russian disagreement with U.S./NATO actions in Bosnia and to U.S. pressure to speed up the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, as well as its unwillingness to support Russian requests for international approval for Russia's peacekeeping operations in the former USSR. The mood of most analysts in that period is characterized

⁹⁵See Oleg Sokolov, Yuri Klyukin, "Starting off for a Secure Future," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 3, pp. 5-9.

⁹⁶Kozyrev, "Washington Summit...", pp. 7-8.

by such titles of articles as Brzezinski's "The Premature Partnership" and Pushkov's "Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over."

In response to the grim predictions about the future of Russian foreign policy in general and of Russian-American relations in particular, Kozyrev developed a set of counter-arguments in a series of his articles and speeches, trying to maintain the framework of pro-Western beliefs. First of all, he confirmed that he did not see any viable alternative to Russian-American partnership: "Indeed, partnership is the best strategic choice for Russia and the United States. Rejection of it would mean the loss of a historic opportunity to facilitate the formation of a democratic, open Russian state and the transformation of an unstable, post-confrontational world into a stable and democratic one."⁹⁷ Russia and the U.S.A. are and should be engaged in "strategic partnership" which means that "we share common values, and national interests of Russia and the U.S.A. with regards to major world's problems do not conflict but rather complement each other."⁹⁸

Second, those who doubt the necessity of close partnership represent specific group interests rather than the national ones. Kozyrev indicated two particular groups that are not interested in Russian-American rapprochement: "military-industrial groups and factions of government bureaucracies in both countries" and "the traditional

⁹⁷Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," p. 59.

⁹⁸Andrei Kozyrev, "Rossiia i SShA: partnerstvo ne prezhdvremenno, a zapazdyvaet" (Russia and the U.S.A.: Partnership is Not Premature but Lagging"), *Izvestiia*, 11 March 1994, p. 3.

American Sovietologists" who "harp on the difficulties and unpredictability of Russian internal processes, which do not fit the usual Western criteria and stereotypes" and "cannot accept the idea of a strong Russia, whether it be imperial or democratic."⁹⁹

Third, partnership and alliance do not imply absence of disagreements and disputes which arise from different visions of national interests: "...a firm and sometimes aggressive policy of defending one's national interests is not incompatible with partnership. Germany and France have shown that national interests can be pursued by cooperation instead of war. It would be naive to expect anything else when talking about great nations, especially unique ones, like Russia and the United States."¹⁰⁰ Genuine partnership is characterized not by agreement on all issues but by the approach to settling disagreements; therefore, the principled position of the Russian leadership should be the following: "Russia's national and state interests in the world arena should be pursued through cooperation and not through confrontation."¹⁰¹

Fourth, the initial illusion that partnership would mean a conflict-free and problem-free idyll contributed to the lack of well-defined strategy of partnership. Such strategy, according to Kozyrev, should include four elements. First, mutual recognition as like-minded nations, committed to democracy, human rights, and responsible

⁹⁹Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," p. 60.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 62-63.

¹⁰¹Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe," *NATO Review*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (August 1994), p. 3.

international behavior. Second, closing institutional gaps between Russia and the West, i.e. gradual admission of Russia to the Group of Seven and transformation of NATO so that it could accommodate interests of Russia. Third, the rules of partnership should be established; these rules should be based on mutual trust which implies not only informing one another of decisions made, but also agreeing on approaches beforehand. An important rule should be equality and absence of paternalism from any side.¹⁰²

Kozyrev's vision of both the obstacles to partnership and the ways to promote it is based on a belief that, after Russia has broken with its communist and authoritarian past and become a "like-minded nation" with the West, all that is needed to establish partnership and alliance is political will and mutual understanding. Belief in an inherent inclination of all democratic nations toward friendship and cooperation makes him look for explanation to the problems in relations between Russia and the U.S.A./the West in mental factors, such as stereotypes, narrow-mindedness, mental inertia, and lack of sensitivity. The objective interest of the West lies in cooperation with Russia and support of its reforms; the problems arise when this interest is not properly understood by political leaders.

This emphasis on trust and mutual understanding has always characterized the westernizers' approach to Russia's relations with the West. Describing what Russia and the West ought to do for the implementation of the partnership in spring of 1993, Kozyrev suggested that Russia improve conditions for foreign businessmen, ensure the

¹⁰²See Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," pp. 65-66.

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensure that Russian arms exports "do not upset existing balances anywhere in the world and are only acquired by stable partners." The West for its part should provide stable financial, technical, and organizational support for economic reforms in Russia. This inevitably involves a good deal of altruism: "However difficult it may be, Western firms will also have to allow Russia its place in world markets for high technologies, aerospace equipment, and even military equipment, that is, in those areas where Russian enterprises can manufacture world-class products."¹⁰³ In January 1993 he said: "...our partners will have to make room for us on markets, give government support to investments in Russia's economy, including investments into our program for conversion. They will have to spend money. But you do that to help an ally, a partner, a friend."¹⁰⁴ Other analysts have also assumed existence of a sense of mutual responsibility of Russia and the West for the fate of Russian reforms; for example, Bocharov wrote on Russia's revival:

Obviously, the sooner it happens, the sooner [Russia] will start contributing much more than now to the strengthening of progressive trends of the post-Soviet period of world development. But this requires more resolute and, to some extent, altruistic actions from the leaders of the world community which is headed now by the U.S.A., in order to facilitate Russia's exit from the political and socio-economic crisis.... The leading countries of the world realize not only theoretically but also practically how detrimental the prolonged crisis situation in Russia may

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 5

¹⁰⁴"What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue," p. 6.

be for the world.¹⁰⁵

Since mutual understanding is crucial for partnership, Russia should convince the Western countries in its commitment to democratic values and to "civilized" foreign policy. As Kozyrev said: "I think we have a stake in persuading our partners far and near that we have the most normal intentions, that we want to become a first-class democratic country with a dynamically developing market economy, to have with all countries relations based on neighborliness and partnership and eventually on alliance."¹⁰⁶ In fact, Kozyrev's articles and speeches addressed to the Western audience in 1993-1994 were part of that effort, first, to convince it that all twists in Russian foreign policy had nothing to do with the reversal of the general pro-Western course and, second, to reproach the Western leadership in lack of understanding of Russia's difficulties, namely the danger of the nationalist opposition exploiting every opportunity to accuse the Russian government in lack of independent foreign policy and the necessity for Russia to promptly react to violent conflicts in the newly independent states and to protect Russian ethnic minorities.¹⁰⁷ In his quest for mutual trust he appealed to the readers of *Foreign Affairs*:

Undoubtedly, problems may arise between our nations in the future that

¹⁰⁵I. F. Bocharov, "Ugrozy natsional'noi bezopasnosti SshA i Rossiia" ("The Threats to the U.S. National Security and Russia"), *SshA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, 1993, No. 9, p. 19.

¹⁰⁶"What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue," p. 6.

¹⁰⁷See Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," pp. 67-71.

will require frank and sometimes unpleasant dialogue. The question is this: How do we approach these problems--with trust or with suspicion, with a wait-and-see attitude or with the spirit of cooperation? American foreign policy is often accused of idealistic optimism. But that is its strength rather than its weakness. In the past, the United States has shown its ability to see beyond narrowly perceived national interests for the sake of major strategic goals. Now is the time for America to show this ability in fostering the transition from the Cold War to a secure democratic peace.¹⁰⁸

One of the most controversial issues in Russia's relations with the West has been Russia's approach toward European security and NATO. NATO as a military alliance of democratic nations and a cornerstone of security of the "civilized world" has been usually perceived by the Westernizers quite positively. Moskvin in his 1991 article called for close cooperation with NATO and for "integration into the security structures of the developed democratic countries."¹⁰⁹ Blagovolin argued that Russia had no other way of guaranteeing its national security than "gradual, careful, but absolutely determined integration into a security system common with the West"; the primary task was to "establish solid institutional links with NATO as a whole and with the U.S.A."¹¹⁰ Kozyrev said about NATO in early 1992: "We have a natural desire to cooperate with this mechanism and become connected with it."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 70-71.

¹⁰⁹See Moskvin, op. cit., p. 26.

¹¹⁰Blagovolin, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

¹¹¹*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 1-2, p. 11.

Positive attitudes toward NATO's role in European security did not provide an answer to the question about concrete forms of cooperation with the alliance which had been functioning as an institution of a common defence against the USSR. The real problem came when the issue of admitting the countries of Eastern Europe to NATO was put on the agenda. An article by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Vladimir Kozin written in early 1993 is quite illustrative for the westernizers' thinking on this issue. Kozin gives a very high assessment of NATO's role as a carrier of transatlantic links between Europe and America, an organization contributing to settlement of ethnic conflicts in Europe, a connecting link in East-West exchange on military issues, and a facilitator of evolving approaches to the problems of disarmament and weapons control. He argues that NATO has shown a high degree of active adaptation to the challenges of the post-Cold War situation by modifying its military doctrine, by promoting a climate of greater mutual confidence in Europe and beyond, and by taking the initiative of unilaterally reducing its offensive military potential.¹¹² Kozin's opinion is that "Russia should be interested in the existence of NATO for a long time to come and in promoting partnership with it."¹¹³ However, Kozin is against expansion of NATO by way of admitting Central and East European countries or former Soviet republics into it without admitting Russia: "The question of extended NATO

¹¹²See Vladimir Kozin, "New Dimensions of NATO," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 3, pp. 30-32.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, p. 32.

membership should probably be decided on the key principle of 'nonisolation and nondiscrimination.' NATO should admit either all applicants or none."¹¹⁴ This does not mean that Russia should rush an application to NATO; Kozin argues that Russia should promote cooperation with NATO without joining it as a full member. But "Moscow could not afford to stay out should the alliance be joined by other countries: sovereign ex-members of the Soviet Union or countries in Central and Eastern Europe. To admit them to NATO without a positive decision on Russian membership would amount to a fresh division of Europe."¹¹⁵

Kozyrev in his 1993-94 speeches and writings also denounced the idea of Central and Eastern Europe's full membership in NATO, using the following arguments. First, that would mean a demonstration of mistrust to the democratic Russia which would conflict with the spirit of partnership. Second, it would create a situation of Russia's isolation that would play directly into the hands of nationalist opposition which would use it to heat up a defensive hysteria arguing that Russia has been encircled. If Russia is "seen in Western capitals as something 'unnecessary' or 'dangerous', this would only encourage our 'national patriots' to increase their attacks on current Russian policy and would sustain their chauvinist desires to close off Russia in pseudo-superpower

¹¹⁴Tbid., p. 34.

¹¹⁵Tbid.

isolation."¹¹⁶ Third, Central and Eastern Europe's entry to NATO without Russia would create new divisions in Europe and undermine the process of building a united, democratic, and secure Europe. "It is important not to miss the chance for the formation of a united democratic Europe that implies guaranteeing equal level of security for each state and real partnership on the basis of common democratic principles of the CSCE."¹¹⁷

When NATO initiated the "Partnership for Peace" program in late 1993, Kozyrev and other westernizers approved it as a correct measure for promoting partnership. Kozyrev wrote: "The virtue and, if you wish, foresight of the 'Partnership for Peace' program adopted by the NATO leaders is in the fact that it, so to speak, opens NATO, makes the first step towards its transformation from a bloc into another form of organization of security. And, therefore, it fits well our concept of all-European partnership."¹¹⁸ (Russia joined the program in June 1994.)

However, the "Partnership for Peace" is considered mostly as a good temporary solution rather than as a final one. Russia-NATO cooperation, in the pro-Western view, should receive a more solid institutional foundation. The most radical option was suggested, among others, by a prominent reformer, former Minister of Finance and now

¹¹⁶Kozyrev, "The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance," p. 5; see also idem., "Obshcheevropeiskoe partnerstvo" ("All-European Partnership"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 2 March 1994, p. 4.

¹¹⁷Kozyrev, "Obshcheevropeiskoe partnerstvo."

¹¹⁸Ibid.

a Deputy of the State Duma, Boris Fedorov, who argued that Russia should immediately apply for NATO membership.¹¹⁹ A more cautious approach included an idea of strengthening NATO-affiliated organizations, primarily the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) that had been set up in late 1991. Kozyrev said in June 1994:

The Partnership for Peace program is important, but it is only one of the directions of establishing military-political cooperation.

Another direction, whose potential should be used more actively, is the cooperation through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. We see prospects for increasing the NACC's role in European affairs, its larger involvement in the issues of coordinations of military activity of states and particularly in peace keeping.¹²⁰

In Kozin's opinion, the NACC could become an optimum instrument of interaction between Russia, other newly independent states, former WTO members, and NATO. Kozin supported suggestions on extending the NACC functions so that it could provide a framework for consultations on security issues, conduct peace-keeping missions planning and humanitarian relief operations, and implement programs of technical assistance for defense conversion.¹²¹ Kozyrev in his speeches at NACC meetings argued for transformation of the NACC into an effective peacekeeping organization

¹¹⁹Boris Fedorov, "Rossiia dolzhna vstupit' v NATO" ("Russia Must Join NATO"), *Izvestiia*, 6 September 1994, p. 2.

¹²⁰"Vystuplenie A.V. Kozyreva na zasedanii soveta NATO (Briussel', 22 iunია)" ("A.V. Kozyrev's speech at the meeting of the NATO Council (Brussels, 22 June)," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1994, No. 13-14, p. 31.

¹²¹Kozin, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

connecting NATO and the CSCE.¹²² As he said in June 1994, "According to our concept of all-European partnership, under the central role of the CSCE, the NACC would coordinate cooperation in the military-political sphere and particularly in peace-making. In order to do this, the NACC can and should be gradually transformed into an independent body."¹²³

The pro-Western vision of post-Cold War European security assigns a very important role to the CSCE. As noted above, Kozyrev has argued that the CSCE with its democratic principles had been the organization that contributed to the collapse of totalitarianism in the USSR and should continue to promote human rights and democracy throughout Europe and the former USSR. He called on numerous occasions for strengthening the CSCE. In January 1992 he suggested that the CSCE needed effective instruments of realization of its principles, and that the way to do it was to develop an effective mechanism of political consultations, to improve crisis prevention and settlement instruments, to create CSCE peacekeeping forces, to create a CSCE economic forum, and to change the decision-making rules based on consensus to the ones based on a "consensus minus one" formula in matters of human rights.¹²⁴

During the debate on NATO expansion Kozyrev and others put forward the idea

¹²²See *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 13-14, pp. 13-14; No. 23-24, p. 43.

¹²³"Rossiia-SSAS. Zasedanie SSAS na urovne ministrov inostrannykh del. Vystuplenie A.V. Kozyreva." ("Russia-NACC. NACC foreign ministers meeting. Speech by A.V. Kozyrev."), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1994, No. 13-14, p. 25.

¹²⁴See *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 4-5, p. 40.

of transforming the CSCE into a central organization of European security which would coordinate activities of other organizations, such as the NACC, NATO, and the CIS.¹²⁵

Kozyrev wrote in summer of 1994:

We see as the main goal of the Russia-NATO partnership the establishment of a system of collective security and stability in Europe. Partnership should not lead to a juxtaposition of NATO to other institutions, but, on the contrary, to coordination of their activities in pursuit of their goals. One should mention here the CSCE first of all. It has already accumulated considerable potential for maintaining and strengthening peace in Europe. This logic also applies to the NACC. Our partnership can contribute to transforming the NACC into an independent body which would be closely linked to the CSCE and which would promote military-political cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic Area. Generally speaking, the CSCE should aim at coordinating the activities of NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the WEU, and the CIS in the sphere of enhancing stability and security, promoting peacekeeping and protecting human and national minority rights.¹²⁶

Disapproval of the expansion of NATO without Russian participation by all major political forces in Russia, including the westernizers, has been interpreted by many analysts as a sign of reversal of Russia's pro-Western foreign policy. Brzezinski argued that "prevailing Russian thinking about Central Europe is an extension of...proto-imperial approach."¹²⁷ This assessment is dubious if applied to Kozyrev and other westernizers

¹²⁵See for example, Kozyrev, "Obshcheevropeiskoe partnerstvo"; Kozyrev's speeches at the NACC meeting on 11 June 1993 (*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 13-14, p. 13) and at the meeting of CSCE Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 30 November 1993 (*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 23-24, p. 43).

¹²⁶Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO...", p. 5.

¹²⁷Zbignev Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994).

(as Brzezinski does). Their position on NATO is not only compatible with the pro-Western belief system but directly follows from it. The main reason for Kozyrev's rejection of the idea of Central and Eastern Europe's entry to NATO is the fear of being left out of the process of integration with the West. As Kozyrev said, "Both we and these [East/Central European] countries have the same goal--to obtain a decent place in the "club" of highly developed democratic states. The question is how to achieve that goal through cooperation and not through elbow-pushing of each other."¹²⁸ The westernizers' alternative provides for Russia's involvement in common institutions with NATO members and strengthening those institutions (NACC, CSCE). It is naive to suspect Kozyrev of an intention to achieve Russia's domination in those institutions; arguing for their strengthening he is aware that this would bring not only an opportunity for Russia to have more influence on the process of building a new European security but also obligations and a higher degree of dependence of Russian foreign policy on multinational institutions. The idea of strengthening international institutions has always been at the core of the westernizers' vision of a post-Cold War world freed of the superpower rivalry. As noted above, they see growing supranationalism as a natural result of cooperation and partnership among democratic nations and want the new Russia to be included in the process. It may be true that Kozyrev was much more optimistic

¹²⁸"Vostochnaia Evropa v novykh usloviakh i vneshniaia politika Rossii: Zasedanie Soveta po vneshnei politike pri MID RF" ("Eastern Europe in the New Conditions and Russia's Foreign Policy: the Meeting of the RF MFA Foreign Policy Council"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1993, No. 23-24, p. 59.

about the Russian-U.S. partnership and was giving a more positive assessment of U.S. foreign policy in 1992 than in 1994. But it is also true that neither in 1994 nor in 1992 did he envisage a possibility for Russia to simply follow the lead of the only superpower. The westernizers never agreed to assign to Russia the role of a humble loser of the Cold War, because, in their view, the new Russia has little to do with the Soviet Union, and it was communism, not Russia, who lost the Cold War.¹²⁹ In early 1992 Kozyrev wrote about the unacceptability of assuming a "world policeman" role by anyone as well as about the inevitability of transformation of NATO.¹³⁰ Two years later he asserted it with more clarity: "One thing is sufficiently clear: the international order in the 21st century will not be a Pax Americana or any other version of unipolar or bipolar dominance....The nature of modern international problems calls for solutions on a multilateral basis."¹³¹

Despite some variations during 1991-94, the policy preferences regarding the West, expressed by Kozyrev and other westernizers, included several stable elements:

- Russia's goal is to establish partnership and alliance with the West, above all with the United States, on the basis of common values. These common values should assure mutual understanding; therefore, Russia should persistently try to

¹²⁹See for example, Yeltsin's speech in the British Parliament (November 1992), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 23-24, p.9; Andrei Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," p. 62.

¹³⁰See Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," p. 13.

¹³¹Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," p. 63.

convince the West that Russian and Western interests do not conflict.

- Russia should join the major institutions of the West (GATT, IMF, G-7, and others) as soon as possible.

- Russia should oppose the eastward expansion of NATO, but expand cooperation with that bloc. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council should be given broader responsibilities in the sphere of European security. Russia should participate in the Partnership for Peace program.

- Russia should support the role of the CSCE/OSCE and strengthening it through linking with other organizations, such as NATO and the CIS.

Chapter 3

THE CENTRIST BELIEF SYSTEM

The centrist, or realist, group includes both career politicians and international affairs analysts, many of whom during the last four years started political careers, both in the executive and the legislative branches of power. This chapter is based on selected (most illustrative) articles and speeches by authors who consistently advance centrist views: A. Arbatov, A. Bogaturov, A. Bykov, M. Gareev, S. Karaganov, M. Kozhokin, V. Lukin, D. Matsenov, A. Migranian, K. Pleshakov, V. Razuvayev, S. Rogov, B. Shmelev, N. Simoniya, A. Vladislavlev, Ye. Volkova, and others.

3.1 Images

3.1.1 History of Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy

The centrists are not, as a rule, sympathizers of communist ideology and defenders of the Soviet political regime. Like the westernizers, they criticize various aspects of Soviet foreign policy. For example, Simoniya in his analysis of Russia's security problem notes that, until 1985, the military aspect of national security entirely dominated Soviet foreign policy resulting in the devastating pumping of resources into military production.¹ Lukin notes that Soviet diplomacy, especially since the time of Khrushchev, was characterized by propaganda and bluffing.² Zhinkina and Kortunov, writing about relations between Russia/Soviet Union and the United States, emphasize that Russia should abandon important features of Soviet foreign policy toward the U.S.A.: first of all, the confrontationist approach; and second, the secretive Soviet style of foreign policy decision-making.³ Ambartsumov harshly criticized the ideological

¹See N. Simoniya, "O poniatii natsional'no-gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti" ("On the concept of national-state security"), *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1993, No. 2, p. 4.

²See Vladimir Lukin, "Ot Manilova k Nozdrevu: Slova i vneshniaia politika" ("From Manilov to Nozdriov: Words and foreign policy"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 14 May 1994, p. 3.

³See I. Yu. Zhinkina, A. V. Kortunov, "Ot kakogo nasledstva my ne mozhem otkazat'sia" ("Which heritage we cannot abandon"), *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiia*, 1993, No. 11, p. 3.

character of Soviet foreign policy:

We all remember very well the time when the Soviet Union supported those regimes which, as it seemed to us, were opposed to our principal rival--the United States of America and which were proclaiming themselves "revolutionary." In fact, as a rule, those were despotic, anti-people regimes. And what matters is not only the amorality of our support, but also the colossal self-inflicted bloodletting to our economy.⁴

Despite these and other criticisms, the centrists are much less negative in their assessment of the Soviet Union than the westernizers. They tend not to derive the overall character of Soviet foreign policy from the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime. The major idea of the centrists is that any state's behavior is shaped mostly not by its leaders' views and desires but rather by its position in the international system. Geopolitical realities, in the centrists' view, are of paramount importance. Location of a country, its size, its resources, and its neighbors determine foreign policy more than ideology or the type of the political system. From this point of view, foreign policies of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Russia inevitably have important common features. Bogaturov wrote:

The new federation is not equivalent either to the Russian Empire or to the USSR. What distinguishes it from the former is the globality, carried over from the Bolshevik Union, making for specific foreign interests as distinct from the "average European" ones characteristic of the Romanov dynasty, and from the latter--an anti-revolutionary view on the outside world and a different approach to an interface with it. But innovation

⁴Yevgenii Ambartsumov, "Otstaivat' interesy Rossii" ("To defend Russia's interests"), *Narodnyi deputat*, 1992, No. 16, p. 16.

does not exclude continuity, suffice it to establish its rational limits.⁵

Pleshakov puts forward a similar idea in his article on Russia's "mission" (by which he means the geopolitical mission): "Russia's mission has not flashed across the historical firmament like a comet; it has been there for centuries."⁶

Bogaturov, Kozhokin, and Pleshakov in their joint article developed the idea of continuity with regards to the Soviet foreign policy: "Supernational communist doctrine of the USSR foreign policy for many years masked the geopolitical factors that never ceased to determine the global role of Russia. In fact, Soviet global role was largely derivative from the Russian role....Russia acquired its global geopolitical functions (which were only expanded and altered by the Bolsheviks) due to its intermediate position between traditional West and East."⁷

Most authors who employ geopolitical terminology agree that Russia's (and USSR's) role was the one of a great Eurasian power which stabilized and "organized" the "heartland" of the continent, and served as a buffer between the European civilization and the Asian ones. They note both the negative sides of Russian imperialism (such as the suppression of Polish uprisings and the russification of the Baltic countries) and the

⁵Alexei Bogaturov, "The Eurasian Support of World Stability," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 2, p. 32.

⁶Konstantin Pleshakov, "Russia's Mission: The Third Epoch," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 1, p. 18.

⁷A. D. Bogaturov, M.M. Kozhokin, and K.V. Pleshakov, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii" ("The foreign policy of Russia"), *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, 1992, No. 10, p. 27.

positive ones (such as the civilizing role of Russia in the east and the south of the empire and protection of smaller nations from other conquerors).⁸ In fact, the word "empire" does not bear a negative connotation for the centrists: they consider it as an adequate form of relationship between peoples for some epochs in history. Pleshakov writes:

Russia's...expansion in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus, in North America, and finally, in Central Asia has been called imperial expansion. The imperial period in any nation's development cannot be painted in black and white colors alone. Essentially unjust, the empires do, nevertheless, weave the common fabric of civilization and bring isles and islets into a broad international interface....Russia's objective role was to gather the mainland Eurasia together. The imperial period of the existence of European nations led to a disunited world getting united to constitute a planetary civilization. The primary forms of integration were bound to be imperial.⁹

Moreover, the centrists carefully stress the uniqueness of the Russian Empire, its difference from other empires. Shmelev argues that, unlike the British or the Ottoman empires which were created in order to exploit colonies for the sake of the metropolis's development, the Russian Empire emerged as a result of "the colonization of the new lands, a purposeful policy of gathering all Russian lands in the single state, a natural desire to improve its geopolitical position, inspired by this desire steady movement

⁸See Bogaturov, op. cit., pp. 32-33; Pleshakov, op. cit., pp. 18-19; B.A. Shmelev, "Problemy formirovaniia vneshnei politiki Rossii" ("The problems of formation of Russia's foreign policy"), *Rossii i sovremennyi mir*, 1993, No. 1, p. 54; D. Matsenov, "Interesy i bezopasnost' Rossii v postsovetskuiu epokhu" ("The interests and security of Russia in the post-Soviet epoch"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1992, No. 4, pp. 21-22; B.M. Pugachev, "Chto posle imperii?" ("What after the empire?"), *Kentavr*, 1992, No. 3/4, p. 3-4.

⁹Pleshakov, op. cit., p. 19.

toward the seas as a necessary condition of economic, cultural, and social prosperity of the country, and also of absorbing into Russia the neighboring peoples who saw in Russia's patronage an opportunity for not only political but also physical survival."¹⁰ Matsenov characterizes the unity of different nationalities in Russia/the USSR as a "model of peaceful coexistence and collective security of the peoples of the 'heartland'."¹¹ The centrists are usually more critical of the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union compared to that of the Russian Empire. In their opinion, the Empire allowed more room for the development of national identities of numerous ethnic groups residing in it, using traditional administrative and cultural institutions.¹² It is necessary to note however, that the centrists do not consider the Soviet Union as a "normal" empire either: they emphasize that if the transfer of wealth existed in the USSR, it was directed from Russia to other republics, and not vice versa.¹³

The centrists' emphasis on the "objective" character of geopolitical factors which

¹⁰Shmelev, op. cit., p. 54

¹¹Matsenov, op. cit., p. 21.

¹²See V.P. Lukin, Presentation at the seminar "Evolution of the CIS and Russia's foreign-policy strategy," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 21-22, p. 49; Matsenov, op. cit., p. 22; Pugachev, op. cit., p. 4.

¹³See Andranik Migranian, "Sny ob SNG" ("Dreams about the CIS"), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 14 September 1994, p. 11; O. Reznikova, "Tsentral'naia Aziia v kontekste mirovoi politiki" ("Central Asia in the context of world politics"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1993, No. 12, p. 22; Richard Ovinnikov, "SNG--ne obuza dlia Moskvyy" ("The CIS is not a burden for Moscow"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 16 April 1994, p. 3.

determine a state's foreign policy leads them to a more positive view of Soviet foreign policy toward the West compared to that of the westernizers. While the westernizers often depict the Cold War confrontation as a global struggle between totalitarianism and democracy, the centrists tend to see the Soviet Union as just another player in the game of world politics—a player who mostly played by the rules. Despite the missionary ideology of Russian communists, writes Bogaturov, it would be not true to say that Moscow became the source of all world troubles after 1917. "The world troubles resulted, as before, from the mistakes, the scheming, and just from the evil designs of large and small powers, and in this sense the role of Soviet Russia was no better, nor any worse than that of nearly any other of the leading nations, properly considered."¹⁴

Analyzing the history of Soviet-American relations after World War II, Bogaturov insists that responsibility for the beginning and unfolding of the Cold War was mutual. Referring to the period of 1945-47, he writes: "...the reciprocal escalation of Soviet and US geopolitical claims that began shortly afterwards resulted in sacrificing the principle of cooperation to confrontation between Moscow and Washington."¹⁵ Similarly: "...the two superpowers quite often, if not as a rule, turned out to be "on the same plane" in the field of practical policies."¹⁶ Assessing post-war Soviet foreign policy in general,

¹⁴Bogaturov, op. cit., p. 35.

¹⁵Alexei Bogaturov, "Global Regulation in Crisis," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, 1993, No. 8, p. 29.

¹⁶Bogaturov, "Eurasian Support...", p. 37.

Bogaturov notes that it became less intransigent and more pragmatic, mostly due to the fact that Soviet leaders appreciated the benefits of "playing by the rules." "True, the appeasement of Stalin's Union was partly due to the geopolitical gains through the creation of a bloc of dependent East-European countries. But still that acquisition was achieved, one might say, 'according to the rules', that is, quite in the spirit of the 19th century, which continued to prevail in the minds of politicians both of the West and of the East."¹⁷

The Soviet Union, according to Bogaturov, was one of the two pillars of the system of "authoritarian two-power regulation" of international relations embodied in the "Yalta-Potsdam order," and, as such, contributed to the global stability.¹⁸ Since 1962, the cooperative elements in the Soviet-American relations grew stronger; in fact, "what actually developed on the basis of 'guided confrontation' from the mid-1960s on was the coordinated formation of the mechanism of maintaining international stability.... That was a starting point of the subsequent stage--the return to Russia's traditional role in the world system. It involved establishing a model of 'confrontational stability'."¹⁹ By "Russia's traditional role" Bogaturov means its role in European and global balance of power in the nineteenth century as a counterbalance to, in sequence, France, Britain, and Germany. The system of "confrontational stability" survived the Vietnam war and Soviet

¹⁷Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁸See Bogaturov, "Global Regulation in crisis," pp. 27-28.

¹⁹Bogaturov, "The Eurasian Support...", p. 37.

invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan due to the prudence of both superpowers.

What really caused the change of the "Yalta-Potsdam order" was, according to Bogaturov, the USSR's failure to recognize the transformation of the "logic of system development," i.e. the growing importance of economic and technological factors in international relations, especially after the oil "shocks" of the 1970s:

Consuming its tremendous oil export earnings, the USSR was late in reappraising the priorities of scientific and technological policies. And, on noticing that, the West redoubled its efforts to widen the gap. Moscow's miscalculation prompted the Atlantic countries to consider wearing out the USSR economically. By the mid-1980s this country reached the limit of its possibilities in every sense, including that of remaining a mainstay of "confrontational stability."²⁰

Analysis of the centrists' view of the Soviet Union shows that it is quite different from the westernizers' image of the "totalitarian empire." First, they do not directly link foreign policy with the character of domestic political regime, emphasizing instead geopolitical factors which secured significant continuity in Russian/Soviet foreign policy. Second, they give a more positive assessment to Russian and Soviet imperialism (criticizing its excesses) considering it as determined mostly by the demands of geopolitical situation. Third, they give a more positive assessment of the USSR's role in the history of XX century international relations recognizing mutual Soviet-American responsibility for the Cold War and positive role of the Soviet Union in the maintenance of global stability.

²⁰Tbid., p. 38.

3.1.2 Post-Cold War International System: Character and Trends

The centrists' views of the trends of post-Cold War international system are different from the views of the westernizers, and this difference is due to, first, the centrists' beliefs about the nature of international relations, and second, to a different assessment of the Soviet Union (analyzed in the previous section) and, consequently, of the effects of the Soviet Union's breakup on world politics. This difference is clearly expressed by Razuvayev:

The real meaning of the events we are witnessing and participating in may be set out as follows:

The Soviet Union vied with the United States for world supremacy for several decades and lost. The loser had to give up not only his "external" empire and spheres of influence but part of his sovereign territory. Ideologized consciousness gave these losses equally ideologized forms (the triumph of democratic forces and the national liberation movement and the defeat of totalitarianism and the imperial center) that means little in the light of an objective analysis.²¹

In the centrists' view, international relations is an arena of competition and conflict not among ideas or social systems (such as capitalism and socialism) but among states pursuing their national interests the core of which is stable and common for all. These core interests deal with state self-preservation, security, and power, and have no direct link to the character of the political system. All large states seek to expand their

²¹Vladimir Razuvayev, "The Superpower Is Gone. Forever," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1992, No. 9, p. 50.

influence abroad. Bykov argues that the end of the twentieth century has not changed the leading powers' desire to "expand their geopolitical space"--the difference is that today they resort to economic and political alliances and integration rather than to wars of aggression.²² In Pleshakov's opinion, "The tendency to build up its power as far as possible (which assumes the form of economic predominance, political supremacy, outright territorial aggrandizement, and so on) is natural for the state as a kind of healthy organism. It is neither a once-only phenomenon nor cyclical but permanent."²³

From this point of view, what has primary importance for the international system is not the collapse of communism but the shift of balance of power in the world, i. e. the shift in the relative capabilities and influence of the leading states. The centrists, as well as the westernizers, point to the breakdown of the bipolar system as the most important international result of the end of the Cold War. However, unlike the westernizers, they do not see this as a beginning of a new era of cooperation and integration of the world's democratic nations. The new world is going to be multipolar. Rogov writes:

The end of the Cold War has radically changed the geopolitical map of the world. The bipolar system of international relations, that reflected the global ideological and military confrontation of the USSR and the U.S.A., has become history....A new system of international relations is forming which is much more diverse and which has a different hierarchy of relations between states. In this multipolar system, the leading role belongs not only to the two superpowers but to several

²²Alexander Bykov, "At the Cross-roads of World Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 3, p. 87.

²³Konstantin Pleshakov, "Geopolitics in the Light of Global Changes," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1994, No. 12, p. 24.

"centers of power."

From this point of view, the world is returning to its normal condition. Indeed, the multipolar system of international relations used to be a typical case, a norm, while the bipolar system (confrontation of Rome and Carthage in antiquity, of France and Britain in Napoleon's times, of the USSR and the U.S.A. in the second half of this century) is rather an exception from the rule.²⁴

This reference to history is very important. The westernizers also sometimes mention multipolarity as a feature of the post-Cold War world, but in their use multipolarity is a synonym for diversity and manifests a need for collective decision-making. For the centrists, multipolarity is a synonym for low manageability and complex balances of power. Thus in Rogov's concept of multipolarity:

In a multipolar world there is no rigid system of domination, and a multipolar balance of power is present which...by definition is a much less firm and stable system.

In recent years much has been said about the imminent change of the Cold War power confrontation by a balance of interests of all participants in world politics. But history does not know examples of stability of a multipolar system of international relations on the basis of a balance of interests of the states participating in such system for a long time.²⁵

A balance of interests, according to Rogov, has been achieved in the past on a bilateral or multilateral basis, but never on a universal basis, and this is why the history of world politics has become primarily a history of wars. Stability of the multipolar system has

²⁴S.M. Rogov, "Rossiia i SSha v mnogopoliarnom mire" ("Russia and the U.S.A. in a multipolar world"), *SSha: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologija*, 1992, No. 10, p. 3; see also Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 8.

²⁵Ibid.

always been maintained by the balance of power, and the equilibrium, as a rule, was short-lived. Each breakdown of an equilibrium led to a military conflict, after which the system stabilized on the basis of a new balance of power, with another destabilization and war waiting for its time. The multipolar system has led to numerous coalition wars in Europe, and it could not prevent the two world wars in the twentieth century. From this analysis Rogov concludes: "Therefore, the idea a return of the system of international relations into its "natural" condition does not provide any ground for optimism, because a multipolar peace is very difficult to keep stable for a long time."²⁶

The Soviet Union and the United States were involved in a confrontation which sometimes put the world on the brink of a global catastrophe. Nevertheless, the Soviet-American conflict has never assumed a form of war, and the two superpowers were relatively successful in localizing the spread of nuclear arms. The strategic balance of power was secured by the rigid control over nuclear weapons. The collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the basis of strategic stability:

The disappearance of one of the superpowers from the world map gave a character of avalanche to the evolution of the system of international relations, having instantly made it multipolar. And this does not at all mean that a "new world order" has been established, which was proclaimed a goal of the Bush administration. One can speak rather about the emergence of a "new world disorder."²⁷

Bogaturov is more cautious with regards to the system that is going to take the

²⁶Ibid., p. 4.

²⁷Ibid.

place of the bipolar one. In his opinion, true multipolarity is not in place yet, especially in the military sphere where an unusual "one-and-a-half" (the United States and Russia) polarity has emerged. But Bogaturov's view of international consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union is similar to Rogov's: the end of the bipolar system, or the "Yalta-Potsdam order," has brought about the drift of the international system toward deregulation. Deregulation, according to Bogaturov, manifests itself at the level of events rather than at the institutional level. This means that while institutions such as the UN, CSCE, and NATO are still functioning, they encounter new, especially regional challenges, for which they have not been designed: "The existing control mechanisms are intended, now as before, to eliminate global threats. As for dealing with limited conflicts, which are the principal evil of the international system, these mechanisms are too cumbersome and unwieldy."²⁸

In Bogaturov's opinion, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the Group of Seven has become a source of regulatory impulses. "Decisions agreed by the Seven take afterwards the form of UN resolutions. Their implementation depends in decisive measure on the efforts of individual countries, which specify half-independently the composition and scope of their participation in coalitions formed 'on the occasion'."²⁹ Due to the new challenges to the world stability and the inadequacy of traditional institutions, the role of force (termed by Bogaturov sometimes as

²⁸Bogaturov, "Global Regulation in Crisis," p. 34; see also Rogov, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁹*Ibid.*

"pressure") is inevitably growing compared to the economic methods of regulating international relations. Bogaturov writes:

Economics has had time to become an effective instrument for system regimentation. But this did not come about until the last three decades, a period when global military political stability was an existing given. It was this favorable climate that enabled economic factors translated into diplomacy to determine the dominant trend of world development. As old stabilizing structures declined, however, the natural limitations of the effectiveness of economic sanctions came out.³⁰

The centrist analysts cite a variety of challenges to the international stability in the post-Cold War era. First is a wave of new nationalism and religious fanaticism that is undermining stability of states not only in the Third World but, most importantly, in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The second challenge comes from the consequences of the breakup of the Soviet Union, especially of its military (including nuclear) forces. The third is the North-South conflict which feeds instability in the Third World and leads some developing countries to aspire to acquisition of modern weapons, including nuclear capability. The fourth challenge comes from possible destabilizing role of new centers of power.³¹

The issue of the "new centers of power" has two sides. The first deals with the problem of regional hegemony which is important because the new "centers of power"

³⁰Ibid.

³¹See Rogov, op. cit., pp. 4-7; Bogaturov, "The Eurasian Support...", pp. 39-41; M. Titarenko, B. Kulik, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii: Dal'nevostochnyi vektor" ("Russia's foreign policy: The Far-East vector"), *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1993, No. 1, pp. 16-17.

may attempt to include parts of the former Soviet Union in their spheres of influence. Alexei Arbatov writes: "The states that could hypothetically constitute a threat of regional political expansion adjacent to Russia are Germany, Turkey, Iran, China, and Japan. An endeavor by third powers to achieve hegemony would further destabilize the situation in the former Soviet republics and aggravate internal and inter-republic conflicts."³²

The second side of the "new centers of power" question is the image of the West, and it is of particular interest because it demonstrates the difference between the centrists and the westernizers. While the westernizers emphasize cooperative elements in the relations between the members of the "family of civilized nations" (the "core," the "community of co-development"), the centrists tend to argue that those relations are competitive and potentially conflictive. Germany and Japan are typically pointed at as the new, alternative centers of power to the United States. Rogov writes about them:

With the breakup of the Soviet Union the role of the U.S.A. as a protector of Japan and Germany has been significantly weakened. There is no real threat for these great powers any longer....So far Japan and Germany still may be the most pacifist-minded nations in the world....But can one conclude from this that these two large "centers of power" in the new multipolar world have refused forever to use military force for protection of their interests and will maintain the gap between their gigantic economic might and their second-rank military status? In fact, economic and technological capabilities of these giants allow them to overcome that gap literally within several years.³³

³²Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

³³Rogov, *op. cit.*, p. 6-7. Bogaturov's point of view is very similar; see "The Eurasian Support...", pp. 39-40; see also Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

The divergence of interests of the United States and other leading industrialized countries noted by all centrist authors is predictable given their belief that the pursuit of national self-interests determines states' foreign policies. Some centrists mention the desire of the United States to cement its position as the sole superpower managing the world single-handedly and the unwillingness of other countries to reconcile with such perspective.³⁴ Bogaturov, Kozhokin, and Pleshakov analyzed the differences in European and American approaches to the disintegrational trends in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. They concluded that the EC countries with their eurocentric thinking have developed an approach to the recognition of new states emerging on the ruins of former socialist federations which would simplify the inclusion of those states in common structures with Western Europe; the United States as a global power has been more interested in the consequences of the federations' collapse for global stability.³⁵ Zhinkina and Kortunov address potential U.S.-European discord in military security matters: "Evolution of the strategic nuclear balance in the direction of 'regionalization' can accelerate European military integration and gradually destroy the Atlantic partnership."³⁶ Volkova also forecasts possible weakening of the "Atlantic" direction

³⁴See for example, Bykov, op. cit., p. 90.

³⁵See Alexei Bogaturov, Mikhail Kozhokin, and Konstantin Pleshakov, "Natsional'nyi interes v rossiiskoi politike" ("The national interest in Russian politics"), *Svobodnaia mysl'*, 1992, No. 5, pp. 35-36.

³⁶Zhinkina and Kortunov, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

in West European politics and emphasizes the role of united Germany in that process.³⁷

What does this image of the West mean from the point of view of Russia's international environment? The centrists do not attempt to present the foreign policy of any country as having some permanent pro-Russian or anti-Russian bias. They think that the United States, Japan, and the countries of Western Europe are neither malevolent nor benevolent in their attitude toward Russia: they all are guided only by their own interests. Zhinkina and Kortunov, writing about the United States' interest in stability, assert that a "stable" situation from the American point of view is the one that "facilitates advancement of American political influence and capital and facilitates favorable settlement of problems and conflicts for the U.S.A. and its allies."³⁸ Bogaturov, Davydov, and Trofimenko write: "American leaders are not interested in an expansion of Russia's international influence (as they are not interested in a growth of Germany's or Japan's influence in the world)."³⁹ Lukin also stresses the selfishness (natural, in his opinion) of the West which "has received from us (especially in Gorbachev's time) unbelievable geopolitical concessions and gave very little in return."⁴⁰ Simoniya argues

³⁷Ye. Volkova, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii: Evropeiskii kontekst" ("Russia's foreign policy: The European context"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1992, No. 9, p. 22.

³⁸Ibid., p. 7.

³⁹A.D. Bogaturov, Yu.P. Davydov, and G.A. Trofimenko, "Rossiisko-amerikanskii otnosheniia: ispytanie vyborom" ("Russian-American relations: trial by the choice"), *SSha:Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1995, No. 9, p. 11.

⁴⁰Lukin, "Ot Manilova k Nozdrevu..."

that it would be naive to expect the West to embrace Russia in response to the latter's pledge to democratize and to be a "natural ally" of the West; moreover, the West is not interested in making Russia a strong competitor.⁴¹ Pushkov's opinion is similar: "The West, above all the United States, has a stake in the success of Russian democratic reforms and the preservation of Russia as a state. But it would not like Russia to become too strong a power. This explains the West's uneven attitude toward Russia, its constant fear lest by helping Russia it should rear an adversary."⁴² Bykov also warns against hopes for Western altruism stressing that "the West renders us some aid linking it up with the need for us to follow a certain course advantageous to it."⁴³

The centrists admit, however, that with the end of the ideological and military confrontation of the Cold War, the West can hardly be considered as a source of a potential military attack against Russia. Lukin writes: "We have lost a lot during the past years, but we have at least one big strategic advantage--the absence of apparent strong sources of military threat."⁴⁴ Bogaturov et al. note that the immediate threat of attack on Russian territory is no longer associated with NATO.⁴⁵

⁴¹Simoniya, op. cit., pp. 9,12.

⁴²"Russia's Foreign Policy. Agenda for 1993" (a round-table discussion), *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 3, p. 42.

⁴³Bykov, op. ct., p. 89.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵See Bogaturov et al., "Natsional'nyi interes...", p. 43.

The centrists' beliefs about the trends of post-Cold War international system do not provide any ground for excessive optimism with regard to the environment in which post-Soviet Russia exists. Unlike the westernizers who see the collapse of the Soviet Union as an event that opened an era of the triumph of democracy and cooperation, the centrist see it as an event that brought about the breakdown of the bipolar system with its mechanisms of securing international stability. The new multipolar system is likely to be more chaotic and conflictive. The core of the international system, i.e. the West, is, first, increasingly split into competing centers of power, and second, not inclined to altruistically help Russia.

3.1.3 Post-Soviet Russia's Place in International Relations

Like the westernizers, the centrists see Russia's position in the international system as significantly different from the position of the Soviet Union. However, while the westernizers emphasize the difference between ideological and moral foundations of Russian and Soviet foreign policies, the centrists focus their attention on the geopolitical implications of the collapse of the USSR for Russia. Most authors note that, reduced from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, Russia is a significantly less powerful state--both in terms of its capabilities and of its international influence. Russia definitely

is not a superpower like the USSR.⁴⁶ Alexei Arbatov summarizes the novelty of Russia's position as a combination of reduction of the country's geopolitical parameters (smaller size of the territory, population, and economy; conditional status of many frontiers) and new strategic surroundings (neighboring former Soviet republics marked by a high degree of instability).⁴⁷ Zhinkina and Kortunov write that after Russia has cut "almost all connections with its former allies, Russia's influence on international relations has been dramatically reduced compared to that of the USSR."⁴⁸ Bykov warns that, in a search for a new place for Russia in the world, one should not use a too close analogy with pre-revolutionary Russia, because in the geopolitical sense the former is a "far cry" from the latter.⁴⁹ Shmelev stresses that Russia has lost much more than it gained from the collapse of the USSR: the new geopolitical conditions, such as the absence of a direct outlet to Western Europe and of a convenient access to the Baltic and Black seas, impede Russia's economic development.⁵⁰ Rogov notes that, "from the point of view of military strategy Russia has lost more military factors of power than

⁴⁶See Rogov, op. cit., p. 8; Mahmut Gareev, "Russia's Priority Interests," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 6, p. 5; Shmelev, op. cit., p. 53.

⁴⁷See Alexei Arbatov, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

⁴⁸Zhinkina and Kortunov, op. cit., p. 8.

⁴⁹See Bykov, op. cit., p. 87.

⁵⁰See Shmelev, op. cit., p. 56; see also Gareev, op. cit., p. 5; Alexandr Vladislavlev, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii: Prioritetnoe napravlenie--strany SNG" ("Russia's foreign policy: Priority direction is the CIS countries"), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 6 May 1994, p. 3.

gained."⁵¹

Despite this unfavorable comparison with the USSR, Russia, in the opinion of the centrists, should and can be a great power. One of the reasons for that is simply the emotional appeal of the great power tradition. Bykov writes: "Having acquired the great power status which we inherited due to our glorious past and in anticipation of our great future, we have to reassert ourselves in it."⁵² Matsenov's opinion is similar: "Today the Federation is bestowed with a historic mission of preserving Russia's appropriate place in the world civilization and its status of a great power or, at least, a power worthy of respect."⁵³ Gareev thinks that a correct attitude toward contemporary Russia should be analogous to de Gaulle's attitude toward France: "France is a real France only if it holds a front-rank position..."⁵⁴

Another important element of Russia's great power status is its global responsibilities inherited from the Soviet Union, which include its role in the United Nations and its military might inherited from the USSR. As Arbatov writes,

Despite the present domestic crisis, Russia has important global responsibilities to fulfill, involving its position as a permanent member of

⁵¹S. M. Rogov, "Interesy voiennoi bezopasnosti Rossii i perspektivy rossiisko-amerikanskogo sotrudnichestva" ("The interests of Russia's military security and prospects of Russian-American cooperation"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 21-22, p. 53.

⁵²Bykov, op. cit., p. 88.

⁵³Matsenov, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵⁴See Gareev, op. cit., p. 4.

the UN Security Council, its role in other international organizations, and its participation in peace-keeping operations in line with UN resolutions. Russian cooperation is essential for international efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, for better control over the export of missiles and missile technology, and for the introduction of quotas and restrictions on the arms trade.⁵⁵

Bogaturov et al. emphasize that Russia's nuclear deterrence capabilities will maintain their significance as an element of the global balance for a long time.⁵⁶

A more important reason for Russia to maintain the status of a great power is its geopolitical position. In fact, for the centrists, geopolitical criteria determine a country's greatness. As Ambartsumov points out: "A concept of a great state should be based on defending its own interests and, first of all, on those interests applied to certain geopolitical space. Traditionally, for centuries, in mentality of many generations, Russia has been something bigger than the Russian Federation in its present boundaries. And, therefore, we need to remember: Russia's interests are not limited by those boundaries."⁵⁷ That "certain geopolitical space" is central Eurasia, and first of all, the territory of the former Soviet Union.

As noted above, the centrists see strong continuity in the international role of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This role consisted in stabilizing and uniting central Eurasia, and post-Soviet Russia should continue to fulfill it. Bogaturov et al.

⁵⁵Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵⁶Bogaturov et al., "Natsional'nyi interes," p. 43.

⁵⁷Ambartsumov, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

write:

"Having abandoned communist messianism, the Russian state has not automatically lost its paramount international role which consists in: first, its stabilizing capability in Eurasian and, consequently, global, scale; second, its integrating function toward the uniting and wealthy Europe and still poor and disunited Asia; third, its ability to suppress, cushion the negative impulses from both sides of the "Eurasian bridge" extending through Russia, those impulses being inevitable in the process of stormy global changes.⁵⁸

In Pleshakov's opinion, Russia ceased to be a global power, but has remained a great Eurasian power and continues to fulfill its mission and to maintain a "great power" status despite the profound crisis of Russian economy and society.

As far as I can see it, the primary object of Russia's mission today is to be basic to Eurasian continental stability. Continental is an important point. Where Eurasia's land surface ends, Russia is powerless, as was the case during the war in Persian Gulf. In such regions stability is maintained by other power centers. But in continental Eurasia Russia's role is paramount. By continental Eurasia I mean here, first, the entire territory of the former USSR, and, second, the continental part of the conflict perimeter. Within these limits, Russia remains the mainstay of stability and a great Eurasian power...⁵⁹

Pleshakov and other centrists substantiate their claim for Russia's role as a Eurasian stabilizer by describing the "geopolitical space" of the former USSR and around it as a permanent source of turmoil and conflict. According to him, strife may be considered an internal affair of nations as long as it does not affect geopolitical stability and basic human rights, which is not the case in the former USSR. The West has very limited

⁵⁸Bogaturov et al., "Vneshniaia politika Rossii," p. 27; see also Bogaturov et al., "Natsional'nyi interes...", p. 41; Gareev, op. cit., p. 3.

⁵⁹Pleshakov, op. cit., p. 22.

economic and political influence in this area and is simply unable to prevent disorder (though it is perfectly capable of protecting "coastal" Eurasia, above all the Middle East). From this Pleshakov concludes: "There can be total chaos in continental Eurasia, a redrawing of frontiers and war of some coalitions against other coalitions, unless a particular force dominates that region militarily and deters conflicts, let alone potential aggressors. And this force can only be provided by Russia."⁶⁰

The centrist concept of Russia as a great power has both similarities and differences with the westernizers. Both Kozyrev's "normal great power" and the centrists' "great Eurasian power" behave in some respects "like others," i.e. like the Western great powers. But as those "others" are seen differently, so is the mission of Russia: while in the pro-Western image, Russia should first of all "join the family of civilized nations," i.e. transform itself and renounce all vestiges of "imperial" behavior, in the centrist view it should, like others, defend its own interests and its "geopolitical space." Russia's contribution to the world order, in the centrists' opinion, should consist in its participation in a "division of labor" with other great powers, in assuming an appropriate portion of responsibility for global stability by securing order in a large part of the world.

Since the very definition of Russia as a great power is built upon its role as an "organizer" and "stabilizer" of central Eurasia, the priority direction of Russian foreign policy consists in relations with the former Soviet republics. The centrists have sharply

⁶⁰Ibid.

criticized Kozyrev and other westernizers for, in their opinion, marginalizing the relations with the CIS countries in favor of relations with the West. According to Alexei Arbatov,

The leadership of the Foreign Ministry failed to recognize in time that the first priority of Russian policy after disintegration of the USSR was not relations with the United States, the World Bank, or "defense of human rights around the world," but relations with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the other republics of the former Soviet Union, however messy and unglamorous they were. These relations were the key not only to protection of Russian economic, political, and security interests abroad, but also to Moscow's relations with the United States, Western Europe and neighbor states in Asia, and moreover to the very prospect of Russian democratic reforms at home.⁶¹

Shmelev supports the idea of the primary importance of relations with the former Soviet republics on the grounds that all the territory of the CIS is a zone of protection of Russia's national security; therefore, in his opinion, Russia should look for strategic allies among the CIS members rather than in the "far abroad."⁶² Ovinnikov writes that, in the age of international economic integration which assumes mostly regional forms, relations with the former Soviet republics serve as a test of Russia's ability to lead at the international arena: "...if the Russian Federation does not become a leader in its own region of the world, it will not be able to become a power of real global significance."⁶³ Ambartsumov argues that it would be foolish and irresponsible to lose "geopolitical

⁶¹Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; see also Vladislavlev, *op. cit.*; Ambartsumov, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16; Simoniya, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶²See Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁶³Ovinnikov, *op. cit.*; see also Matsenov, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

space" which is currently under Russian influence, because Russia's place would be immediately filled by others: "There is no vacuum in politics. If we halve or cease our efforts to deal with the Caucasus's problem, if we leave some region, we should not think that situation there will stabilize and Russia's position will strengthen. Of course, not. The vacuum will be filled by other forces, who are not at all friendly to us."⁶⁴

Russia's status of a great power means, for the centrists, that it should pursue an independent foreign policy, without uncritically following anyone. Outside the Commonwealth of Independent States, the centrists do not see any group of countries which Russia should treat "specially." The centrists have sharply criticized the westernizers--above all Kozyrev--for the one-sided orientation towards the West and especially the United States.⁶⁵ In Simoniya's opinion, the long-term interests of Russia require not an orientation on any particular country or group of countries, but a balanced development of relations with all countries of the world. He attacks the concept of the Western countries as Russia's "natural allies" used by Kozyrev and assesses it as drawing the idea of partnership to absurdity.⁶⁶ Titarenko and Kulik argue that all discussions about whether Russia should be closer to the West or to the East are artificial and superfluous: Russia should not excessively lean to either side.⁶⁷ Borko warns against

⁶⁴Ambartsumov, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁶⁵See for example Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 20; Volkova, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁶⁶See Simoniya, p. 7-9.

⁶⁷See Titarenko and Kulik, *op. cit.*, p 15; see also Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

excessive optimism of the popular idea of Russia's entry to the "common European home": "...prevailing in Europe image of a 'common home' has more of less definite spacial limits. We must admit that Russia does not belong within them."⁶⁸ In his opinion, Russia should build its own "home," common with other countries of the CIS. Vasiliev argues that one-sided affiliation with the West may force Russia take sides in the conflict between the West and the Muslim world, which may be very dangerous for Russia, drawing it into a confrontation with countries whose interest do not contradict Russia's.⁶⁹ Malashenko's concern is similar: "In its rush to the West, trying to prove that politically and culturally it belongs to Europe, Russia, in a sense, subordinated its uneasy links with the Muslim world....The impression was that the Russian leadership was ready to return to Europe even at the cost of changing Russia's historically acquired geopolitical status which to a large extent secured its uniqueness as a Eurasian power."⁷⁰

The centrists' distaste for a pro-Western orientation is closely linked to their criticism of ideologically-based foreign policy. Rogov stresses that Russia's policy should be determined not by ideological dogmas but by the interests of national

⁶⁸Yurii Borko, "Yesli ne 'obshchii dom,' to chto zhe?" ("If not a 'common home,' then what?"), *Svobodnaia mysl'*, 1993, No. 3, p. 8.

⁶⁹Alexei Vasiliev, "Trudnosti preodolimy" ("The difficulties can be overcome"), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 11 March 1994, p. 3.

⁷⁰Alexei Malashenko, "Novaia Rossiia i mir islama" ("The new Russia and the world of Islam"), *Svobodnaia mysl'*, 1992, No. 10, p. 29.

security.⁷¹ In the centrists' opinion, to define the character of Russia's relations with other countries on the basis of their performance in pursuit of democracy and protection of human rights is wrong to the same extent as building international strategy on a distinction between policies toward socialist and capitalist countries. Liberal ideology is not a better guide to foreign policy than communist ideology. Bogaturov et al. write: "A social doctrine, in normal conditions, should not be a basis of foreign policy. Everyone remembers the Marxist experiment, when it was a social doctrine that was used as a coordinate axis in international relations,—it resulted in grave conflicts."⁷² Gareev calls for renunciation of a "reideologization" of Russian foreign policy and gives an example of its potential consequences: "Russia stands to lose in relations with China by becoming a bastion of anti-communism."⁷³

The right foreign policy should be not ideological, but "pragmatic" and "realistic," which means that Russia should build its relations with other states according to its interests, the understanding of which by the centrists has been discussed above. Vladislavlev, for example, explains that the policy of realism means first of all concentration on relations with the CIS countries.⁷⁴ Lukin reminds that international

⁷¹See Rogov, op. cit., p. 8.

⁷²Bogaturov et al., "Vneshniaia politika Rossii," p. 28.

⁷³Gareev, op. cit., p. 7; see also Sergey Rogov, *Tri goda prob i oshibok rossiiskoi diplomatii (Three years of trials and errors of Russian diplomacy)*, Tsentr problem natsional'noi bezopasnosti I mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, Moscow, 1994, p. 18 .

⁷⁴See Vladislavlev, op. cit.

relations is a world of no altruism and calls for a foreign policy that would "use our pretty modest assets and the liabilities of our opponents and complications of relations between them."⁷⁵ Gareev emphasizes the flexibility of a realistic policy: "A one-sided foreign policy loses the flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre needed in a changing situation. I am sure the only ideology that should underlie Russian foreign policy is that of the Russian Federation's interests."⁷⁶ Bykov argues that ideological considerations should not cause an automatic reversal in relations with the old allies of the Soviet Union: "...it does not become a great power...to abandon old partners, particularly leave friends in misfortune, because today we do not like their ideological principles or policy, or even more so because our stronger new friends do not like them. Such behavior can only breed doubts about the durability and reliability of new ties being established by us."⁷⁷

The priority of relations with the CIS countries and rejection of a pro-Western course do not mean that the centrists consider the West unimportant or are anti-Western. First of all, since, in their opinion, other great powers, primarily the United States, realistically assess their ability to influence events in the former USSR, Russia should and will find mutual understanding with them with regards to its "responsibilities" in

⁷⁵Lukin, "Ot Manilova k Nozdrevu..."

⁷⁶Gareev, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷⁷Bykov, op.cit., p. 95.

Eurasia and its great power status.⁷⁸ As Lukin said, "Ordering and stabilizing the geopolitical space of the CIS on the basis of good-neighborliness and collective security corresponds with the vital interests of Russia and its neighbors. But solution of this problem also corresponds with the interests of other large states, among them and first of all the U.S.A. as the main external balancer of the Eurasian strategic balance."⁷⁹

Secondly, most centrists see Russia's future in a democratic society with a market economy, i.e. admit the need for a significant measure of "westernization." In fact, most centrists do not reject altogether the westernizers' idea of joining the "family of civilized nations." As noted above, due to their image of that "family," they argue that economic and political "westernization" of Russia should not entail pro-Western or pro-American foreign policy. But, as Lukin argues, a democratic way of development is the only one for Russia, if it wants to "preserve itself as a great power and to become in future a member of the community of advanced, developed states."⁸⁰ Bogaturov, Kozhokin, and Pleshakov clearly state that the "recognition of the priority of the individual's rights which has been already proclaimed by the Russian leadership, brings us together with the West." They consider two alternative ideas that may provide a foundation for the new

⁷⁸See Gareev, op. cit., pp. 6-7; Bogaturov, "The Eurasian Support...", p. 43; Bogaturov et al., "Vneshniaia politika Rossii," p. 32..

⁷⁹Lukin, op. cit., p. 50.

⁸⁰V.P. Lukin, "Rossiia i ee interesy" ("Russia and its interests"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 21-22, p. 48; see also Bogaturov et al., "Vneshniaia politika Rossii," p. 40.

identity of the Russian state--the *rusaskaia* (ethnic Russian) idea and the idea of *derzhavnost'* (strong statehood). They dismiss the former as inappropriate for the multiethnic Russian federation and approve the latter, describing it as the idea of "creation of a free, democratic Russian state on the basis of national revival, with the priority of human rights..."⁸¹ In their opinion, the West can play an important role in Russia's modernization; in a list of goals of Russian foreign policy they include "attracting real assistance from the West in preserving Moscow's orientation toward strengthening democracy, market reforms, and creation of civil society."⁸² Other authors also want Russia to become a law-based democratic state with an advanced market economy.⁸³

Thirdly, the centrists, with their "realist" view of the world, are well aware of the dominant power position of the West, led by the United States, in the international system. Lukin who is known as one of the most eloquent critics of Kozyrev's pro-Western policy, is strongly against an anti-Western orientation as well. He argues that an anti-Western strategy would be destructive for Russia, because its inevitable result would be "gradual formation of a large and powerful coalition against Russia including practically all great powers..."⁸⁴ During centuries of Russia's history, continues Lukin,

⁸¹Bogaturov et al., "Natsional'nyi interes...", p. 38.

⁸²Bogaturov et al., "Vneshniaia politika Rossii," p. 31.

⁸³See Borko, op. cit., p. 9; Gareev, op. cit., p. 4; Shmelev, op. cit., p. 52.

⁸⁴Lukin, "Ot Mahilova k Nozdrevu."

the specter of such coalition has followed Russian leaders, and today's generation of them should not make a catastrophic mistake.⁸⁵

Finally but, probably, most importantly, the centrists' views of Russia as a great power do not imply confrontation with the West not only because they believe in the West's acceptance of Russia's role in the former USSR, but because they emphasize that the methods of Russian foreign policy must correspond to internationally recognized norms of international behavior and international law. All centrist authors stress that Russian policy toward the former Soviet republics must respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁸⁶ Bogaturov et al., have strongly argued against "imperial" policy, including its Serbian variety.⁸⁷ Analyzing Russia's strategy in actual and potential crises on the territory of the former Soviet Union, they suggested that Russian reaction should meet "international standards," and that, when such standards are not established yet--for example in case of the criteria of diplomatic recognition of new states--Russia should actively promote relevant international agreements.⁸⁸

With regard to the centrists' views of methods of Russian foreign policy, it is important to note that they emphasize the necessity of achieving Russia's goals in

⁸⁵Tbid.

⁸⁶See for example Alexei Arbatov, op cit., p. 29; Lukin, "Rossiia i ee interesy," p. 49.

⁸⁷See Bogaturov et al.. Natsional'nyi interes..., p. 36; see also Ambartsumov, op. cit., p. 14.

⁸⁸See Bogaturov et al., "Vneshniaia politika Rossii," pp. 33-34.

cooperation with others. Pleshakov writes that Russia has to share its "mission" of securing Eurasian continental stability with the CIS, first of all with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.⁸⁹ Many authors approve inviting the international community (primarily the West) to assist Russia in fulfilling its geopolitical role. Bogaturov writes: "The fact that the Commonwealth's geopolitical space remains a sphere of Russia's special interests does not mean that it is her exclusive sphere."⁹⁰ The centrists welcome international involvement in the settlement of conflict in the former Soviet Union via international organizations such as the UN and CSCE.⁹¹

The centrist image of Russia as an international actor is consistent with the centrists' general beliefs about international relations. In the unstable and conflict-ridden post-Cold War world, Russia should stand as an independent great power whose democratic and market-oriented domestic reforms do not mean following the foreign-policy course of the West. Russia should be aware of its geopolitical losses which resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union and not allow its geopolitical position to deteriorate even more. Russia is unable to play a superpower role any more, and its great power status depends mostly on its ability to play its historic regional role as a stabilizer and organizer of continental Eurasia. Therefore, the Commonwealth of

⁸⁹See Pleshakov, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

⁹⁰Bogaturov, "The Eurasian support...", p. 43.

⁹¹See *ibid.*; Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Lukin, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

Independent States is a zone of vital national interests of Russia, and relations with the CIS countries are the top priority of Russian foreign policy. This policy, however, should be a policy of leadership rather than domination, and correspond to accepted norms of international behavior.

3.2 Policy Preferences

3.2.1 Policy Toward the Newly Independent States

The centrists' attitude toward the former Soviet republics is based on the belief in the necessity of their close integration with each other and with Russia. This belief is linked to the assessment of the breakup of the Soviet Union: unlike the westernizers, the centrists see it as a tragedy resulting from wrong political decisions rather than as a historically inevitable collapse of a totalitarian empire.

The centrists question the assertion that it was the "peoples" of the USSR who wished to dissolve the Soviet Union. As Simoniya writes, "the avalanche-like destruction of the territorial integrity of the Union was a result of exclusively subjective striving of a group of political leaders, of their struggle for political power, and not a result of a

consensus of all or the majority of the members of the union."⁹² The results of that were extremely negative: after the initial Belavezha decision of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus on the establishment of the CIS, the destruction of the USSR assumed uncontrollable character; Russia encountered serious problems in defending its borders; economic, transport, and communication links between the republics were broken; new national minorities problems and regional conflicts emerged; the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation itself started to be questioned and political situation in the country was destabilized.⁹³

Plyais gives a similar assessment of causes and results of the liquidation of the Soviet state:

The Belavezha act was a mistake because it stopped the process of reforming the USSR and transforming it from a unitary state, if not to a genuinely federal one, then at least to a confederative one. The result was that instead of a directed and an objectively necessary process of reform we got an undirected, chaotic process of an avalanche-like and often senseless "parade of sovereignties" and of the breakup of the USSR as well as of its constituent parts. This could not but have an extremely negative effect on all aspects of life in the former Union: economics, politics, culture, humanitarian connections, etc.⁹⁴

Brutents also reproached current leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus who did not

⁹²N. Simoniya, "O poniatii natsional'no-gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti" ("On the concept of national-state security"), *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1993, No. 2, p. 5.

⁹³See *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

⁹⁴Yakov Plyais, "O nastoiashchem i budushchem SNG" ("On the present and future of the CIS"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 3 March 1994.

wish to recognize the grave consequences of their decision to liquidate the USSR.⁹⁵

Since the breakup of the USSR is seen as a source of the most serious problems of the newly independent states, the solution to those problems is sought in some form of reintegration of the former USSR. This is not surprising in light of the centrists' belief that the Eurasian space that used to be known as the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was a specific geopolitical entity "organized" by Russia and closely knit together. As Migranian notes, "...that common space was based on something bigger than just the desire of the communist regime to hold all peoples and nations in its hand. In addition to the common economic complex, there were historical traditions, sociopsychological features, geopolitical realities, etc. The Soviet system was just a specific way of organizing that space."⁹⁶ According to Pleshakov, "living together within common borders for decades or centuries has formed a common civilizational space."⁹⁷

Rather than resurrecting the Soviet Union, the centrists look for new forms of integration. As Lukin writes, a "voluntarist" restoration of what has been destroyed in

⁹⁵See Karen Brutents, "Prezhdevremennno li rossiisko-amerikanskoie partnerstvo?" ("Is Russian-American partnership premature?"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 13 May 1994, p.4.

⁹⁶Andranik Migranian, "Sny of SNG" ("Dreams about the CIS"), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 14 September 1994, p.11.

⁹⁷Konstantin Pleshakov, "Russia's Mission: The Third Epoch," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 1, p. 20; see also Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 28-29; Alexei K. Pushkov, "Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over," *Foreign Policy*, No 93 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 88-89.

1991 would be "not only impossible, but extremely dangerous....To solve this problem momentarily is impossible. But to work on solving, one after another, the numerous problems of drawing the post-Soviet space together is not only possible but necessary."⁹⁸

Most centrist believe that the Commonwealth of Independent States in its present form is not sufficient for the needs of the integration of the post-Soviet space. In Simoniya's opinion, the CIS has served mostly as a tool of "civilized divorce" of the former Soviet republics, while integration requires a new organizational foundation.⁹⁹ Bykov argues that the present-day CIS is an amorphous entity and should be significantly strengthened in order to avoid disintegration.¹⁰⁰ Vladislavlev criticized the Russian government not only for the lack of initiative in the search for new forms of common life in the post-Soviet space but also for its reluctance to support or at least seriously consider initiatives of the others, first of all Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev's proposal to create a Eurasian Union.¹⁰¹ Gareev writes that hopes of many people for

⁹⁸Vladimir Lukin, "Ot Manilova k Nozdrevu: Slova i vneshniaia politika" ("From Manilov to Nozdriov: Words and foreign policy"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 14 May 1994, p. 4.

⁹⁹See Simoniya, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁰⁰See Alexander Bykov, "At the Cross-roads of World Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 3, pp. 88-90.

¹⁰¹See Alexander Vladislavlev, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii: Prioritetnoe napravlenie-strany SNG" ("Russia's foreign policy: The priority direction is the countries of the CIS"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 6 May 1994, p. 3.

the formation of a new voluntary union of the majority of the ex-Soviet republics are not very naive or unrealistic.¹⁰²

Typically, the centrist authors think that future integration of the former Soviet republics will assume a form of *confederation*. As Shmelev writes, "Restoration of a state like the Russian Empire of the USSR is impossible, but formation of a confederative state with a single center which would have clearly defined rights and functions is a very possible historical prospect of development of the countries of the CIS."¹⁰³ According to Plyais, "Today's CIS is an inefficient and not a very viable formation. We should honestly recognize that, and, having bravely abandoned it, start resolutely creating a confederative union of the Eurasian states, keeping in mind that some day it can develop into a more solid state formation."¹⁰⁴ Karaganov, speaking at the conference "Russia's Foreign-policy Strategy in the Near Abroad," analyzed three variants of Russia's policy in the former Soviet Union. He disapproved the "radical-democratic" option of "leaving" the newly independent states, as well as the "neoimperial" option of forceful reintegration. The third, most reasonable option, according to Karaganov, is "regulation that has as its goal partial reintegration of the former USSR into a more or less

¹⁰²See Mahmut Gareev, "Russia's Priority Interests," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 6, p. 6.

¹⁰³Shmelev B.A. "Problemy formirovaniia vneshnei politiki Rossii" ("Problems of formation of Russia's foreign policy"), *Rossia i sovremennyi mir*, 1993, No. 1, p. 57.

¹⁰⁴Plyais, op. cit.

confederative framework."¹⁰⁵

Russia should and will play a special role in the process of integration. As noted in the previous chapter, the centrists link Russia's status as a great power with its ability to be a strong leader in the post-Soviet geopolitical area. In their opinion, Russia is interested in such leadership because of two reasons. First of all, Russia and other former Soviet republics are economically interdependent. As Bykov argues, since the West is unlikely to increase its assistance to the CIS countries, "we have to rely mostly on ourselves and on cooperation within the CIS framework."¹⁰⁶ Vladislavlev writes that even if Russia has to be a donor for other states for some time, it has no other alternative but to pursue economic integration: "I am not talking about charity. Russia, may be more than anyone else, is interested in restoration of economic links, in creation of markets for its products, in developing extensive trade with its immediate neighbors. Therefore, it should take the initiative in putting on the agenda the questions of economic cooperation."¹⁰⁷

A second and most important reason is that leadership in the post-Soviet integration serves Russia's geopolitical interests. Most centrists insist that all territory

¹⁰⁵*Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 21-22, p.44.

¹⁰⁶Bykov, op. cit., p. 89.

¹⁰⁷Vladislavlev, op. cit.; see also Migranian, op. cit.

of the former USSR is a zone of Russia's vital interests.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, economic criteria should not dominate consideration of Russia's strategy toward other former Soviet republics. Migranian writes:

Obviously, Russia does not want to continue being a donor, as earlier, but it is interested in maintaining economic relations. On the other hand, economic expediency alone can hardly become a basis for Russia's policy toward the near abroad. For example, if such expediency were a basis for Germany's policy, Germany would have never united....All this has to do with the future of Russia's geopolitics, with its geostrategic, military-political interests.¹⁰⁹

Razuvayev in his analysis of the projects of monetary union between Russia in Belarus which were discussed in the summer and fall of 1994 criticizes the "liberal" approach of the radical westernizers Gaidar and Fyodorov for their opposition to the agreement on merging Russian and Belarusian monetary systems (they stressed the potential high cost of such merger for Russia's economy and budget). Razuvayev emphasizes the enormous geopolitical importance of Belarus which is not only a territory providing a vital land route to Western Europe but also the only Western newly independent state pursuing an openly pro-Russian foreign policy. In his view, Russia would in any case pay for the Belarusian economic stabilization; therefore it is necessary to stop complaining about possible costs of the monetary union and to sign that agreement which would help the

¹⁰⁸See D. Matsenov, "Interesy i bezopasnost' Rossii v postsovetskuiu epokhu" ("Interests and security of Russia in the post-Soviet epoch"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1992, No. 4, p. 23; Shmelev, op. cit., p. 60.

¹⁰⁹Migranian, op. cit.

pro-Russian political forces in Belarus.¹¹⁰

The prospects of building a confederation in the post-Soviet area depend not only on Russian efforts; the centrists carefully emphasize their respect for sovereignty of the former Soviet republics and their formal equality with Russia. Therefore, for the period of coexistence with the newly and fully independent states, Russia should pursue an active policy which would be aimed both at creating a basis for future integration and at securing current and future Russian interests. Despite the fact that the centrists do not consider Russia as a "typical" empire, they often compare its position vis-a-vis other post-Soviet states with positions of West European countries, first of all Britain and France, vis-a-vis their former colonies after the collapse of their colonial empires. In Simoniya's opinion, Russia, "using the vast (positive and negative) experience of postcolonial relations between the West and the 'third world', should quickly develop a program of restructuring those relations on the basis of mutual benefit and purposeful economic and technical cooperation."¹¹¹ Sirotkin calls for a careful study of the experience of France which gave its former colonies independence but preserved enormous influence on them.¹¹² Karaganov and Lukin argue that Russia should

¹¹⁰See Vladimir Razuvayev, "Blesk i nishcheta rossiiskogo liberalizma" ("Splendor and misery of the Russian liberalism"), *Segodnia*, 23 April 1994, p. 3. The agreement on the monetary union between Russia and Belarus was signed but not ratified by the parliaments of the two countries.

¹¹¹Simoniya, op. cit., p. 10.

¹¹²See Sirotkin V.G., presentation at the conference "Russia's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Near Abroad," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 21-22, p. 46.

consistently pursue a "post-imperial policy."¹¹³

Post-imperial policy includes several components. First, Russia needs to protect *stability* in the post-Soviet region. Karaganov argues that, no matter which direction the events in the CIS take, "Russia will have to play an active post-imperial role. If we refuse to play it, it will be imposed on us by history: by waves of refugees, by explosions at chemical plants, etc."¹¹⁴ Karaganov illustrates his point with the example of actual and potential conflicts in Central Asia:

We won't be able to leave them [Central Asian republics] as we attempted to do a year ago. We will be pulled back in there by the whirlpool of events if Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and others will start falling apart. If we don't play, with Kazakhstan's help, an active postimperial role in that region, contain conflicts, protect minorities, etc., sooner or later all that will spout on us and we won't escape. In 10 years everything will turn into a boiling kettle. Islamic fundamentalism is horrible. And it will be worse when a zone of unstable states forms there. I think we should understand: Russia should return to its traditional role, to bribe local princes, to send troops, to save somebody, etc. It is not a rewarding job, but we have been drawn to it by history and partially by ourselves.¹¹⁵

The idea of Russia's "traditional" role implies a refusal to be a leader in democratization and westernization of the former Soviet Union. In the centrists' writings and speeches, the theme of Russia's interest in supporting democracy in the "near abroad" is practically absent: what Russia is interested in is political stability in the

¹¹³See Karaganov, op. cit., p. 44; V.P. Lukin, "Rossiia i ee interesy" ("Russia and its interests"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 21-22, p. 50.

¹¹⁴Karaganov, op. cit., p. 44.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

newly independent states and their friendliness to Russia. Russia should not build its relations with neighboring countries depending on the character of their political regimes and ideologies.¹¹⁶ The only kind of regime that may present a threat to Russian interests is an extremely nationalist or religious-fundamentalist one, because it can become a danger to regional stability and to the security of ethnic Russian minorities.¹¹⁷ This is why, as Pleshakov argues, it is in Russia's interest to guarantee "at least minimum respect for human rights in post-Soviet space."¹¹⁸

Bogaturov, Kozhokin, and Pleshakov write that Russia should "assume the task of preventing escalation of instability on the territory of the former USSR and its immediate surroundings."¹¹⁹ The threats to stability in the post-Soviet "geopolitical space" that they list include territorial and other disputes among the newly independent states, difficulties of consolidating the new states' statehood, problems in relations between the former Soviet republics and their neighbors which were not parts of the USSR (such as relations between Moldova and Romania, influence of pan-islamism and

¹¹⁶See for example V. Nadein-Raievskii, "Rossiia i gosudarstva Tsentral'noi Azii: vozmozhnosti integratsii" ("Russia and the states of Central Asia: possibilities of integration"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1993, No. 12, p. 16.

¹¹⁷See *ibid.*, p. 15.

¹¹⁸Pleshakov, *op. cit.*, p. 22-23.

¹¹⁹A.D. Bogaturov, M.M. Kozhokin, and K.V. Pleshakov, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii" ("Russia's foreign policy"), *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1992, No. 10, p. 32.

pan-turkism on Central Asia).¹²⁰ The first principle of Russia's policy with regards to stability, according to Bogaturov et al. is to contain the military growth of the Eurasian states. However, they warn against Russia's assuming a role of a Eurasian policeman similar to the role the United States played in the Persian Gulf; Russia should rely primarily on non-military means of influence and discourage extremism among those who, being Russia's friends or allies, might undermine regional stability (e.g. Armenia in its approach to the Karabakh problem and the separatists in the Transdnier region of Moldova).¹²¹ Ambartsumov's views are similar: he disapproved the 1992 resolution of Russia's Congress of People's Deputies prohibiting the use of Russian troops abroad, but warned against Russia's turning into a regional gendarme.¹²²

A second aspect of the post-imperial role includes protection of ethnic minorities in the former USSR. The centrists stress that the problem of Russian minorities in the near abroad should be treated as a part of broader problem of minorities rights in general. As Karaganov said, "If we defend [only] Russian-speaking population, we will willingly or unwillingly allow--at least conceptually--suppression of the rights of other national minorities....I think that the concept of Russia's foreign policy toward the Russian-speaking population should be based on the concept of protection of human and

¹²⁰See *ibid.*

¹²¹See *ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

¹²²See Evgenii Ambartsumov, "Otstaivat' interesy Rossii" ("To defend Russia's interests"), *Narodnyi deputat*, 1992, No. 16, pp. 17-18.

minority rights on all the territory of the former USSR."¹²³ Bogaturov et al. advance exactly the same approach.¹²⁴

This position is very close to the views of Kozyrev and other Westernizers. However, the centrists give it some additional aspects, due to the fact that they consider Russia's approach to the minorities problem in the broader context of means of "post-imperial" policy. Karaganov's opinion is that Russia's policy, in its pursuit of equality of Russians with the citizens of titular nationalities, should not limit itself only to diplomatic means. First, Russia should do whatever it can in order to make ethnic Russians stay in countries of their current residence not only to avoid a wave of refugees, but also to preserve levers of influence in the long run; one of the means to influence other governments in the issue of Russian minorities should be creation of economic "enclaves" owned by Russia through the purchase of enterprises for debts that most other newly independent states owe Russia. Secondly, Russia should support Russian language and culture abroad and continue educating other states' elites in Russian institutions. Thirdly, Russia should promote a continuing presence of Russian officers in the armies of the former Soviet republics. Fourthly, Russia should not exclude the use of force in extreme cases.¹²⁵

A third component of the post-imperial role is securing Russia's position as the

¹²³Karaganov, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

¹²⁴See Bogaturov et al., op. cit., pp. 36-37.

¹²⁵See *ibid.*, p. 45; see also Arbatov, op. cit., p. 27.

only great power controlling the post-Soviet "geopolitical space." Rogov, discussing the necessity for Russia to seek some form of military integration with its neighbors, writes: "At the very least, Russia would like to exclude participation of the newly formed states in any hostile blocs and placing of foreign forces or creation of military bases of other states on territories of former Soviet republics."¹²⁶ In Lukin's view,

[Russia] has the right to expect them [the states of the near abroad] to abstain from actions hostile to Russia and not to allow on their territories any third countries' activities threatening Russia's security; Russia is ready, on its part, to render any assistance to its neighbors in guaranteeing their security--in bilateral as well as in multilateral forms.

Essentially, it is that type of relations between a large state and its smaller neighbors which is called a regime of "good neighborliness" and which is especially well known to the Americans and has been practiced by them for a long time and recognized by the international community (I recall the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Pact, etc.).¹²⁷

The reference to the American experience¹²⁸ implies the necessity of recognition (formal or informal) of the territory of the former USSR as a special zone of Russian interests and national security by other powers. Such recognition, in the centrist view, will be prompted by the understanding of the importance of Russia's "presence" in the former USSR for maintaining international stability. As Lukin said, "the restoration on a new basis of the temporarily weakened stabilizing role of Russia in those regions is in

¹²⁶S.M. Rogov, "Interesy voennoi bezopasnosti Rossii i perspektivy rossiisko-amerikanskogo sotrudnichestva" ("The interests of Russia's military security and the prospects of Russian-American cooperation"), *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, No. 21-22, p. 55.

¹²⁷Lukin, op. cit., p.49.

¹²⁸See also Brutents, op. cit., p. 4; Gareev, op. cit., p. 6.

the interests of the regional forces as well as of the international community as a whole."¹²⁹ After the publication of Brzezinski's article "Premature Partnership" in 1994, many centrist authors attacked his idea of promoting "geopolitical pluralism" in the former USSR as destabilizing,¹³⁰ and later criticized Washington for following Brzezinski's ideas.¹³¹

Russian presence is especially important in the southern regions of the former USSR with its explosive potential of religious and ethnic conflicts. Lukin, referring implicitly to Zhirinovsky's ideas, warns against any attempts of expansion in the South but insists that Russia should "hold the current southern borders of the CIS--and not because we need Central Asia, but because there's nowhere to retreat. If we start retreating, we won't stop. And here the West may become our real partner....I think that a more or less similar situation can emerge in Transcaucasia where the Islamic world is immediately adjacent to Russia's borders."¹³² Analyzing Russia's interests in the Transcaucasian region, many centrists emphasize the importance of long-term friendly relations with Georgia and Armenia as Christian states creating a containing effect on the Muslim world.¹³³

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 50.

¹³⁰See Brutents, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Migranian, *op. cit.*

¹³¹See Bogaturov, Davydov, and Trofimenko, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹³²Lukin, "Ot Manilova k Nozdrevu."

¹³³See Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p.61; Matsenov, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Russia's role as the predominant great power of the post-Soviet area implies the necessity of maintaining significant military potential.¹³⁴ As Bogaturov et al. write, "under any scenario Moscow will have to maintain a military potential sufficient for defending not only itself but also all CIS states that might ask for that. That is, apparently, the price of the right to be a foundation of the united Eurasian strategic and political space..."¹³⁵ Russia, in their opinion, should continue offering its nuclear "umbrella" to the Central Asian countries historically included into the zone of its "responsibility." Another task for Russia is to direct more attention and resources to the creation of mobile and effective forces of rapid deployment capable to react quickly to crises around Russia's borders, including the crises threatening the security of ethnic Russians in the near abroad. In case of crises of the latter type Russia should, at a minimum, consider a possibility of their evacuation and physical protection--as the United States does when its citizens are in danger.¹³⁶

Russia's security responsibilities in the post-Soviet area should be formalized and legitimized through international agreements and regimes. The first way to do it is to promote military cooperation and collective security agreements with the CIS members, especially in the most unstable regions, such as the South, where Russia faces a task of "preventing an open struggle of the third countries for the influence in the vacuum that

¹³⁴See Pleshakov, *op. cit.*, p. 23; Gareev, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹³⁵Bogaturov et al., *op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹³⁶See *ibid.*

has emerged in Central Asia and Transcaucasus."¹³⁷ The second way is to receive an international sanction for Russia's and the CIS's use of force in the former USSR. Karaganov developed that idea as follows:

How to use force? If we start using force on the basis of the right of the strong, it would be scary. We need legitimation, and not only because the whole world might turn against us, but because without external control we ourselves would step over the limits of the permissible. Now it is necessary to prepare public opinion and international organizations to the possibility of Russia and other CIS subjects using limited force in legal limits. It is necessary to think about a new concept, about creation of two zones of the CSCE....In one CSCE zone--Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia--peacekeeping efforts might be conducted on the basis of NATO and EC, which will please NATO very much. We can participate as observers there. In the other zone (Russia and the CIS) we should achieve reserving such role for Russia, but with international control, so that the troops had foreign observers, the use of the troops was discussed, and exceeding by the troops of their rights was denounced.¹³⁸

Karaganov's statement clearly demonstrates the limits which the centrists assign to the idea of the "division of spheres of influence." They expect the West to recognize Russia's special role in the former USSR, but they are not arguing for a complete exclusion of the West from the ex-Soviet affairs, as well as for Russia's self-isolation from events outside the former USSR. As Bogaturov writes, "the fact that the Commonwealth's geopolitical space remains a sphere of Russia's special interests does

¹³⁷Lukin, "Rossiia i ee interesy," p. 50.

¹³⁸Karaganov, op. cit., p. 45.

not mean that it is her exclusive sphere."¹³⁹ In his opinion, Western countries cannot (and do not want to) assume responsibility for the security of the post-Soviet region, but they can contribute to it, in cooperation with Russia, and Russia should welcome such contribution.¹⁴⁰ The Western participation, according to most centrists, should proceed through the channels of international organizations sanctioning and supervising Russia's activity in the former Soviet Union. In Karaganov's opinion, as seen from the excerpt cited above, the CSCE should provide the organizational basis for Russian-Western interaction. Arbatov, writing about protection of minorities, also emphasizes that the use of force, which may become Russia's instrument of last resort, should never be unilateral and must be sanctioned by the UN, CSCE, or, at least, the CIS.¹⁴¹

Analysis of the centrists' policy preferences shows that they differ from those of the westernizers, and that the difference can be explained by the peculiarities of the centrists' belief system. In many respects the centrists' views are very similar to the westernizers'--for example, in their approach to the ethnic minorities problem and to the international organization' participation in post-Soviet affairs. But the centrists' belief in Russia's mission as an organizer of the Eurasian geopolitical space and in the competitive character of international relations leads them to insist that Russia should

¹³⁹Alexei Bogaturov, "The Eurasian Support of World Stability," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 2, p. 43.

¹⁴⁰See *ibid.*

¹⁴¹See Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

assume the role of the leader of post-Soviet integration (with its inevitable costs) which should eventually lead to some form of confederation, while the westernizers are extremely cautious about integration fearing accusations of imperial behavior and high economic costs of Russia's leadership in the integration process. The centrists promote the idea of a "post-imperial" policy which is based on Russia's right to consider the former USSR as its zone of special interests, and argue that Russia should actively defend its strategic and economic interests there and prevent other powers from establishing their spheres of influence in the post-Soviet space. Unlike the westernizers, they do not want Russia to be a leader in westernization and to promote democracy, but they want it to be a stabilizing force containing conflicts and violence.

3.2.2. Policy Toward the West

The centrist image of Russia includes several basic beliefs which directly influence policy preferences regarding the West. Three of those beliefs were discussed in the previous chapter: the belief in the priority of Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics, the belief in the West's pursuit of self-interest in its relations with Russia, and the belief in a necessity for Russia to pursue an independent foreign policy, based on its own interests and not ideologically oriented toward any group of countries.

The idea of the priority of Russia's relations with the CIS countries makes relations with the West less crucial than in the pro-Western belief system. This is reinforced by the belief in a lack of Western altruism: most centrists argue that Russia should not hope to receive substantial economic aid from the West and should instead rely on itself and on cooperation with the CIS countries.¹⁴²

As noted in the previous chapter, the centrist image of Russia excludes both one-sided pro-Western orientation and an anti-Western one. Usually the centrists speak for the necessity of cooperation and even "partnership" between Russia and the West, and especially the United States. For Pushkov, "Russia's choice is not whether to have a partnership with the United States, but what form that partnership might take and how close it might be."¹⁴³ Brutents, criticizing Brzezinski's idea of "premature partnership" between Russia and the United States, writes:

Russian-American partnership corresponds with fundamental interest of the U.S.A. and of the world community. And one cannot overestimate its significance for Russia--not only because of the special role of the U.S.A. in international relations of the end of the century or of the interest in economic support, but also because it is a part of the environment which is necessary for the survival and development of the seeds of Russian democracy.¹⁴⁴

Rogov argues that partnership with the West is necessary as a means to preserve international security in a world where leading states maintain large armies and possess

¹⁴²See Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Pushkov, *op. cit.*, p. 83-84.

¹⁴³ Pushkov, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁴⁴Brutents, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁵ Other authors, in addition to the security reasons, cite economic reasons for the partnership--Russia's need for economic assistance, foreign investments, trade, etc.¹⁴⁶

The term "partnership" is reminiscent of the westernizers' views; however, the content of that concept is quite different when it is used by the centrists (and the latter never use the term "alliance" when discussing relations between Russia and the United States). First of all, the centrists stress that partnership between Russia and the West should be absolutely equal. Russia should not bear any "guilt" for the "evil" policies of the Soviet Union and should be accepted as equal not because it has declared its commitment to democratic values, but because it has much to contribute to global stability. Therefore, its position vis-a-vis Western partners should be based on self-respect and awareness of its own strengths. Harshest criticism of Kozyrev's foreign policy was directed by the centrists against Russian leadership's "concessions" to the West. In Alexei Arbatov's words,

In dealing with the West the government produced a widespread impression (whether justified or not) of a never-ending sequence of easily given unilateral concessions on such matters as UN sanctions on Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya; the levels and limitations on weapons

¹⁴⁵See S.M. Rogov, "Rossiia i SShA v mnogopoliarnom mire" ("Russia and the U.S.A. in the multipolar world"), *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologii*, 1992, No. 10, p. 9.

¹⁴⁶See Simoniya, op.cit., p. 12; Shmelev, op. cit., pp. 61-62; M. Titarenko, B. Kulik, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii: dal'nevostochnyi vektor" ("Russia's foreign policy: the Far-Eastern vector"), *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1993, No. 1, p. 23; Gareyev, op.cit, p. 6; Lukin, "Rossiia i ee interesy," pp. 50-51.

permitted under START II; controls on missile technology exports to India and arms sales to Iran; the Western position on the rights on Russian minorities in the Baltics; and the dispute with Japan over the South Kurile Islands...¹⁴⁷ The apparent absence of tangible political and security gains achieved at negotiations produced a common perception of foreign policy as merely an adjunct of tactics for getting credits and economic aid from the West. (It is not inconceivable that former acting Prime Minister Gaidar and his team looked at it precisely in this way.)¹⁴⁸

Georgii Arbatov, veteran international affairs analyst, characterized the change that occurred in Russia's attitude toward the West after abandonment of traditional Soviet confrontational approach as a transformation of Russian leaders from Mr. "No" to Mr. "Yes."¹⁴⁹ Lukin often criticized "infantile pro-Americanism" and an interpretation of Russian-American partnership as an unconditional support of any American foreign policy initiatives.¹⁵⁰

Russian policy, in the centrists' opinion, should resist Western, especially American, attempts to treat Russia as a subordinate. First, as follows from the excerpts cited above, Russia should demonstrate the unacceptability of subordination of Russia's foreign policy to American interests. Secondly, the Russian leadership should firmly counter any attempts to "manage" domestic economic and political development from

¹⁴⁷Pushkov cites the same examples of Yeltsin/Kozyrev "concession": see op. cit., pp. 85-87.

¹⁴⁸Arbatov, op. cit., p. 21; see also Pushkov, op cit., pp. 83-85.

¹⁴⁹See Georgii Arbatov, "Rossiisko-amerikanskii otnosheniia: Kak predotvratit' ukhudshenie?" ("Russian-American relations: How to prevent deterioration?"), *Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 14 April 1994, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰See Lukin, "Rossiia i ee interesy," p. 51.

abroad. Such "management" of Russian reforms, according to Lukin, is often pursued by the Americans.¹⁵¹ Georgii Arbatov harshly criticized the United States' "support, almost imposition, of the destructive, for Russian economy, Gaidar's model of a market pseudo-reform."¹⁵² Brutents criticizes Washington's "paternalist" attitude to Russia which has become annoying to the Russians, especially since it includes support for unpopular economic policies.¹⁵³

Russia's equal stance in dealing with the West implies open recognition of differences in opinions. As Alexei Arbatov writes, "This possibility for difference suggests not confrontation, but rather hard bargaining and agile political maneuvering to reach agreements, just as the Western powers bargained over numerous economic and political issues, especially after the end of the Cold War."¹⁵⁴ In Lukin's opinion, Russia should seek an "equal-rights based partnership. And this suggests finding a balance of interests through skilful combination of pressure and compromises."¹⁵⁵ Writing about Russian-American relations, the centrists stress that the inevitable divergence of interests of the two powers on many issues makes the partnership between

¹⁵¹See Vladimir Lukin, "Sotrudnicat' ne v ushcherb svoim interesam" ("To cooperate not at the expense of our own interests"), *Moskovskie novosti*, 24 October 1993, p. 15.

¹⁵²Georgii Arbatov, op. cit.

¹⁵³See Brutents, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁵⁴Alexei Arbatov, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁵⁵Lukin, "Ot Manilova k Nozdrevu...."

them limited in scope. Brutents writes: "With all American foreign policy's commitment to democratic values its god is not abstract ideals but quite earthly needs. What follows from this is that global, in other words, universal partnership with the U.S.A. is hardly possible. If to be based on Russia's needs, it's hard to imagine it with regard to, for example, China, India, or the East in general."¹⁵⁶

A second and the most important idea of the centrists' concept of partnership is that the basis for partnership is provided not by *common values*, as the westernizers think, but by common *interests*; the most important of such interests is preserving stability in the post-Cold War world. In Rogov's opinion, "the challenges of the multipolar system objectively push the U.S.A. to cooperation with Russia, which is not an economic competitor for the United States, in order not to allow a diffusion of military might, to balance the influence of the new 'centers of influence' and to prevent their dominations over entire regions."¹⁵⁷ Matsenov argues that the West is interested in maintaining a predominantly "European" (i.e. Western) orientation of Russia in today's period of growing significance of the "Islamic factor" in world politics. In his opinion, "the West assigns key significance to its relations with the new Russia which, even weakened and changed, is still a critical factor of world politics and of global balance of power."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶Brutents, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁵⁷Rogov, op.cit., p. 11.

¹⁵⁸Matsenov, op. cit., p. 28.

This view of the foundations of the partnership leads the centrists to a conclusion that partnership implies the West's recognition of Russia's special role in the post-Soviet area. Securing such recognition is an important task of Russian foreign policy. As Bogaturov et al. write, Russia should and can achieve mutual understanding with the West in issues containing fundamental challenges to Russia's statehood, first of all in the issue of preventing escalation of instability on the territory of the former USSR and its immediate surroundings.¹⁵⁹ Pushkov formulates this idea more clearly:

The United States ought to acknowledge Russia's legitimate interest and its special role in the CIS. Unless Moscow resorts to military threats or direct blackmail, there is nothing wrong with Russia being the nucleus of the CIS. The price the West must pay for the Soviet Union's disintegration is accepting Russia's leading role in the area of its historical influence.¹⁶⁰

In fact, for the centrists, partnership implies clear mutual understanding regarding each other's spheres of influence—with all the qualifications discussed in the previous section, such as checking and monitoring each other's activities via international organizations.

Russia's policy toward the United States should be aimed at facilitating America's stabilizing role in the multipolar world. On the one hand, the centrists argue that Russia should discourage the United States from futile attempts to establish a unipolar world: the hopes to secure global American domination are illusory.¹⁶¹ On the other hand,

¹⁵⁹See Bogaturov et al., "Vneshniaia politika Rossii," p. 32.

¹⁶⁰Pushkov, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

¹⁶¹See Gareyev, op. cit., p. 6; Brutents, op. cit., p. 4; Georgii Arbatov, op.cit.

Russia should support a benign American presence in regions where, without it, regional balances of power might be upset. Alexei Arbatov argues that in the Far East where Russia will remain weak and vulnerable for many years and where potential Japanese and Chinese bids for regional hegemony need to be kept in check, "the interests of Russia (in contrast to those of the USSR) may be best served by the maintenance of American political role and military presence."¹⁶²

All centrists agree that a continuing American presence in Europe is desirable for Russia. In Lukin's opinion, a strong American role in European politics is important because it would prevent Western Europe's turning into a closed economic and military-political alliance.¹⁶³ Gareyev's point of view is similar: "...whereas the Soviet Union wanted to separate leading European countries from the United States, today a formation of a closed and strong military alliance in Western Europe and the involvement of Eastern European countries in it without American participation could cause additional complications for Russia and affect its security interests."¹⁶⁴ Volkova argues that Russian diplomacy should not create an impression of promoting United States' "leaving" Europe: "The presence of American troops in the European continent--though in considerably smaller numbers than now--would serve as a stabilizing factor, at least

¹⁶²Alexei Arbatov, op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁶³See Lukin, "Rossiia i ee interesy," p. 50.

¹⁶⁴Gareyev, op. cit., p. 7.

in short-term and medium-term perspective."¹⁶⁵ Both Volkova and Alexei Arbatov see one of the reasons for Russia approving an American presence in Europe in the United States' ability to contain potential German attempts to establish domination over Europe.¹⁶⁶

The issue of America's role in Europe is closely linked with broader views on European security, especially on the role of NATO. As follows from the centrists' ideas discussed above, NATO is generally assessed quite favorably because it is considered as one of the pillars of stability. Alexei Arbatov argues that military structures like the WEU and NATO are very important for prevention of "German expansionism" of "spilling over" of Yugoslavia-like crises. He writes: "A traditional Soviet goal was the undermining of NATO unity but today, on the contrary, Russia's interest lies with the maintenance of NATO mechanisms into the next decade (including an American military presence and a leading U.S. position in the command structures), and cooperation with it through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This is one of the ways that Russia can most effectively safeguard its interest in stability in Europe."¹⁶⁷

Volkova analyzes two reasons for Russia's interest in maintaining NATO. First, the weakening of NATO would lead to the "breakup of strategic stability" which would

¹⁶⁵Ye. Volkova, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii: yevropeiskii kontekst" ("Russia's foreign policy: the European context"), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1992, No. 9, p. 25.

¹⁶⁶See Volkova, op. cit., p.26; Alexei Arbatov, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁶⁷Alexei Arbatov, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

cause only a rearrangement of the power distribution, with inevitable formation of new military alliances directed against the most powerful state which, on the European scale, is Russia. Second, NATO neutralizes not only German aspirations to dominate Europe but also "those in the U.S.A. who want their country to become the only superpower with far-reaching claims to world domination."¹⁶⁸

The centrists, as practically everybody else in Russia, are opposed to the idea of NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe. However, there are some important differences between the views of the centrists and the westernizers. First, unlike the westernizers, the centrists see the problem not in "mistrust" of Russia which would be demonstrated by the admission of East-Central European states to NATO, but in the mere fact of expansion of a powerful military alliance to the borders of Russia's sphere of influence. Although East-Central Europe is not a part of Russia's zone of historical "responsibility," it is definitely a zone of Russia's vital interests due to its geopolitical position, and Russia' views should be taken into account by Western great powers when they consider East European affairs.¹⁶⁹

A second difference with the westernizers is in the approach to potential Russian membership in NATO. The westernizers, even those who do not insist on Russia's immediate application for NATO membership, argue that if the expansion of NATO is deemed necessary, it should proceed on a non-discriminatory basis, i.e. Russia should

¹⁶⁸Volkova, op. cit., p. 26.

¹⁶⁹See Brutents, op. cit., p. 4; Volkova, op. cit., pp. 26-27; Pushkov, op. cit., p. 90.

be offered membership together with the East European countries. For the centrists, the idea of Russia's entry to NATO is unacceptable. Alexei Arbatov ridicules that idea as a product of naive pro-westernism; Volkova also notes that Russia's membership in NATO would tie the country with the military structures of the North and thereby distance it from the South.¹⁷⁰ Migranian warns that inclusion of Russia in NATO would "lead to transformation of our country into a stronghold on that bloc's borders with the Islamic world and China."¹⁷¹

A third difference is in the assessment of the Partnership for Peace program. As noted in section 2.2.2, the westernizers enthusiastically approve both the program and Russia's participation in it. The centrists are at best skeptical. Some of them, like Pushkov, appreciate the fact that PFP allowed the delay of Eastern Europe's admission to NATO and consider Russia's participation in it as justifiable. But for them, participation in PFP is something which is imposed on Russia by circumstances, and they pessimistically predict future expansion of NATO to the East without Russian participation. As Pushkov writes, "Russia will participate in the Partnership for Peace, and it will be a qualitatively new step in its relations with NATO. But in reality it will be the East European countries, and in perspective may be the Baltic countries, whom

¹⁷⁰See Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 22; Volkova, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁷¹Andranik Migranian, "Zachem vstupat', yesli luchshe ne vstupat'?" ("Why join if it's better not to join?"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 15 April 1994, p. 3.

the partnership will prepare for the admission to the bloc."¹⁷²

More typical for the centrist was rejection of the idea of Russian participation in PFP. Lukin's criticism during the parliamentary debates was so eloquent as to compare the agreement with NATO on joining the PFP with a "rape" of Russia. Migranian in his analysis of this issue put forward several reasons for Russia not to join the program. First, since it is NATO who defines which countries can become full NATO members after their participation in PFP, it is obvious that East Europeans will be offered an opportunity to join NATO first while Russia would wait for the invitation for a long time, perhaps forever. Therefore, those who say that participation in PFP is a means of avoiding Russia's "isolation" are naive: Russia will be isolated anyway. Second, "facing a multitude of problems in both the near and far abroad, Russia can not be on NATO's short leash when its national interests might require making decisions regarding different parts of the world, decisions not coinciding with the opinion of the NATO bloc, the U.S.A., or its partners in the Partnership for Peace." Third, whether or not the authors of the PFP concept want it, that concept "includes an objective attempt to block the process of military and political consolidation of the space of the former Soviet Union." Finally, joining PFP would be a step in the direction of transforming NATO, which has been created for solving very particular problems, into a universal instrument of

¹⁷²Alexei Pushkov, "Rossiia i NATO: chto dal'she?" ("Russia and NATO: what's next?"), *Moskovskie novosti*, 1994, No. 3, p. 13; see also Bogaturov, Davydov, and Trofimenko, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

preventing and settling conflicts in Eurasia.¹⁷³

The last argument is a part of a broader approach to the role of NATO and NATO-affiliated institutions in European security. The westernizers see the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a principal organization of military cooperation in Europe which would formalize and legitimize NATO's peace-keeping and peace-making activity. The centrists are not so interested in advancing the NACC role. As Migranian writes, "First, in the NACC we are still alone and without allies. Second, these are our former Warsaw Pact allies--now the NACC members--who are rushing to NATO, and we can not influence how quickly and effectively the NACC can be turned into an instrument of European security."¹⁷⁴ Rogov writes that Russia, having joined the NACC, dissolved among dozens of the members of that organization which is not designed to serve serious goals.¹⁷⁵

The cautious approach of the centrists to the NACC is explained by their unwillingness to increase, even indirectly, the role of NATO in decision-making about European security. In Migranian's opinion, the events of winter and spring of 1994 in Bosnia corroborate that skepticism: after the UN Security Council, with Russian approval, gave the UN Secretary General the right to transfer to NATO responsibility for peace-making operations, NATO started to take measures (such as ultimatums to the

¹⁷³Migranian, *op. cit.*, pp. 1,3.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵See Rogov, *Tri goda...*, p. 11.

Serbs) without consulting Russia.¹⁷⁶ Alexei Arbatov also expresses doubts in NATO's ability to serve as a cornerstone of European security in the long run:

At present there is no better substitute, but in the long run this [NATO's activity similar to that in former Yugoslavia] may create a problem, if new mechanisms are not created. By definition Russia does not have any serious influence over NATO decisions and operations. If NATO takes too active a role and engages in large-scale combat actions in Europe, this would cause a negative Russian reaction and greatly strengthen the hand of hard-liners in Moscow. To avoid that, the West must pay much greater attention to Russian views and interests, and act on the basis of genuine compromise and consensus primarily through the UN and CSCE, so that these bodies do not look like mere fig-leaves for essentially U.S., NATO, or German actions.¹⁷⁷

Here Arbatov reveals a common centrist preference to see the CSCE/OSCE rather than the NACC as a most powerful organization of European security. Migranian clearly states that instead of participating in PFP and empowering NACC, Russia should promote "improvement of the mechanisms of the CSCE which has been created specifically as a guarantor of peace and order in the entire European continent."¹⁷⁸ Rogov argues that one of the mistakes of Kozyrev's diplomacy was "ignoring" the CSCE/OSCE.¹⁷⁹

The centrists' policy preferences regarding Russian foreign policy toward the

¹⁷⁶See *ibid.*

¹⁷⁷Alexei Arbatov, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁷⁸Migranian, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁷⁹See Rogov, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

West may be summarized as follows.

- Russia should seek partnership with the West and especially with the United States, but this partnership should be based on (a) full equality, (b) recognition of its limited scope and of differences in views, and (c) recognition of Russia's special role in the former USSR.
- In its relations with the United States, Russia should discourage it both from attempts to establish world domination and from withdrawal to "fortress America" (especially from Europe and from the Far East).
- Russia should promote preservation of the status quo in NATO's position in Europe: that bloc should not be weakened but should not expand or assume additional, all-European security responsibilities.
- Russia should join neither NATO nor the Partnership for Peace.
- only OSCE, not NACC should be the most powerful organization in the sphere of European security.

Chapter 4

THE ANTI-WESTERN BELIEF SYSTEM

Analysis of the anti-Western belief system is more difficult than that of the pro-Western and the centrist ones, because anti-Western views are much more diverse. Unlike the westernizers who share a commitment to liberal ideology or the centrists who share the 'realist' philosophy of international relations, the anti-westernizers represent a whole set of ideologies and theoretical perspectives. They include three major schools of thought which I define as *communist* (e.g. Gennadi Zyuganov), *imperialist* (or *Eurasianist*; e.g. Alexandr Dugin, Elgiz Pozdnyakov and Natalya Narochnitskaya), and *nationalist* (or, more precisely, *ethnic nationalist*; e.g. Nikolai Lysenko and Alexandr Barkashov). However, all of them can be described as adherents of the anti-Western belief system because important parts of their foreign-policy views are similar or even congruent with each other. I will address these similarities in the following sections, at the same time noting the differences between the three subdivisions of the anti-Western view.

4.1 Images

4.1.1 History of Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy

A starting point for the anti-western outlook on Russia's history is an idea of the uniqueness of Russian "civilization," most importantly, its profound difference from that of Western Europe. This difference includes national spirit, ideology, culture, predominant type of relations between individuals and the state, etc. Pozdnyakov writes (in reference to a political system in general):

It is a product of many centuries of effort, a product and manifestation of the people's spirit and national consciousness. I do not think this philosophical truth has ever come out so clearly as in the case of the formation of Russian statehood: a spirit of togetherness, an aspiration to live and act in common and in harmony, runs through Russia's history. ...And it would be very wrong and, in fact, dangerous to forget that Russia's history, the history of the formation of our society and state, differs *entirely* from that of Western Europe.¹

Pozdnyakov explains that the West European civilization, since the collapse of the Roman Empire, was built on principles of disunity and of "war of everybody against everybody else." Unlike that, Russia, starting from the rise of Moscow, was advancing from disunity to unity (he compares Russia not to particular West European states but to Western Europe as a whole).²

¹Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "Russia Is a Great Power," *International Relations* (Moscow), 1993, No. 1, p. 5.

²See *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

An important foundation of the distinctive Russian national consciousness is Orthodox Christianity. As Narochnitskaya argues, Russia and the West have different understandings of the essence of Christianity:

In the Western worldview which has been formed by Latin Christianity, it is an abstract individual who has primacy--any individual, without reservations about the moral use of his free God-given will. But we value first of all the moral search, leaving hope even to the most fallen person. The former approach produces inevitable and gradual erosion of the criteria of good and evil, virtue and vice, morality and immorality; it results in massive alienation and advocacy of rightfulness of any manifestations of personality if they do not interfere with others. As for a Russian, he has always aspired to live according not so much to the Law as to the Truth...It was that foundation which grew political culture, political institutions, forms of statehood, traditions of economic activity, motivation for work, and attitude to wealth.³

Communist Zyuganov, unlike the communists of the Soviet period (including, most likely, himself at that time), agrees with this approach to the Orthodoxy's role in Russian history. In his opinion, "any political or social formation gains stability, solidity, the will to live, the ability to evolve and to fight for survival only when it is inspired by a great Idea, by a noble Ideal. For Russia, this moving force was found in the aspiration to implement ideals of rightfulness and love, empathy and mercy, faith and faithfulness. From the ancient times it was reflected in the country's self-name--Holy Russia."⁴

³Natalya Narochnitskaya, "Ochnis', Rossiia" ("Wake Up, Russia"), *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 29 July 1993, p. 6.

⁴Gennadi Zyuganov, *Derzhava (The State)*, Informpechat', Moscow, 1994, p. 17.

The "noble ideals" inspired by Orthodox Christianity shaped the way the Russian state was expanding into an empire. "Empire" as a form of state is viewed by the anti-westernizers very positively. Pozdnyakov describes it as follows: "Every empire is primarily a community. This implies at the least the absence of frontiers, customs and other barriers, of provincialism, particularism, and whatever else used to serve as a source of feudal, civil, ethnic, and religious wars."⁵ The Russian empire, according to Pozdnyakov, differed from all other empires in being "organic," i.e. geopolitically compact and based on mutual interests of all its peoples.⁶ Sterligov's opinion is similar: the Russian empire was "built on the principle of balance of interests of the indigenous peoples, and this made the empire sufficiently solid in all respects....The space in which our state was located included peoples who inevitably aspired to create a single state."⁷

Zyuganov, rejecting traditional Soviet communist assessment of the Russian empire as a "prison of peoples," writes that empire is "a historically and geopolitically determined form of development of the Russian state."⁸ He agrees with a nineteenth century scholar Lomansky who described the Russian empire as a "great power embracing a multitude of different tribes and peoples who are linked by the unity of a

⁵Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "Russia Today And Tomorrow," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1993, No. 2, p. 23.

⁶See Pozdnyakov, "Russia Is a Great Power," p. 7.

⁷Alexander Sterligov, "Russkii vopros" ("The Russian question"), *Nash Sovremennik*, 1992, No. 11, p. 122.

⁸Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 14.

higher culture and by the awareness of everyone's equality under the law and the supreme power, and who enjoy broad local self-rule."⁹ Fascist Barkashov is more eloquent: "During the last millennium, having formed their national religious worldview—the Orthodoxy, Russians built an empire founded on a higher justice which attracted different peoples to it."¹⁰

The view of Russia as a unique civilization based on distinct religion and morality has important implications for the interpretation of history of Russia's foreign relations. First of all, Russia's profound cultural difference from the West resulted in the latter's hostility toward a large and powerful country whose culture was independent and alien to it. Zyuganov gives the following assessment (applicable both to history and today's situation) of the West's attitude to Russia: "Centuries of military, religious, and economic competition between Russia and Western Europe leave no illusions: the contrast of our cultures, societal and state values, and historically formed national worldviews is obvious. The West does not understand us in many respects. It is afraid of our state's might. It is interested in weakening, dismembering, and, if possible, enslaving Russia."¹¹

Western hostility toward Russia has not only cultural, but also geopolitical roots.

⁹Tbid., pp. 14-15.

¹⁰A. P. Barkashov, *Azbuka russkogo natsionalista (The ABC of a Russian nationalist)*, Slovo-1, Moscow, 1994, p. 58.

¹¹Gennadi Zyuganov, "Russkii vopros" ("The Russian question"), *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 3 July 1993, p. 3.

Geopolitics plays a prominent role in all brands of anti-Western theorizing. Anti-Westernizers usually infer bolder and farther-reaching generalizations from the basic geopolitical concepts than the centrists who, as discussed in ch. 3.1, also use geopolitical terminology. While the centrists consider geopolitical realities as an important factor determining rational choices of states' leaders, the anti-westernizers virtually merge geopolitical and civilizational approaches, linking a country's location with culture, ethics, perception of the outside world, and international behavior. Eurasianists typically emphasize the importance of Russia's location between European and Asian civilizations. That location, in their opinion, gave Russia the role of a keeper of the global balance of power among civilizations.¹²

Glivakovsky, building upon the ideas of Halford Mackinder, describes two opposite "modes" of economic development and international behavior--the maritime and continental. The continental mode originating from the Roman empire is based on economic self-sufficiency and a strong centralized state which is interested primarily in control over territory. The lands acquired by a continental empire are included in it as more or less equal parts. The maritime mode originating from Carthage is based on international trade and a weak state. A maritime empire maintains a clear distinction between metropolis and colonies whose territories and peoples are considered only as an object of exploitation (hence the wide-spread practice of slave trade). The historical

¹²See for example, Natalya Narochnitskaya, "Osoznat' svoiu missiiu" ("To understand our mission"), *Nash sovremennik*, 1993, No. 2, p. 164; Pozdnyakov, "Russia Is a Great Power," p. 6.

conflict between Russia and the West is, therefore, a clash of continental and maritime civilizations, with Russia standing in the way of Western attempts to dominate the whole world through the imposed liberal economic model.¹³

Dugin develops a very similar concept and adds to it a conspiratorial interpretation of the history of Russian and Soviet foreign policy which is presented as a result of continuous struggle between "Eurasianists" and "Atlanticists" in Russian/Soviet elite. The "Atlanticists" conspired to ally Russia with Britain and the United States making the country a dependent part of Western-controlled global free-trade economy; the "Eurasianists" conspired to keep Russia on its own independent path and to ally with Germany against the maritime Anglo-Saxon powers.¹⁴ Barkashov also combines geopolitics with a conspiracy theory, but in a simpler manner: in his opinion, the Bolshevik revolution was a result of Western (primarily American) Jewish financial capitalists' conspiracy which was designed to destroy Russia which had been an obstacle to Western colonial and neocolonial rule over the whole world. Russia was such an obstacle not only because it was independent and rich in resources, but also because it served as an "antipode to the Western world from the point of view of the building principles of the state and of the relations between the peoples in it."¹⁵

¹³See Anatoly Glivakovsky, "Okno v Evropu--cherez svalku" ("A Window to Europe--across a dump"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 16, p. 2.

¹⁴See Alexander Dugin, "Velikaia voina kontinentov" ("The great war of continents"), *Den'*, 1992, No. 4-15.

¹⁵Barkashov, op. cit., p. 33.

Due to its positive perception of the Russian Empire, the anti-Western image can not deal easily with an assessment of the communist Soviet Union which destroyed the Orthodox autocratic state, at the same time continuing some aspects of the imperial tradition. Barkashov's view of Soviet foreign policy is extremely negative, but it is rather an exception. For Barkashov, the Bolshevik revolution inspired by the West resulted in a takeover of the country by the Jews who started genocide of the Russian people; despite differences in foreign policy views among the Soviet leaders, real decision-making has always been "in the hands of Kaganovichs, Kollontays, Litvinov-Filkensteins, and not in the hands of Molotovs and Zhdanovs" (here Barkashov contrasts non-Russian and Russian names). He is especially upset with the Soviet Union's participation in a war against Hitler's Germany which, in his opinion, was a country trying to escape from the control of international Jewish capital and was sentenced to death for that by the Western powers, that sentence being executed by Soviet soldiers (Barkashov supports the ideas of writer Victor Suvorov who argued that the Soviet Union was preparing to attack Germany in 1941).¹⁶

Barkashov's views are extreme and, as I have noted, are supported by few. A more moderate nationalist Nikolai Lysenko shares Barkashov's assessment of the October 1917 revolution as a result of a Jewish conspiracy, but suggests a more complex interpretation of Soviet history. In his opinion, the Jewish political elite (i.e. the Bolshevik party leaders) succeeded in mobilizing large segments of the Russian

¹⁶See *ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

population because it offered a messianic ideology (Marxism) which could substitute in popular consciousness the traditional idea of Moscow as a "Third Rome." Lysenko writes:

Yes, the chimeric construction of a Russian body with a Jewish head ended demographic dynamism of the Russians as a nation, it destroyed traditional Russian rural way of life, and catastrophically undermined Russian Orthodox mentality. But even this could not deprive our people of its greatest national quality--its special genetic ability to foresee its own messianic essence, to entirely concentrate on the achievement of a new messianic supergoal, and to relentlessly build a state of the universal idea--the Empire.¹⁷

Lysenko admits that it was the Soviet period when Russia achieved the apex of its might. In his opinion, it happened due to the creative labor of the Russian people, despite the designs of international Jewish bankers.¹⁸

Dugin, with his theory of struggling Eurasianist and Atlanticist conspiracies, describes different periods and acts of Soviet foreign policy as either Eurasian or Atlantic oriented and classifies Soviet institutions and leaders according to his scheme: KGB as a stronghold of the Atlanticists, GRU (military intelligence) as a stronghold of the Eurasianists; Stalin and Brezhnev as Eurasianists, Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Atlanticists.¹⁹ His overall assessment of the Soviet period, however, is positive due to its preservation of the empire. Dugin describes "Soviet nationalism" (or "patriotism")

¹⁷Nikolai Lysenko, "Nasha tsel'--sozdanie velikoi imperii" ("Our goal is creation of a great empire"), *Nash Sovremennik*, 1992, No. 9, p. 127.

¹⁸See *ibid.*

¹⁹See Dugin, *op. cit.*, *Den'*, 1992, No. 6-11.

as an heir to the "Orthodox Russian nationalism," because the former inherited the "eschatological messianic idealistic trend" of the latter. He writes:

In communism, the nation felt the taste of a great idea which had to be implemented by the "chosen"--Russian--people.... This is how the theory of "building socialism in one country," i.e. in Russia, emerged and overturned scholastic Marxist economic and cosmopolitan calculations. The Russians perceived communist teachings completely differently from the Western communists. They recognized in it first of all an "idealistic" drive to the magical which had been always present in Russian nationalism, and not the complex socio-economic materialistic and atheist doctrine.²⁰

Another Eurasianist, Narochnitskaya, argues that Russia turned out to be stronger than the communist experimentation and that Russian national consciousness increasingly penetrated the communist ideology, especially since the Great Patriotic War.²¹

The thesis about communism being "digested" by traditional Russian imperial and Orthodox consciousness is shared by representatives of all brands of the anti-Western view. Zyuganov, like the authors cited above, writes that communist ideology was just another "great Idea" to which the Russian people are so receptive, and describes the Soviet Union as a state full of contradictions. On the one hand, communism interrupted valuable, thousand years old, spiritual tradition; on the other hand, "the enormous historical inertia of Russian statehood and the strong-state tradition of the national consciousness were steadily pushing the Soviet Union to assume the geopolitical role

²⁰Alexandr Dugin, "Apologija natsionalizma" ("Apology of nationalism"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 38, p. 3.

²¹See Narochnitskaya, "Ochnis', Rossiia!."

which Russia played for centuries."²² The communist party, according to Zyuganov, has always been split into two unofficial parties--the party of "our country" and the party of "this country." The former included overwhelming majority of rank-and-file party members and lower-level apparatchiks, as well as significant part of the highest leadership whose priority has been the interest of the Fatherland. The latter "party" included small but influential group of politicians for whom "this country" was just an arena for realization of personal ambitions and adventuristic social experiments. "This is the party of Trotsky and Kaganovich, Beria and Mekhlis, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze."²³ It was exactly this "party" which led the USSR to its crisis and collapse.

As seen from the writings cited above, the major reason for the anti-westernizers to positively assess the Soviet Union is the latter's successful preservation, in a new form, of the Russian Empire. The first important feature of the empire preserved by the USSR was peaceful and "harmonious" coexistence of nationalities. In Dugin's words, "the USSR was in fact "the last empire" preserving the ancient traditional principle of administrative-political strategic centralism with a fairly mild ethnic policy toward the national regions."²⁴ In Kara-Murza's opinion, both Russia and the USSR existed only

²²Zyuganov, *Derzhava*, p. 19.

²³Ibid., p. 66.

²⁴Dugin, op. cit.

because they found ways to support stable inter-ethnic peace.²⁵ Zyuganov writes that such Soviet concepts of a "multinational union state" and "the Soviet people as a new historical community" were expressions of traditional imperial principles.²⁶

A second important feature of the Russian Empire inherited by the USSR was an independent stance toward the West. It was primarily that determination to follow an independent foreign-policy course that fed Western hostility toward the USSR. Narochnitskaya argues that the beginning of the Cold War can be better understood if we take into account the fact of strengthening of Russian patriotic feelings and weakening of the "antinational" trends in the communist party doctrine during the 1940s.²⁷ Glivakovsky, in accordance with his geopolitical concept of international relations, writes that, since the USSR continued Russia's tradition of "continental" mode of development, it found itself in conflict with the trends of the global economy dictated by the centers of the maritime civilization, first of all the United States.²⁸ In Milgram's opinion, what was really irritating the West during the Cold War was not communist ideology but the Soviet communists' readiness to resist Western economic and political expansion and to

²⁵See S. Kara-Murza, "Unichtozhenie Rossii" ("The destruction of Russia"), *Nash Sovremennik*, 1993, No. 1, p. 130.

²⁶See Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 16.

²⁷See Narochnitskaya, op. cit.

²⁸See Glivakovsky, op. cit.

defend their country's interests.²⁹

The overall assessment of Soviet and pre-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the anti-Western image is positive. The most valued characteristics of it, as can be seen from the above discussion, are the creation and maintenance of a great multiethnic empire and an independent stance toward the hostile West. Another conclusion that can be made at this point is that the most fundamental belief underlying the anti-Western image and distinguishing it from both the pro-Western and the centrist images is the belief in a profound difference between the motives of foreign policy actions of Russia and the Western states. This difference, based on civilizational, cultural, religious, and geopolitical factors, caused a permanent anti-Russian bias in the West's foreign policies, thereby determining Russia's fate as a stronghold of resistance to Western cultural and economic expansion.

4.1.2 Post-Cold War International System: Character and Trends

Because the anti-Western view of the history of international relations is strongly focused on the antagonism between Russia and the West, the end of the Cold War and

²⁹See Svyatoslav Milgram, "Opasna li Zapadu vtororazryadnost' Rossii kak partnera" ("Is a second-rank position of Russia as a partner dangerous to the West?"), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 2 April 1994, p. 3.

subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union are interpreted by all anti-westernizers as a defeat for Russia and a victory for the West. The crisis and collapse of the Soviet Union (starting from Gorbachev's reforms) is viewed as a result of careful planning by American and other Western governments. After the elimination of a strong Russian state as an obstacle to Western efforts to dominate the world, the West is trying to take advantage of the situation and secure its control over global economy and politics.

In Zyuganov's opinion, the events of the last ten years have been part of the leading capitalist countries' strategy designed to help them cope with the global crisis. He explains the origins and the essence of that crisis as follows:

Today's accumulation of global crisis phenomena is caused first of all by the fact that, under the existing economic mechanism, the tempos of the exhaustion of non-renewable resources, of the destruction of the natural environment, of the growth of population, and of social stratification achieved a level that threatens human civilization with universal catastrophe and self-destruction.³⁰

The responsibility for the global crisis, however, is not evenly distributed among the earth's population. Zyuganov makes it very clear that it is the group of rich Western countries who created the modern international economy and benefitted from it. Moreover, the maintenance of the level of Western consumption is entirely dependent on the preservation of the gap between the rich and poor countries, because the poor part of the world simply cannot achieve the same consumption level without ruining the global

³⁰Zyuganov, *Derzhava*, p. 85.

environment.³¹ This picture of the world's future "requires the West to actively develop a strategy which would allow it to pass the dangerous 'zone' at the expense of others without endangering its wealth and reducing its level of consumption. It is impossible to do so without changing the balance of forces."³²

The balance of forces Zyuganov is referring to is the global one, which used to be based on the confrontation between the West led by the United States and the anti-Western countries led by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the key element of the Western strategy became "the scenario of destruction and removal from the world arena of the Soviet Union and consequent breakdown of historically developed geopolitical equilibrium."³³ The success of the West was achieved by unique means: without a full-scale war, by means of ideological subversion.³⁴

The explanation of the West's motivation from the point of view of the structure of the world economy is natural for the communists, but it is readily shared by all brands of the anti-Western image. Barkashov writes that "the so-called 'Western civilization' builds its prosperity on super-exploitation of material and human resources of the raw-materials producing countries, which at this time include Russia."³⁵ Kara-Murza, a

³¹See *ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 86.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

³⁵Barkashov, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

Eurasianist, argues that the West wants to preserve its "freedom to consume," and in order to do so it needs to contain the growth of consumption for 80% of the global population.³⁶ The leader of the Union of Officers Stanislav Terekhov, whose views combine communist and imperialist features, speaking to the All-Union Officers' Meeting (a gathering of armed forces officers opposing the Yeltsin political regime) in June 1993, described the primary driving force behind Western foreign policy, similarly to Zyuganov, as a desire to resolve the global environmental and resource crisis at the expense of others.³⁷

The international system became very different after the collapse of the USSR. First of all, it is characterized by the mastery of the West, led by the United States, in international relations. Many anti-Western authors argue that the West has created a unipolar world.³⁸ The United States is typically seen as successfully pursuing global hegemony.³⁹

³⁶See Kara-Murza, op. cit., p. 139; see also V. Veselov, D. Evstafyev, and P. Skorospelov, "Rossiia v epokhu 'srazhaiushchikhsia tsartstv' ("Russia in the epoch of the 'fighting kingdoms'), *Nash sovremennik*, 1992, No. 12, p. 119.

³⁷See Stanislav Terekhov, "Idiot tret'ia mirovaia voina" ("The Third World War is under way"), *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 29 June 1993, p. 3.

³⁸See Milgram, op. cit.; Vladimir Kryuchkov, "Rossiia lishilas' samogo glavnogo--bezopasnosti" ("Russia has lost the main--security"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 37, p. 6.

³⁹See Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 88; Boris Poklad, "Partnyorstvo radi SShA" ("Partnership for the U.S.A."), *Pravda*, 8 April 1994, p. 3; Mikhail Khatsankov "Gorchakov, koshmar Kozyreva" ("Gorchakov, Kozyrev's nightmare"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 31, p. 2.

Secondly, the change in international relations means much more than a mere shift in the balance of power: it is an attempt to qualitatively transform the international system in the direction of erosion of state sovereignty. Zyuganov terms the state of the world politics pursued by the West as the "new world order" (always in quotation marks to emphasize a foreign origin of the term). According to him, the ongoing realization of the plan to establish the "new world order" means that "the global back-stage forces started decisive actions forming a rigid centralized system of coercive management of the development of human civilization."⁴⁰ The Gulf War, or "the slaughter in Iraq," was a clear sign of the end of a "traditional bipolar world built on a balance between the two superpowers and of the beginning of a new era in world politics."⁴¹ The post-World War II technological revolution created an opportunity to develop a system of global control over mankind. The "back-stage," or "transnational," "cosmopolitan," forces aspire to use the opportunities of the post-Cold War situation for the creation of a "global super-state." Zyuganov explains:

That super-structure, according to its authors' design, should gradually swallow national sovereign states. In large states, they at first stimulate processes splitting united statehood into small pieces which are easy to "digest." As all countries lose their independence, they are included in the field of general political influence as peripheral elements, a type of transmitters of influences and commands coming from a united command center.⁴²

⁴⁰Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 89.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., p. 23.

The institutional foundation for the emerging "super-state" and the "new world order" is provided by existing international organizations, first of all the United Nations, whose activities increasingly infringe on sovereign rights of nation-states. Zyuganov is especially critical of the growing UN peacekeeping operations: "Only in 1993 the UN conducted more than ten peacekeeping operations.' The size of the international 'peacekeeping contingent' will exceed one hundred thousand....There is a solid ground for a statement that after the liquidation of the Soviet Union the UN is rapidly losing its function of a harmonizer of international relations and turning into a tool of establishing a geopolitical dictatorship."⁴³ That dictatorship under the name of a "new world order" is resolute and brutal. Volodin (in an April 1993 article) described it as completely immoral and blamed it for the "genocide of Iraqi people," intent to stage a similar genocide of the Serbian people, and an "occupation of Somalia."⁴⁴ Zyuganov also addresses the events in the Persian Gulf, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia, and gives them the same assessment as Volodin.⁴⁵

Barkashov, like Zyuganov, writes about a back-stage transnational force which stands behind the negative changes in the world, but he is more specific in describing it.

⁴³Ibid., p. 24; see also Shamil Sultanov, "Goluboi mondialism" ("The blue mondialism"), *Den'*, 1992, No. 33, p.2

⁴⁴Eduard Volodin, "Potakaem nadrugatel'stvu" ("Approving the outrage"), *Sovetskaya Rossiia*, 24 April 1993, p. 5.

⁴⁵Zyuganov, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

For him, it is not enough to note the fact that the United States rules over the West and aspires to rule over the world, but it is also necessary to see that the United States itself is ruled by the Jewish bourgeoisie.⁴⁶ The international Jewry is that transnational force that moves the West's foreign policy (as well as domestic politics). Here is how Barkashov describes the essential conflict of the international system:

Today we can definitely say that global historical phenomena are stimulated only by the struggle of nations, personified by national elites, against the international organized force which wants to play the role of a global elite which would have right to rule over all peoples...having deprived them of originality and independence. This international force which wants to play a role of a global elite has formed for a millennium on the basis of the ideology of Judaism...⁴⁷

The "international force" controls not only governments, but also international organizations, including the UN, NATO, CSCE, IMF, and others. All these organizations, according to Barkashov, are created in order to put their noses in national affairs and control by all means developments in the world so that the "international elite" continued its mastery.⁴⁸

A necessary condition for the West (controlled by an "international force") to secure establishment of the "new world order" is the completion of the destruction of Russia as a potential competitor for influence in the world. All anti-Westernizers are united in their conviction in profoundly evil character of the current Western policy

⁴⁶See Barkashov, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁴⁸See *ibid.*, p. 91.

toward Russia. Pozdnyakov argues that the major U.S. geopolitical objective today is "to destroy the Eurasian geostrategic monolith for all time" which requires a weak Russia.⁴⁹ Milgram writes: "Cracked, weak, vassalized, or--better--completely disintegrated Russia can be easier squeezed out to the periphery of the world diplomacy and economy, easier attached to the wheels of Western strategy. And, vice versa, the West is scared of a mighty, dynamic, and prosperous Russia."⁵⁰ Zhirinovsky argues that the West will attempt to drive Russia back no matter what political system the latter has: "Is it a Soviet, Stalinist, or tsarist Russia--does not matter, the struggle of the rivals continues. We are their rivals. If we become absolutely democratic now, if we become exactly like they, they will fight against us anyway."⁵¹

Narochnitskaya emphasizes the economic motivation of Western policy: "It is obvious that today's U.S. policy which promises to the easily-believing dilettantes that Russia will join the 'West,' in reality will transform it from industrially developed 'North' into backward 'South.'"⁵² Khatsankov writes that the West is interested in turning Russia into a raw-material appendage and a market for second-rank products and

⁴⁹Pozdnyakov, op. cit., p. 7.

⁵⁰Milgram, op. cit.; see also Ksenia Myalo, "Konets stoletia: russkii vyzov" ("The end of the century: the Russian challenge"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 12 April 1994, p. 5.

⁵¹"Nam nuzhna Rodina, a demokrati khotiat eksperimentov" ("We need a Motherland, and the democrats want experiments"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 13, p. 3.

⁵²Narochnitskaya, "Osoznat' svoiu missiu," p. 168.

environmentally "dirty" technologies.⁵³ In Glivakovsky's opinion, the West tries to include Russia and other former Soviet republics into global economy in order to relocate environmentally damaging industries there.⁵⁴ Lysenko writes that the attack on Russia began with the imposition of Gorbachev's "new political thinking" (which was nothing but a Western subversive action) and pursues the goal of economic and technological enslavement of Russia.⁵⁵

Zyuganov similarly assesses the goals of the West toward Russia and presents an account of Soviet/Russian political history since 1985 interpreting it as a process of consistent removal of patriotic forces from Russian political arena by Western "conductors" and their Russian puppets. The essence of the Western scenario, in his opinion, "consists in the destruction of the historically formed Russian 'center of power' and integration of its remains into transnational structures of the 'united world community.'"⁵⁶ Terekhov describes all negative developments in Russia as parts of a "war" which is being waged by the West.⁵⁷ Varennikov writes that the West's strategic objective is "to deprive Russia and other CIS countries of their independence and

⁵³See Khatsankov, op. cit.

⁵⁴See Glivakovsky, op. cit.

⁵⁵See Lysenko, op. cit., p. 127.

⁵⁶Zyuganov, op. cit., pp. 9, 52-58.

⁵⁷See Terekhov, op. cit.

sovereignty and put them into complete and assured dependence from the West."⁵⁸

The outcome of Western attempts to destroy and enslave Russia will depend on the Russians' ability to resist (which will be discussed below). But no matter what the course of Russian foreign policy, the "new world order" is not going to be free of conflicts and contradictions. In fact, when Zyuganov examines the role of the UN as a tool of global dictatorship, he notes that the growth of "peacekeeping operations" is a direct response to the increasing number of conflicts caused by the West's attempt to deprive other countries of an opportunity to develop economically and define their own destinies.⁵⁹

The number and scale of conflicts in the world are growing due to two factors: first, the continuing "global crisis" dividing the world's countries into rich and poor (discussed above), and, second, the radical change in the global balance of power after the collapse of the USSR. The Eurasianists usually describe this change as geopolitical "collapse," "catastrophe," or "disaster" which has set civilizations in motion.⁶⁰

There are several major conflicts outside the former USSR that have been exacerbated by the end of the bipolar system. First, the conflict between the West, above all the United States, and the Islamic world. Veselov, Evstafyev, and Skorospelov

⁵⁸Valentin Varennikov, "Razgrom posle pobedy" ("Defeat after a victory"), *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 16 December 1993, p. 5.

⁵⁹See Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 23-24.

⁶⁰See Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "The Geopolitical Collapse and Russia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1992, No. 9, p. 3; Narochnitskaya. "Osoznat' svoiu missiiu," p. 165.

argue that, after the Russian government took a pro-American stance, the major threat to *Pax Americana* comes from Islamic fundamentalism. The intensity of the conflict between the United States and the Islamic world, in their opinion, will increase due to the fact that the center of the world economy will more and more move to the continent of Eurasia where Muslim countries control many strategic (actual and potential) transcontinental transportation arteries. They foresee the emergence of a new "containment" strategy in the U.S. foreign policy--this time it will be the containment of Islamic fundamentalism which has no chances, however, to produce a situation as static and predictable as the Cold War.⁶¹ Morozov argues that "the U.S. activity in the South meets the strongest resistance from the Islamic factor."⁶²

It is necessary to note that while all anti-Western authors underscore the role of the Islamic world in resisting the "new world order," they assess it differently. The communists and Eurasianists are mostly sympathetic to the Islamic cause because of its anti-American, anti-Western stance. Moreover, Eurasianists argue that Russian civilization has emerged and survived as an "alloy" of Christian/European/Slavic and Islamic/Asian/Turkic elements.⁶³ Ethnic nationalists, however, are very suspicious toward Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, and they see it as a threat not so much for the

⁶¹See Veselov et al., op. cit., pp. 119-122.

⁶²Evgeny Morozov. "Rossiia i Iug: geostrategicheskaia problema" ("Russia and the South: the geostrategic problem"), *Nash sovremennik*, 1992, No. 11, pp. 147-148.

⁶³See for example Narochnitskaya, op. cit., p. 167; Kara-Murza, op. cit., p. 131.

United States as for Russia itself.⁶⁴ Zhirinovsky, whose eclectic views are a mixture of imperialism and ethnic nationalism, considers Islamic fundamentalism as one of the factors contributing to the instability of the "South" by which he means the part of Eurasian continent to the south from Russia and which, in his opinion, has always been the source of troubles not only for Russia but for the whole world.⁶⁵

A second conflict of the post-Cold War world is that between the United States and large non-Western countries, especially China and India. As Morozov writes, "The United States is persistently implementing its old plan of blocking the countries capable of being political, economic, and military competitors--China, India, and the former USSR."⁶⁶ Traditional U.S. means include encircling those countries with military bases and forming strategic alliances with the Middle East countries. Now, according to Morozov, the United States is planning to encircle China and India even more tightly using territories of the Central Asian former Soviet republics. Morozov is convinced that a war between the United States and China is inevitable; China, in his opinion, is increasingly penetrating the Islamic world in order to create allies for the time of future

⁶⁴See for example, Nikolai Lysenko, "Otkrovennyi razgovor o "druziakh, "vragakh" i korenykh interesakh natsii" ("Frank talk about "friends," "enemies," and the basic interests of the nation"), *Nash sovremennik*, 1993, No. 7, pp. 152-155.

⁶⁵See Vladimir Zhirinovsky, *Poslednii brosok na iug (The last surge to the South)*, LDP, Moscow, 1992, pp. 64-65, 128-129.

⁶⁶Morozov, op. cit., p. 147.

war.⁶⁷

Finally, a whole set of tensions and contradiction within the West itself has been revealed by the end of the Cold War. One of the most important factors is the strengthening of Germany. In Pozdnyakov's opinion, "Germany will soon become a mighty power center in Europe well ahead of France and Britain in potential, leverage, and influence. This situation is logically leading to a major redistribution of forces and a new balance, with the likelihood of a recurrence in a new form of the traditional European policy of alliances and coalitions."⁶⁸ German reunification together with the collapse of the USSR, according to Pozdnyakov, effectively killed the process of European integration.⁶⁹ Morozov shares this idea and takes it further: "The unification of Germany has practically stopped the process of creation of a European Community. By the beginning of the 21st century an economic giant will rise in the center of Europe--the German economic zone. Germany will start to actively squeeze the U.S.A. from Europe."⁷⁰

Despite variations in the anti-Western assessment of the character and trends of the post-Cold War international system, it is safe to say that it has the following

⁶⁷See *ibid.*, pp. 147-148.

⁶⁸Pozdnyakov, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶⁹See *ibid.*

⁷⁰Evgeny Morozov, "Velikaia Aziia i vselenskoe oko" ("The Great Asia and the universal eye"), *Den'*, 1993. No. 4, p. 4.

important common features:

- The post-Cold War world has become unipolar, with the West, led by the United States, as a power center.
- The major trend of the international system's development is the continuing offensive of the "transnational force"--which is controlling Western governments--on the sovereignty of states, in order to create a system of a centralized control over global economy and politics (a "new world order").
- Existing international organizations, primarily the UN, have become tools in the establishment of that "new world order."
- The western objective vis-a-vis Russia is to "destroy" it, i.e. to make it an economic appendage of the West, deprive it of sovereignty, and, if possible, disintegrate the Russian state.
- A trend which complicates the establishment of the "new world order" is the growth of number of conflicts in the world, including the conflicts within the West itself and the conflicts between, on the one hand, the West and, on the other hand, the Islamic world and China.

4.1.3 Post-Soviet Russia's Place in International Relations

The anti-Western image gives an extremely negative assessment of changes in

Russia's position in the world after the breakup of the Soviet Union, which is consistent with the anti-Western view of the international system discussed above. Pozdnyakov argues that the "geopolitical collapse" produced by the breakup of the Soviet Union left Russia so weak that it cannot guarantee inviolability of borders not only of other states but even its own.⁷¹ In Narochnitskaya's opinion, after civilizations have been set in motion by the geopolitical catastrophe, Russia finds itself surrounded by enemies fighting for the "Russian succession." The Orthodox Slavic civilization finds itself increasingly squeezed between the "Latin" West and the Islamic world who are encouraged by Russia's weakness.⁷² Volodin describes Russia as surrounded by two *cordons sanitaires* blocking it from being a great power: the first cordon consists of nationalist regimes in the former Soviet republics and the second one of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe whose governments are paying their Western masters for their support by "making Russophobia a doctrinal principle of their interstate relations with the Russian Federation."⁷³

Glivakovsky gives the following assessment of the change in Russia's geopolitical situation: "As a result of the USSR's breakup, Russia geopolitically returned to the pre-

⁷¹See Pozdnyakov, "Geopolitical Collapse and Russia," p. 9.

⁷²See Narochnitskaya, op. cit., p. 165.

⁷³Eduard Volodin, "Porog samozashchity" ("The threshold of self-defence"), *Sovetskaiia Rossiia*, 1 April 1993, p. 5.

Peter the Great times. It is literally pushed inside the Eurasian continent."⁷⁴ This situation has important negative geoeconomic aspects: worsening of Russia's access to strategic transportation routes and separation from millions of highly qualified Russians living now in the "near abroad."⁷⁵ Zyuganov summarizes the results of *perestroika* and the breakdown of the Soviet Union" as follows:

- De-facto loss of the great power status by our country and emergence of its dependence on external forces.
- Loss of all former allies and reduction of cooperation with most of our well-meaning partners--both political and economic ones.⁷⁶
- Abrupt decrease in the level of state, national security from the point of view of all important parameters: military, political, economic, and ideological.
- Strategic destabilization of vast geographic space--from the Baltics to the Caucasus, from Kishinev to Dushanbe...⁷⁷

This assessment of the "objective," geopolitical position of Russia does not dramatically differ from that of the centrists. What makes the anti-Western image different is its vision of the role of the West's policy toward Russia in the current processes and of motivation of both the West and the post-Soviet Russian government. As discussed in the previous section, the motivation of the West's policy toward Russia is seen as vicious and aimed at Russia's destruction. The Yeltsin political regime, in

⁷⁴Anatoly Glivakovsky, "Sibirskaja rodina" ("Siberian homeland"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 22, p. 3.

⁷⁵See *ibid.*

⁷⁶See also Kara-Murza, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

⁷⁷See Zyuganov, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

turn, is viewed as a tool in Western hands. Thus, Zyuganov's characterization of it:

The regime of national betrayal which is in power today will most likely be a conductor of foreign influence in any conflict which might emerge in Russia. And this is easy to explain: our "homemade" elite of people without principles but with lust for power and of corrupted *nouveaux riches* is attracted by an opportunity to raise their status by walking (or crawling) into the transnational cosmopolitan class--the stratum of the new "masters of the world" steering the "international community." ⁷⁸

Zyuganov explains why Western "conductors" have chosen so-called "democrats" as their "friends" within Russia. In his opinion, the major Western criterion for choosing "friends" is their readiness to "sacrifice the interests of the USSR (Russia) as a geopolitical actor." Therefore the natural allies of the "conductor" have been found among the "denationalized democrats" with their "aspiration toward the 'global economic system,' 'entering the market,' 'priority of common human values,' and similar ideological fetishes concealing an absence of any national goal or even a rudimentary instinct of statehood."⁷⁹

Barkashov provides another theory of an inherent link between democracy (and democrats) and betrayal of national interests. He writes that, since electoral campaigns under a democratic regime require large amounts of money, political parties and so-called "people's representatives," fall into dependence on the holders of money. Therefore, a parliament represents interests of only one group--entrepreneurs and bankers who have international connections. "The major holder of money in the world is the transnational

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 24.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 53.

financial oligarchy, with the controlling packet of shares in the hands of Jewish financial oligarchy. This is how a democratic system actually facilitates a takeover and control of power in the country by antinational, international forces."⁸⁰

Kara-Murza argues that the power in Russia has been captured by a "team of enthusiasts of the old idea of a 'world state' governed by an enlightened but rather tough government."⁸¹ Sultanov's opinion is more extreme: he writes that Yeltsin's regime is a regime of foreign occupation.⁸² Katasonov writes that post-Soviet Russian rulers are guided not by Russia's national interests but by their own material interests and by ideological affiliation which makes them closer to the U.S. ruling class than to their own people.⁸³ Vlasov calls post-Soviet Russian foreign policy a betrayal of the Russian people.⁸⁴

Many anti-Western authors use the term *mondialism* to describe the ideology of post-Soviet Russian leaders. Shtepa notes that this term was introduced by Alexandr Dugin (cited on several occasions above) and defines *mondialism* as a "geopolitical

⁸⁰Barkashov, op. cit., p. 38-39.

⁸¹Kara-Murza, op. cit., p. 139.

⁸²See Shamil Sultanov, "Vashi ukazaniia vpolneny, g-n Bush" ("Your instructions have been carried out, Mr. Bush"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 3, pp. 1-2.

⁸³See Yu. Katasonov, "Roli v maskarade" ("Roles in a masquerade"), *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 21 August 1993, p. 3.

⁸⁴See Yurii Vlasov, "Takoe partniorstvo--ne dlia Rossii" ("Such partnership is not for Russia"), *Pravda*, 15 April 1994, p.1.

doctrine aimed at building a 'new world order' uniting the whole world under the influence of material and quasi-cultural (mostly American) values implanted by the international bankocracy and leveling the cultural identity of all peoples."⁸⁵ Narochnitskaya compares today's *mondialists* with the Trotskyists of 1920s and finds their similarity in forgetting Russia's national interests for a utopian idea of supranational organization of the world. She writes that *mondialism* is based on "materialism, Eurocentrism, and rationalism" and attempts to push all peoples in the world to one, Western path of development. This is utopian, because the world's civilizations are too different. Russian civilization is definitely different from the Western one, and therefore it is a tragedy for the country to have *mondialist* leaders.⁸⁶

The image of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union presented by the anti-westernizers is rather ugly: the country is defeated, weakened, humiliated, dissected, and ruled by the agents of foreign powers. To improve its position in the world, Russia needs to radically change the whole foundation of its post-Soviet foreign policy. First of all, Russia should reject the idea of dependence of successful domestic development on its acceptance to the "family of civilized nations." Moreover, Russia can survive only if it refuses to join any "family" and carefully preserves its identity, which is completely different from the West. This difference has defined the uniqueness of Russia throughout

⁸⁵Vadim Shtepa, "Zametki neokonservatora" ("Notes of a neoconservative"), *Nash sovremennik*, 1992, No. 5, pp. 134-135.

⁸⁶See Narochnitskaya, op. cit., p. 166; see also Pozdnyakov, "Russia Is a Great Power," pp. 3, 10.

its history and it should be protected.

Pozdnyakov argues that Russian history has demonstrated the dangers of borrowing elements of Western culture, psychology, economics, and politics. Russia has been weakened by each attempt to westernize and required a long period for recuperation each time.⁸⁷ To survive now, Russia needs to build its economic and political systems on national, not foreign traditions. Russian national political traditions, according to Pozdnyakov, include strong central political authority and cooperation (rather than struggle) between various branches of power.⁸⁸ Barkashov's opinion is, as usual, more extreme and straightforward: Russia needs to "turn on the mechanism of national collectivist thinking, the instinct of national self-preservation which implies an authoritarian rule of a leader as the only means of survival of the Russian People (as well as any other indigenous people of our country)."⁸⁹ Narochnitskaya writes that the idea of "joining the civilized community" has proven its viciousness because it was under that slogan that the thousand-year old Russian state has been destroyed.⁹⁰

The idea of Russia's independent posture in the anti-Western image differs from a similar idea in the centrist image. While the latter emphasizes Russia's similarities with other states in their pursuit of national interests, the former goes further and insists

⁸⁷See Pozdnyakov, "Russia Is a Great Power," pp. 9-10.

⁸⁸See Pozdnyakov, "Russia Today and Tomorrow," p. 30.

⁸⁹Barkashov, op. cit., p. 39.

⁹⁰See Narochnitskaya, "Ochnis', Rossiia!."

on inherent differences in Russia's and the West's civilizations and modes of international behavior. This implies a strong isolationist trend, which includes an aspiration toward a self-sufficient economy. Pozdnyakov writes about Russia:

Her very nature, her size, and her vast natural resources have destined her to become an independent economic world, which means that she need not fear autarky. This sort of thing frightens small, nonself-sufficient countries but not Russia, which has all she needs for a full and independent development. What Russia really lacks is a competent and effective administration that would see the purpose of its efforts in serving the people, the country, the state and its greatness, not in trying to put new social utopias in practice at all costs.⁹¹

Zyuganov's view is similar: "Our country has all necessary natural, labor, material, scientific, moral, and cultural resources in order to exit from the crisis on the basis of its own efforts, without foreign capital which is lent on enslaving economic and political conditions."⁹² Self-sufficient economy, according to Zyuganov, requires a strong regulatory role of the state and domination of public property.⁹³ Barkashov argues that the myth of impossibility for Russia to survive without the West is a major tool in a psychological war. In fact, it is the West who is dependent on Russia--on Russian raw materials. A positive example of liberating a country from dependence on international financial oligarchy has been shown, in his opinion, by Hitler's Germany.⁹⁴ Russia,

⁹¹Pozdnyakov, "Russia Is a Great Power," p. 11.

⁹²Zyuganov, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁹³See *ibid.*, p. 80-81.

⁹⁴See Barkashov, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 77.

writes Barkashov, "has all chances to develop in a self-sufficient (autarkic) manner, totally independently from any economic and political designs of our enemies."⁹⁵

When anti-Western authors write about the possibility of Russia's self-sufficiency, as well as about Russia's great power role, they do not mean Russia in its current borders, the Russian Federation. All of them strongly condemn the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a destruction of hundreds of years of the Russian people's state-building efforts.⁹⁶ Zyuganov notes that, discussing Russia's future, one should remember that "today's Russian Federation is not a whole Russia yet, but just a stump with torn bleeding limbs."⁹⁷ Zhirinovskiy consistently argues that a natural name for the territory of the former USSR is "Russia" and nothing else.⁹⁸ The desire to see Russia regaining lost territories is consistent with the anti-Western positive assessment of the imperial form of the Russian state.

The restoration of "wholeness" of Russia is a condition for the revival of its great power role. As Zyuganov writes, "Without the revival of the Union on a new basis of a free and voluntary choice of peoples, without reunification of the now separated Russian people our state will never stand up from its knees."⁹⁹ Pozdnyakov insists on

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 92.

⁹⁶See for example Narochnitskaya, "Osoznat' svoiu missiiu," pp. 164, 170.

⁹⁷See Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 25.

⁹⁸See Zhirinovskiy, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

⁹⁹Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 26.

a link between the restoration of Russia's control over the "Heartland" of Eurasia (i.e. over the territory of the former USSR) and the reemergence of Russia as a great power whose mission is to serve as a balancer in a geopolitically unstable world.¹⁰⁰ A similar argument is presented by Narochnitskaya who stresses the global importance of Russia's mission as the holder of the balance of forces in the world.¹⁰¹

An important feature of the anti-Western image distinguishing it from the pro-Western and the centrist images is the role it assigns to ideology. Any movement toward the restoration of Russia's greatness is dependent on the ability of the Russian people to embrace the ideology of national rebirth. Most anti-westernizers agree that a new national ideology should include three major components. The first of them is a strong sense of continuity of the tradition of Russian imperial statehood. In Zyuganov's words, it is necessary "to restore historical continuity of the Russian statehood and of our spirituality."¹⁰² A second component of the ideology should include priority of the interests of the state over personal and group interests.¹⁰³ Finally, the national ideology should make the Russian people aware of their uniqueness and mission. I have already addressed the anti-westernizers' assessment of the importance of the devotion to a great "Idea" for the history of the Russian nation. At the current stage of Russia's existence,

¹⁰⁰See Pozdnyakov, "Geopolitical Collapse and Russia," p. 11.

¹⁰¹See Narochnitskaya, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

¹⁰²Zyuganov, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁰³See for example, Narochnitskaya, "Ochnis', Rossiia!";

it is equally important to create a sense of mission in the minds of people. Lysenko describes an "ideology of a breakthrough" which suggests to the Russian people "to start a struggle for building a new great empire--the Empire of technological and intellectual superiority over the whole world."¹⁰⁴ In Barkashov's opinion, "the Russian people's historic obligation is the creation of a mighty and just Russian State; and through this State the Russian People must be the guarantor of justice (not to be confused with "equality") in the world. When the Russian people become aware of that obligation and aspire to fulfill it, they become the Russian Nation."¹⁰⁵ Zyuganov and Narochnitskaya argue that Russia's recovery can start only with the rebirth of genuine national self-consciousness which includes awareness of the nation's uniqueness and its special role in the world.¹⁰⁶

The anti-Western view of Russia's place in the international system clearly differs from the centrist and pro-Western views. Its distinctive features consist in two major ideas. First, the idea of the opposition or even confrontation between Russia and the West which is present in any aspect of analysis of Russia as an international actor. Russia's troubles, including its current miserable international position, have been created by the West. Russia's foes trying to prevent its great power revival, are also found in

¹⁰⁴Lysenko, "Nasha tsel'...", p. 127.

¹⁰⁵Barkashov. op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁰⁶See Zyuganov, "Russkii vopros"; Narochnitskaya, op. cit.

the West. Russian national identity can be established only as an opposite to that of the West.

A second idea is that of an inherent link between Russia's status in the world and restoration of an empire--notwithstanding different interpretations of that idea by different authors (those differences will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter). The imperial and the anti-Western ideas are closely linked together: only after restoring its control over the former empire can Russia be truly independent of the West.

4.2 Policy Preferences

4.2.1 Policy Toward the Newly Independent States

The anti-westernizers' attitude toward the former republics of the USSR is determined by their belief in the inherent link between Russia's greatness and its imperial role. For them, the destruction of the Soviet Union (the latest form of the empire) was a crime, and the goal of Russia's policy in the post-Soviet area should be reversing the processes set in motion by that crime. Russia should stop the disintegration of post-Soviet geopolitical and economic space and restore the empire.

Different groups within the anti-western image describe this task in different words, while agreeing in substance. The communists usually call for the restoration of the Soviet Union (see Zyuganov's statement above). Kryuchkov argues that the only way

out of the current crisis is "the reconstruction of the Union, of the vertical and horizontal economic ties, of the administrative structures."¹⁰⁷ Communist-organized Congress of the Peoples of the USSR issued a manifesto in September 1993 which called for the revival of the Soviet Union where "the socialist mode of production will be an economic basis of the society" and "the power structures will be based on the Soviets which are the most democratic bodies of people's power."¹⁰⁸

Imperialists, with their positive assessment of the USSR's role in continuing the imperial tradition, also argue for its restoration, without mentioning its socialist or communist nature. Narochnitskaya describes the most important task of Russia's policy as "restoration of the illegally destroyed country, its constitution and laws."¹⁰⁹ Zhirinovskiy who is a mixed imperialist-nationalist type, approaches the restoration problem as an imperialist. In his opinion, the empire should be not only restored within its former borders, but expanded further to the South. It should be called neither USSR nor CIS but Russia. However, it would not mean a state for the ethnic Russians.¹¹⁰

Nationalists who blame the Soviet Union for humiliating the Russian nation also

¹⁰⁷Kryuchkov, op. cit.

¹⁰⁸*Pravda*, 25 September 1993, p. 2; see also "Sveriaia pozitsii: Zaiavlenie predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh partii Belorussii, Kryma, Rossii, Ukrainy" ("Comparing positions: The statement of the representatives of communist parties of Belarus, Crimea, Russia, Ukraine," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 7 September 1993, p. 3.

¹⁰⁹Narochnitskaya, "Osoznat' svoiu missiiu," p. 170.

¹¹⁰See Zhirinovskiy, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

want restoration of the unity of the country, but in a different form. In their opinion, the Russian Empire, where ethnic Russians dominate, should return, not the Soviet Union. Their views, however, differ regarding the scale of reunification. For the most consistent ethnic nationalists, the recreation of an empire territorially equal to the Soviet Union is dangerous because of the prospect of the Russians being swallowed by the growing Turkic/Moslem population. As Fomin writes, "the restoration of the Soviet Union or the creation of a Eurasian Union in its former borders does not correspond with national interests of the Russian people. Such a restoration would allow keeping the territory, but in the long run it would lead to a gradual disappearance of the Russians as a nation."¹¹¹ In Fomin's opinion, Russia should create a union only with Ukraine and Belarus and acquire Russian-populated Northern Kazakhstan. In future, that union would become a unitary Russian state, with an administrative structure based on territorial rather than ethnic principle.¹¹²

Lysenko similarly argues for a prompt "organic merger of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in a united Russian Empire."¹¹³ Barkashov views Russian (*ruskii*, i.e. ethnically Russian as opposed to *rossiiskii*, i.e. citizens of Russia) people as consisting of three branches: the Great Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians), and the White

¹¹¹Sergey Fomin, "O russkikh natsional'nykh interesakh" ("On Russian national interests"), *Molodaia gvardiia*, 1993, No. 2, p. 7.

¹¹²See *ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹³Lysenko, *op. cit.*, p. 129; see also *idem*, "Otkrovennyi razgovor...", p. 158.

Russians (Belarusians).¹¹⁴ It is interesting to note, however, that neither Lysenko nor Barkashov clearly reject the idea of restoration of Russian control over non-Slavic former Soviet republics.

Ukraine and Belarus have special significance for all anti-westernizers. Even the imperialists and the communists who try not to emphasize the issue of ethnicity, note that the reunification of the three "brotherly Slavic peoples" is the most urgent objective. Zyuganov writes that "the Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarusians constitute, in their historical unity, that axis around which the mighty state was forming during the centuries."¹¹⁵ Eurasianist Glivakovsky stresses that Russia and Ukraine constitute one entity.¹¹⁶ Sterligov is sure that the "Little Russians," i.e. Ukrainians, will be the first to return to a unified state with Russia.¹¹⁷

The Commonwealth of Independent States is not highly evaluated in the anti-Western image. One searches in vain for a single statement by an anti-westernizer referring to the CIS as an organization useful for building future unity of the former Soviet republics. For the anti-westernizers, the CIS is an artificial structure created by the traitors who destroyed the Union/Empire, and it has no future. Note above Zhirinovskiy's remark about "Russia" as a proper name for what is the CIS now.

¹¹⁴See Barkashov, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹¹⁵Zyuganov, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹¹⁶See Glivakovsky, "Okno v Evropu...."

¹¹⁷See Sterligov, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

Khatsankov, discussing the CIS, writes:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the executive authorities have spoken about the importance of the CIS for so long that today it is clear for everyone (except those authorities) that the politicians' undertaking of consolidation within that amorphous commonwealth has turned into useless waste of time and resources. For Russia, the transparency of borders has resulted in a robbery by the former Soviet republics...¹¹⁸

State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin argues that politics within the former USSR is essentially Russia's domestic politics, and the CIS with its emphasis on sovereignty cannot provide a basis for Russia's relations with the newly independent states.¹¹⁹ For the ethnic nationalists, the CIS is dangerous because it continues the unnatural union between Russia and the non-Slavic southern republics who, using the preferential treatment under CIS rules, continue redistributing the CIS combined national income in their favor and, using the transparency of borders, continue flooding Russia with migrants. The only part of the CIS which should stay with Russia includes Ukraine and Belarus, but these two countries (plus northern Kazakhstan) should be parts of Russia proper and not equal members of an interstate union.¹²⁰

All anti-westernizers stress that these are the disastrous consequences of the collapse of the USSR that will draw its former republics together. Pozdnyakov describes

¹¹⁸Khatsankov, op. cit.

¹¹⁹See "Stat' nashimi satellitami ili umeret'" ("To become our satellites or die"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 5 May 1994, p. 3.

¹²⁰See Fomin, op. cit., pp. 20-21; Lysenko, "Nasha tsel'...", pp. 129-130.

political and economic weakness and instability of the former Soviet republics and concludes: "The very first and also the gravest effect of secession is economic, political, and cultural regression affecting all the peoples concerned."¹²¹ Sooner or later they will understand that integration is the only salvation:

Unless a score of helpless and powerless states wish their peoples harm and are willing to live in poverty, having cut themselves off from the rest by dozens of customhouses and being left with a currency of their own that is not backed by anything, and unless they plan to fight trade and other wars against each other and to do without badly needed goods and raw materials, the only solution is to set an early date to re-establish economic ties and breathe new life into a common economy, an organism that can still be saved.¹²²

In Pozdnyakov's opinion, the reunification will return Russia's history on its course:

Russia will certainly overcome this crisis. Having done so and risen to her feet, she will begin sooner or later but inevitably to reproduce the trend of history by unifying her parts torn asunder by events. She has repeatedly furnished proof of her capacity for regeneration. I think that after going through various adversities and tasting the bitter fruits of "self-determination," those parts themselves will be drawn to Russia. This process may be called "reintegration," "destiny," or "Providence"--it makes no difference which.¹²³

Zatulín argues that the former Soviet republics have no chance of survival without Russia: "they are doomed to either become our satellites or die."¹²⁴ Kryuchkov is sure

¹²¹Pozdnyakov, "Russia Today and Tomorrow," p. 24.

¹²²Ibid., p. 25.

¹²³Ibid., p. 31.

¹²⁴"Stat' nashimi satellitami ili umeret'."

that the former republics will be unable to preserve their sovereignty.¹²⁵ Morozov argues that the post-Soviet states are artificial formations which are already falling apart.¹²⁶ In Sterligov's opinion, no state which has split from Russia has any historical prospects--due to numerous reasons, the most obvious of which is the artificial character of existing borders.¹²⁷ Economic necessity will become a powerful engine of reunification: "Economic ties will inevitably create a unified economic space, and, as in the past, economic ties will start creating the state structure itself and borders beneficial to everyone."¹²⁸ Zhirinovskiy emphasizes that only joining Russia can save the southern newly independent states from inevitable wars--international and domestic.¹²⁹ Glivakovskiy analyzes the geopolitical positions and prospects of independent Ukraine and Kazakhstan and concludes that both countries are doomed to become satellites of either Russia or other foreign countries.¹³⁰

If reunification of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire is inevitable, how will it proceed and what should Russia do for it? The anti-westernizers' suggestions are usually vague; most of them seem to rely on the "objective" forces that are pulling the

¹²⁵See Kryuchkov, op. cit.

¹²⁶See Morozov, op. cit., p. 146.

¹²⁷See Sterligov, op. cit., p. 124.

¹²⁸Ibid., p.125.

¹²⁹See Zhirinovskiy, op. cit., p. 104.

¹³⁰See Glivakovskiy, "Okno v Evropu...."

former Soviet republics together and which Russia should support. However, one can find some policy prescriptions in the anti-Western writings. Authors representing all branches of the anti-Western image agree that Russia should not recognize sovereignty of other newly independent states. As Zatulin said, "We cannot...recognize territorial integrity of states which have never been in their today's borders."¹³¹ Khatsankov refers to the current borders in the former USSR as to "artificially established, recognized by nobody, borders."¹³² Zhirinovskiy argues that recognition of a right for parts of larger states (including the former Soviet republics' rights) to become sovereign is absurd because it can lead to infinite divisions of all existing states. A better solution, in his opinion, is to "deprive everyone of that right and to find a formula which would allow all of us to live as free citizens in a normal big country."¹³³ Russia, writes Zhirinovskiy, has the right to expand to the South (including not only the former Soviet republics, but also neighboring countries), because it would not be a capture of someone's territories: "all territories there are disputed."¹³⁴ Narochitskaya addresses a particular case of Crimea and states that Russia should firmly insist on recognition of

¹³¹Zatulin, op. cit.

¹³²Khatsankov, op. cit.

¹³³"Nam nuzhna Rodina, a demokrati khotiat eksperimentov" ("We need a Motherland, and the democrats want experiments"), *Den'*, 1993, No. 13, p. 3.

¹³⁴Zhirinovskiy, *Poslednii brodok na Iug*, p. 104.

Crimea as Russian, not Ukrainian territory.¹³⁵

The principle of territorial integrity of the newly independent states is attacked by the anti-Westernizers from yet another angle: the presence of large numbers of ethnic Russians outside Russia. As Ksenia Myalo writes, the Russian people "found themselves in a position of forcefully divided people who are close to proclaiming their right to reunification."¹³⁶ Zyuganov makes this idea a clear policy principle: describing the goal of "reviving Russia's statehood," he states that the first principle of it should be a "legislative recognition by Russia's supreme authorities of the right of nations, including the Russian nation, to reunification."¹³⁷ Sterligov suggests that ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics have to aspire to creation of compact autonomous units in order to survive as Russians. But, beyond survival, there is still a goal of reunification with Russia. When the political and economic situation in Russia stabilizes, "the Russian people will start gathering again."¹³⁸ Zatulín's opinion is similar: "Russia should take the Russians living in the near abroad under its protection. And, if national minorities live compactly, they should be granted autonomy--the state should become federal. Special status of regions inhabited by national minorities should be bolstered by

¹³⁵See Narochmitskaya, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

¹³⁶Ksenia Myalo, "Konets stoletia: russkii vyzov" ("The end of the century: the Russian challenge"), *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 12 April 1994, p. 5.

¹³⁷Zyuganov, *Derzhava*, p. 36.

¹³⁸Sterligov, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

Moscow's guarantees."¹³⁹

How to proceed from Moscow's position as a dominant power in the region is not entirely clear. Since Russia's criminal code prohibits the propaganda of war and national hatred, few openly call for a military way of reunification of the empire. Zhirinovsky, however, is very close to that. His idea of Russia's "surge to the South" implies "pacification" of the zone of instability between Russia's southern borders and the Indian Ocean by force. Zhirinovsky writes:

[The "last surge"] should be implemented as a shock therapy, unexpectedly, quickly, efficiently. This will solve all problems at once, because we will achieve calmness. We will obtain four-sided platform. When we rest on the Arctic Ocean in the north, on the Pacific Ocean in the east, on the Atlantic through the Black, Mediterranean, and Baltic Seas, and finally, on the Indian Ocean in the south,--we will obtain quiet neighbors. Friendly India....Quiet and peaceful Russian-Indian border.¹⁴⁰

The use of military force seems inevitable to Zhirinovsky. He does not openly call for starting a war right away, but he writes:

Let Russia successfully take its last "surge" to the south. I see Russian soldiers getting ready for that last southern campaign. I see Russian commanders in headquarters of Russian divisions and armies, drawing the routes and destination points for the military units. I see airplanes at air force bases of the southern districts of Russia. I see submarines surfacing near the shores of the Indian Ocean, and landing craft approaching the shores on which the soldiers of Russian army are already marching, and

¹³⁹"Stat' nashimi satellitami..."

¹⁴⁰Zhirinovsky, op. cit., p. 64.

armored infantry carriers and large masses of tanks are moving.¹⁴¹

Zhirinovsky is an exception in his promotion of an idea of a military campaign. Other authors prefer not to discuss the military solution. The communists insist that the restoration of the unity of the country will be voluntary. They link that with the inevitable failure of pro-Western reforms which will push the impoverished people of the former USSR toward reunification. Kryuchkov writes:

Immediate restoration, revival, or creation of a new Union, at least a partial one, on strictly agreed principles and on a voluntary basis, is most beneficial economically. It is, so to speak, the cheapest way, it will free the people from torturous shock movement toward so-called market relations which are still unclear in their essence but very clear already in their consequences for the people.¹⁴²

The communists are convinced that the peoples of the former Union are longing to unite again, and only the demagogy and manipulation by the politicians keep them from doing that.¹⁴³ The Congress of the Peoples of the USSR called for organizing a grass-roots movements aimed at the restoration of the Union in all former republics.¹⁴⁴

The imperialists and nationalists often suggest that Russia use economic pressure to push other former Soviet republics toward integration. Sterligov argues that Russia

¹⁴¹Ibid., pp. 142-143.

¹⁴²Kryuchkov, op. cit; see also Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 26.

¹⁴³See Kryuchkov, op. cit.

¹⁴⁴See "Manifest Kongressa Narodov SSSR" ("Manifesto of the Congress of the Peoples of the USSR," *Pravda*, 25 September 1993, p. 2.

should demonstrate the consequences of independence by charging world-level prices for the goods it sells to the countries of the "near abroad," especially oil and gas.¹⁴⁵ Khatsankov's opinion is the same: "Trade with the former republics of the USSR on the basis of world market prices or the equivalent exchange of goods would become, unlike the fruitless talk about creating unified economic and other spaces within the CIS, efficient stimuli for those countries to quickly move towards integration with Russia."¹⁴⁶

Anti-Western belief system produces policy preferences which are clearly different from those related to the pro-Western and centrist belief systems. Both the belief in Russia's greatness as dependent on its imperial role and the belief in the West's inherent hostility against Russia prescribe a task of reunification of the former empire (communist variation: restoration of the Soviet Union; ethnic nationalist variation: restoration of a reduced, Slavic empire). Russia's policy toward the former Soviet republics should be not "post-imperial," but rather imperial. Russia should not recognize their sovereignty and, instead, push them toward return into a single state.

¹⁴⁵See Sterligov, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹⁴⁶Khatsankov, *op. cit.*

4.2.2 Policy Toward the West

The anti-westernizers' belief in the inherent hostility of the West toward Russia leads them to view Russia's foreign policy as necessarily including a strong element of confrontation (although this term is not approved by all of them) with the West, especially the United States. The degree of that confrontation is different, but present in all anti-Western writings.

The first anti-westernizers' demand for Russian foreign policy toward the West is the resistance to Western attempts to influence Russia's domestic politics and international behavior. Zyuganov writes that Russian left and patriotic forces cannot

turn a blind eye at the fact that the "new world order" actively imposed by the U.S.A. and their allies objectively infringes upon Russia's fundamental interests, as well as the interests of other member of the world community. ...All honest Russians cannot but reject Western policy of blatant interference of our internal affairs, of factual national humiliation of Russia.¹⁴⁷

Zhirinovsky insists that Russia should tell the United States to deal with its own problems and not to interfere in Russian affairs, including its actions on the territory of the former Soviet Union.¹⁴⁸ Narochnitskaya writes that Russia's foreign policy should be based on the understanding that all the territory of the former USSR is a sphere of Russian, not

¹⁴⁷Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 95.

¹⁴⁸See Zhirinovsky, op. cit., p. 119-120.

U.S. interests.¹⁴⁹

An important aspect of Russia's opposition to United States policies is the refusal to follow United States leadership in relations with other countries. This is consistent with the anti-westernizers' belief in the profoundly evil character of U.S. international behavior. Zyuganov warns against Russia's involvement in suppressing countries who don't like American domination.¹⁵⁰ Vasiliev et al., describing the imminent conflict between the United States and the Islamic world, argue that Russia should not be involved in it.¹⁵¹ Addressing the same issue, Narohnitskaya writes: "Having ceased to be a balance-keeper between West and East, Russia is already turning into a blind tool in the reviving global "Eastern question." A wise and restrained, neutral position, not a submission to foreign interests, would be appropriate for Russia."¹⁵² Morozov also blames the Russian government for following in the wake of U.S. policy in Southern Eurasia.¹⁵³ Addressing U.S. intentions regarding Russia and the future conflict between the United States and China, he writes: "The U.S.A. draws Russia in a military alliance (so-called 'security system from Vladivostok to Seattle') in order to use it in the same capacity as Russia-USSR was used in the First and Second World Wars, i.e. for

¹⁴⁹See Narohnitskaya, "Osoznat' svoiu missiiu," p. 170.

¹⁵⁰See Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 115.

¹⁵¹See Vasiliev et. al., p. 120.

¹⁵²Narohnitskaya, op. cit., p. 167-168.

¹⁵³See Morozov, "Rossiia i Iug," p. 149.

wearing out U.S. opponents and itself and yielding all the fruits of victory to the Anglo-American Alliance."¹⁵⁴ Morozov concludes:

This time...the U.S. victory in the imminent competition (including the military one) is more than doubtful. An alliance between Russia and the U.S.A. is deadly dangerous for us. Now our interests to a far greater extent correspond with the interests of Germany and China. The strategic solution for Russia is an economic alliance with Germany and political alliance with China. Russia is strategically doomed to anti-Americanism.¹⁵⁵

This excerpt from Morozov's article shows that anti-Westernism is not a simple belief system ranking all Western countries equally. All branches of the anti-Western image clearly single out the United States as the most evil country of the West. In fact, for most anti-Westernizers, the essence of the predatory Western civilization is represented mostly by the United States and its faithful ally, Britain. Other Western countries are considered as both participants and victims of Anglo-American domination. The previous chapter noted that some authors, e.g. Barkashov, Dugin, and Lysenko, consider both Russia and Germany as victims of an Anglo-American plot to dominate the world. Therefore, it is quite logical for many anti-Westernizers to favor playing the "German card" against the United States. In fact, this approach is not entirely new for Russian/Soviet foreign policy: it is well known that even ideologically-based communist foreign policy views included using "contradictions among the capitalist powers" and the

¹⁵⁴Morozov, "Velikaia Aziia..."

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

actual foreign policy of the Soviet Union both before and after World War II followed that idea.

The idea of special relations with Germany in order to limit the influence of the United States is shared by many. Lysenko argued that, from the point of view of his National-Republican Party, the cooperation between Germany and Russia is most promising and that Germany will become aware of the fact that "its real enemy has always been not Russia, but well-known forces in the U.S.A. and England."¹⁵⁶ Kazintsev and Soldatov similarly argue that the real patriots in Russia and Germany should work together against U.S. hegemonistic policies.¹⁵⁷ Addressing the prospects and implication of the alliance, Lysenko wrote:

The Anglo-American world's fear caused by the reunification of Germany is primarily a fear of possible continental bloc between Germany and Russia. Such an alliance would deliver a terrible blow to the global expansion of transnational corporations, to America's world position, and to the ambitions of medium-sized European powers.¹⁵⁸

Volodin (a communist) puts forward a similar idea: Russian-German strategic union would prevent American hegemony, "neutralize" Eastern Europe and settle the conflict in the Balkans.¹⁵⁹ Zhirinovskiy also looks at the prospects of Russian-German

¹⁵⁶"Rossiia i Germaniia: kruglyi stol v redaktsii "Nashego sovremennika" ("Russia and Germany: a round table at "Nash sovremennik"), *Nash sovremennik*, 1993, No. 1, p. 141.

¹⁵⁷See *ibid*, pp. 140-141.

¹⁵⁸Lysenko, "Nasha tsel'...", p. 130.

¹⁵⁹See Volodin, "Porog samozashchity."

cooperation favorably: in his opinion, to have a new Russia (i.e. expanded to the old Russian Empire's borders and beyond) as a neighbor will be beneficial for Germany.¹⁶⁰

It is necessary to note that Zhirinovsky's views on Russia's relations with the West and the United States are somewhat different from most other anti-Westernizers. Zhirinovsky's originality lies in his concept of spheres of influence between Russia and other great powers. Zhirinovsky denounces the American desire to dominate the world. Russia's task, in his opinion, is to prove to the Americans the necessity of and impose on them a division of spheres of influence according to the principle "North-South." He writes:

If we start crossing our paths again, we will disturb each other. We have to strike a deal, and that will be such a global agreement that we divide the whole planet, we divide spheres of influence and act in the North-South direction. The Japanese and Chinese would get South-East Asia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia. For Russia, in the South-Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey. For Western Europe, in the South, the African continent. And, finally, for Canada and the U.S.A., all of Latin America. And all this on equal basis. No advantages for anyone. The same direction--to the South.¹⁶¹

Zhirinovsky is convinced that Russia's "surge to the South" and the last imperial redivision of the globe would be beneficial for the whole of mankind.¹⁶² The United States will not be happy with the Russian expansion, but will not risk preventing it and

¹⁶⁰See Zhirinovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

¹⁶¹*Ibid*, pp. 71-72.

¹⁶²See *ibid.*, p. 72.

will eventually appreciate its results.¹⁶³

As discussed in the previous chapter, it is common for the anti-westernizers to see international organizations as instruments of Western/American control over global economics and politics. It is not surprising therefore that they look very negatively at Russia's participation in enhancing the role of the U.N. and other international organizations. Zyuganov blasts the official Russian military doctrine approved by Yeltsin in November 1993 for its acceptance, among the goals of Russian armed forces, of serving some abstract "efforts of the world community" and "various bodies of collective security." He is especially critical of the doctrine's provision allowing the use of armed forces in peace-keeping operations ordered by the U.N. Security Council. Zyuganov asks rhetorically: "We have to wonder if we still have our own national government, or its functions are already performed by those 'bodies of collective security?'"¹⁶⁴ Sultanov, discussing Russia's attitude toward the United Nations, denounces Yeltsin government's statements approving the growing influence of that organization on world politics. In his opinion, the U.N. is a tool of "mondialist dictatorship," and a patriotic government should not encourage its strengthening. He warns against the use of Russian servicemen in U.N. operations: "Russian U.N. mercenaries defending the interests of the 'Big Seven' around the world would be used as cannon meat in future regional

¹⁶³See *ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁶⁴Zyuganov, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

conflicts aimed at protection of democratic values."¹⁶⁵ Barkashov states that Russia and the Russian people will stand on the way of international organizations which are trying to secure the mastery of the "international force."¹⁶⁶ Analysis of the anti-westernizers' texts shows that they either negatively assess international organizations or simply ignore them.

Profound mistrust of the West has its impact on the anti-Western attitude toward Russia's policy in the area of military security. Russia's security is regarded as incompatible with participation in mutual military structures with the United States and its allies. The anti-Westernizers denounce Russia's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and do so more firmly than those centrists who also criticize Russia's participation in it. Poklad argues that the PFP serves as a cover for NATO's *Drang nach Osten*. He writes:

Russia's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program would become a first but significant step in the direction of a radical change in global geopolitical and strategic situation. Russia is not only a European but also an Asian power. That would allow NATO and, therefore, the U.S.A., to intervene into the Eurasian geostrategic region which plays an exclusively important role in realization of their aspirations.... This will be a partnership not for peace, but for the U.S.A. who aspire to global hegemony.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵Shamil Sultanov, "Goluboi mondialism" ("The Blue mondialism"), *Den'*, 1992, No. 38, p. 2.

¹⁶⁶See Barkashov, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

¹⁶⁷Boris Poklad, "Partniorstvo radi SShA" ("Partnership for the U.S.A."), *Pravda*, 8 April 1994, p. 3.

Vlasov's opinion on the PFP is also extremely negative: "When Partnership for Peace program is signed, nothing will be left of sovereignty of Russia which will become a voiceless subject of the U.S.A. Russia will find itself on a leash. And that leash will be in Uncle Sam's hands."¹⁶⁸

The difference between centrist and anti-Western views of NATO stems from their interpretations of the West's foreign policy motivation. While the centrists ('realists'), who do not see the United States and NATO as inherently anti-Russian, acknowledge NATO's important role in Europe's (and the world's) security and stability, the anti-westernizers see NATO exclusively as a tool in Western/American plan to weaken and split Russia.

The continuing existence of NATO is viewed as a proof of the West's Cold War mentality.¹⁶⁹ The anti-westernizers see NATO strength as a permanent source of Russia's security concerns. They consider NATO as a potential enemy; therefore, they usually insist on the necessity for Russia to be militarily as strong as NATO and conduct all arms reduction measures on the principle of equality. In fact, the anti-Western writings and speeches include an old Cold War approach measuring Russia's security as reversely proportional to NATO strength. Vlasov, criticizing the weakening of the Russian army, asks: "Who will defend Russia? Let's think that nobody is going to

¹⁶⁸Yurii Vlasov, "Takoe partniorstvo--ne dlia Rossii" ("Such partnership is not for Russia"), *Pravda*, 15 April 1994, p. 3.

¹⁶⁹See Poklad, op. cit.; Vlasov, op. cit.; Zyuganov, op. cit., p. 96.

attack us. But then we should ask: why do NATO and the U.S.A. continue increasing their might?...I am curious: whom are our new 'partners for peace' going to fight?"¹⁷⁰ Zhirinovsky insists that Russian and American arms reductions are possible only if they are implemented simultaneously and equally; in his opinion, Russian troops should have been pulled out of Europe only simultaneously with American troops.

Anti-westernizers criticize most arms reduction treaties signed by the Gorbachev and Yeltsin governments as concessions to the West. The strongest criticism is directed against the START-2 treaty which was signed in January 1993. In Vlasov's opinion, START-2 "means a total nuclear-missile capitulation of Russia."¹⁷¹ Katasonov's opinion is the same.¹⁷² Varennikov calls implementation of that treaty a nuclear disarmament.¹⁷³ Khatsankov writes that in case of the treaty's implementation the existing balance of nuclear arms will be shifted in America's favor.¹⁷⁴ Morozov argues that START-2 together with the Strategic Defence Initiative will allow the Americans to defeat Russia militarily.¹⁷⁵ Agreements of lesser significance, when noticed by the anti-Westernizers, are usually criticized as well. For example, Narochnitskaya and

¹⁷⁰Vlasov, op. cit., pp. 1,3.

¹⁷¹Vlasov, op. cit.

¹⁷²See Katasonov, op. cit.

¹⁷³Varennikov, op. cit.

¹⁷⁴See Khatsankov, op. cit.; also Poklad, op. cit.

¹⁷⁵See Morozov, op. cit.

Sultanov characterized the 1993 Russian-U.S. agreement on transportation, storage and destruction of weapons (regulating U.S. aid to Russia in these matters) as national humiliation.¹⁷⁶ Addressing all the treaties with the West, Barkashov, in a program of the movement "Russian National Unity" written by him, states: "All unequal international treaties concluded by anti-Russian rulers of Russia and damaging Russia's interests, will be considered invalid."¹⁷⁷ It is important to note once again that the anti-westernizers usually attack only the arms control and reduction treaties concluded during *perestroika* and after. Narochnitskaya, for example, insists that one of the reasons Russia should be recognized responsible for order and security of the post-Soviet area is that all treaties signed by the Soviet government cover the territory of the USSR, not only Russia. She also denounces START-2, but adds to her criticism an assertion that START-2 undermines earlier agreements, first of all the ABM treaty.¹⁷⁸

Despite variation in anti-Western views, common features are present in the approach to Russia's policy toward the West. These features include:

- determination to exclude Western influence from Russia's domestic politics and

¹⁷⁶See Natalya Narochnitskaya, "Dikost' na prezidentskom urovne" ("Wilderness on a presidential level"), *Molodaia gvardiia*, 1993, No. 3, pp. 202-203; Sultanov, "Vashi ukazaniia....," p. 2.

¹⁷⁷Barkashov, op. cit., p. 100.

¹⁷⁸See Narochnitskaya, "Osoznat' svoiu missiiu," p. 170; idem, "Russia Belongs to....," pp. 127-128.

relations within the former USSR (the latter being considered as an extension of the former);

- refusal to contribute to the growth of Western, above all, U.S. influence in the world by participating in U.S. (West) initiated foreign policy initiatives;

- singling out the United States as the major opponent of Russia, and an intention to encourage other Western countries, primarily Germany, to loosen their political dependence on the U.S.A.;

- opposition to increasing Russia's participation in international organizations common with the Western countries, such as the United Nations, and opposition to the enhancement of these organizations' international role;

- opposition to Russia's cooperation with NATO, including the Partnership for Peace program;

- symmetrical approach to arms reduction agreements, i.e. insistence on the necessity of equality in NATO's and Russia's strength;

- criticism of arms reduction treaties signed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin administrations, primarily the START-2 treaty.

CONCLUSION

The three belief systems analyzed in the dissertation include numerous "subsystems" and versions. However, each of them has a distinctive set of common core beliefs which are linked with each other in a coherent manner. Each of the three belief systems suggests its own image of Russia and of the world, as well as a set of policy preferences. The table below summarizes major components of the three belief systems.

Table 1 Post-Soviet Russian Elite Belief Systems

	Pro-Western	Centrist (Realist)	Anti-Western
IMAGES:			
Soviet Union	Totalitarian empire, hostile to democratic nations, responsible for the Cold War confrontation.	"Normal player"	Harmonious multi-ethnic empire. Stronghold of resistance to Western domination

Table 1 (continued)

	Pro-Western	Centrist (Realist)	Anti-Western
Post-Cold War international system	Liberated from the evil presence of the USSR, moving toward a new democratic world order, characterized by increased cooperation between states	Unstable because of the collapse of the bipolar system. A multipolar system emerged with increased probability of conflicts	A unipolar world, dominated by the United States. "Transnational forces" on the offensive against states' sovereignty, using international organizations.
The West	"Family of civilized nations"; cooperative among each other; benevolent to democratic Russia	A group of countries pursuing their self-interests; includes several competing centers of power; neither benevolent nor malevolent to Russia	Exploits the rest of the world; inherently hostile to Russia, willing to destroy and enslave it.
Post-Soviet Russia	Benefitted from the end of the Cold War. Can be a great power if joins the "family of civilized nations" and gives up the anti-Western orientation of the past	Suffered geopolitical losses as a result of the end of the Cold War. Can be a great power if retains its traditional role of an "organizer" of continental Eurasia and pursues and independent foreign policy.	Humiliated and defeated in the Cold War as a result of a conspiracy by foreign and domestic enemies Can be a great power if returns to the role of a stronghold against Western domination and restores control over the former empire.

Table 1 (continued)

	Pro-Western	Centrist (Realist)	Anti-Western
<p>POLICY PREFERENCES:</p> <p>Policy Toward the Newly Independent States</p>	<p>Reject a hegemonic role in the post-Soviet area; cautiously participate in the CIS integration, without assuming a role of a leader; accept a variable-speed approach to integration. Promote democracy and human rights.</p>	<p>Facilitate integration of the post-Soviet area; be a leader of the integration process, but respect sovereignty of others. Pursue "post-imperial policy": protect stability in the post-Soviet area, without trying to be a leader in democratization; prevent other powers from establishing spheres of influence in former USSR.</p>	<p>Recreate a unified state on the territory of the former USSR. Not recognize sovereignty of the former Soviet republics.</p>
<p>Policy Toward the West</p>	<p>Joining the community of Western nations (and its major institutions) is the major foreign policy priority. Partnership and alliance with the West, above all with the United States, on the basis of common values. Partnership with NATO: participation in the Partnership for Peace Program; support to the growth of the role of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.</p>	<p>Limited-scope partnership based of common interests, full equality, and recognition of Russia's special role in the post-Soviet area. Encourage a stabilizing global role of the United States, but resist U.S. attempts to establish world domination. Contain growth of NATO influence in Europe; promote the role of the OSCE rather than the NACC.</p>	<p>Resist Western, above all, American, influence in the post-Soviet area and in the world. Encourage tensions between the United States (the archenemy of Russia) and other Western states. No cooperation with NATO.</p>

In all three belief systems, a strong correspondence exists between images and policy preferences. Policy priorities regarding the newly independent states are determined by the image of Russia as an international actor: the pro-Western view of Russia's future in the community of democratic industrialized nations makes integration of the post-Soviet space less important compared to the centrist view which links Russia's great power status with its ability to "organize" continental Eurasia. The anti-Western view of Russia as an object of Western destructive efforts makes a desire to reunite the former empire even more urgent. Priorities in policy toward the West are directly dependent on the image of the world in general and the West in particular. While the anti-Western conviction in an inherent anti-Russian bias of the West makes resistance to Western domination a first priority, the pro-Western image of a cooperative and benevolent Western community implies a need for Russia's fastest integration into Western structures. The centrists suggest a balanced approach of a cautious cooperation based on the image of a selfish and disunited West.

Despite the general correlation between images and policy preferences demonstrated in this study, it would be incorrect to conclude that such correlation is present in all cases. As the example of the consensus on the opposition to the NATO expansion shows, there might be exceptions to the rule: in some cases very different images and very different reasoning may lead to the same policy preferences. Perhaps

this is another illustration of the fact that regularities discovered by social sciences can hardly be considered "iron laws of history" and can be characterized at best as probabilistic laws.

The goals of the dissertation did not include a thorough analysis of the *dynamics* of the belief systems and of their relative *influence* on Russian foreign policy. The deliberately established goal was to define and elaborate the spectrum of Russian elite beliefs. As noted in the introduction, group belief systems have considerable momentum, and their national spectrum remains stable over long periods of time. As early as in the Gorbachev period, the belief systems analyzed in this study were already visible in Soviet debates on foreign policy. Dramatic changes happened not to the spectrum, but to the prominence and popularity of particular belief systems.

Today, after the failure of the liberal westernizers to implement economic reforms without impoverishing the Russian people and to achieve desired respect to Russia at the international arena, the pro-Western views have relatively low appeal among Russian politicians and public. President Yeltsin, who sounded like a devoted westernizer in 1991-93, adopted a centrist position later. It is quite obvious that the pro-Western belief system has lost its early influence on Russian policy-makers, but it would be premature to declare it extinct and exclude from the spectrum, because the fortunes of particular schools of thought depend on many factors, both domestic and international. This can be illustrated by the changes in popularity of communist views.

In late 1991-early 1992 many commentators spoke about a death of communist ideology in Russia. The communists seemed defeated and demoralized, and the public seemed disappointed in communism forever. After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, it became clear that rumors about the death of communism had been somewhat exaggerated. Today, with the Communist party dominating the State Duma (after December 1995 elections) and its leader Gennady Zyuganov leading the polls before the June 1996 presidential elections, the communist views are influential again. As the communists' role in Russian politics grows, driven by popular discontent with poor living conditions, their views on Russian foreign policy are getting more popularity. If Zyuganov becomes a president, the foreign-policy making bodies of the executive branch, currently dominated by the centrists, will definitely include more individuals with anti-Western views. But even in this case the prominence of the communist variety of the anti-Western belief system will still depend on how successful the communists are in solving Russia's domestic problems.

Therefore, for the purposes of a belief system spectrum analysis, ignoring short-term trends in a belief systems' popularity and influence is justified. Each of the belief systems analyzed in this study may lose or gain popularity. A study of the driving forces behind the changing influence of different belief systems on Russian policymakers requires a different focus and a different conceptual framework, and it may be part of my future research plans.

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